China emerges the ‘winner’ from Modi, Xi’s cautious reengagement, but India won’t be displeased

As prime minister Narendra Modi met Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, on the sidelines of the SCO leaders’ summit in the port city of Tianjin Sunday, the Western world broke into a sweat. The general consensus seemed to be that Trump has alienated India to such an extent that Modi is joining the ‘axis of autocrats’, seeking refuge in the arms of Putin and Xi and hedging against American unpredictability.

That’s the exact flipping of the Trumpian argument. That India is a geopolitical swing state that responds only to coercive diplomacy. Neither Trump nor his critics take into account India’s agency, the possibility that India is a strategically autonomous state that shuns power blocs, refuses to be drawn into treaty alliances and aligns solely on shared interests.

The Chinese understand it better. As a Global Times editorial writes, “What makes some American media outlets uneasy about the prospect of ‘the dragon and the elephant dancing together’ is essentially a residue of Cold War mentality. When Washington criticizes India for buying Russian oil, the implication is that it wants India to ‘pick a side’…”

This was Modi’s first China visit in seven years, and the fact that it coincided with a fraught time in India-US relations has fed into speculation that Modi wants to show Washington DC he has ‘options’ and is pivoting sharply to tackle the challenges posed by Trump’s trade war and secondary sanctions. That is wrong lens.

Modi’s visit to China is the culmination of a rapprochement process that began in October last year during the BRICS Summit in Kazan, and while there is certainly a recalibration of India’s diplomatic stance owing to Trump’s boorish behaviour and coercive diplomacy, India and China’s reconciliation is driven by its own dynamic, pulls and imperatives. I am not sure that it can be called a “reset”. Maybe a cautious reengagement. The readouts released by both sides are signified by soaring rhetoric and focus on optics and little by way of concrete progress if we, for example, compare the outcomes from Tianjin to the just released India-Japan joint statement and the declaration on security cooperation.

A reading of the statements issued by New Delhi and Beijing indicates a thematic mistrust lying in the background. Modi’s opening remarks lay down the gauntlet that improvement in the border situation has sparked improvement in ties. This is a reiteration of India’s core position that in order for both sides to generate mutual trust, an atmosphere of peace, tranquility and stability in the border is a prerequisite.

A variation of this statement finds expression in India’s three separate statements. One, when Modi delivers the opening remarks during the bilateral meeting: “I sincerely thank you for the warm welcome. Last year, we had a very meaningful discussion in Kazan, which gave a positive direction to our relations. An atmosphere of peace and stability has been established after disengagement at the border.”

Second, when the MEA released a readout of the closed-door meeting . “Prime Minister underlined the importance of peace and tranquility on the border areas for continued development of bilateral relations. The two leaders noted with satisfaction the successful disengagement last year and the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the border areas since then.”

And third, when the prime minister took to the social media platforms. “Had a fruitful meeting with President Xi Jinping in Tianjin on the sidelines of the SCO Summit. We reviewed the positive momentum in India-China relations since our last meeting in Kazan. We agreed on the importance of maintaining peace and tranquility in border areas and reaffirmed our commitment to cooperation based on mutual respect, mutual interest and mutual sensitivity.”

In contrast, the Chinese statement (in Mandarin) makes it clear that while “We must work together to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas”, we should not “let the border issue define the overall China-India relationship.” That’s a reinforcement of irreconcilable positions, and an indication that on core areas of self-interests there is no alignment.

A variation of such a structural difference can also be found in the statements where New Delhi calls for a “multipolar world and a multipolar Asia befitting the trends of the 21st century.” The Chinese side, however, talks about “jointly promoting a multipolar world and democratization in international relations, making due contributions to maintaining peace and prosperity in Asia and beyond.”

This is a clear assertion of Chinese hegemony and an unwillingness to leave an inch of space for India in Asia. As the Chinese say, ‘one mountain cannot contain two tigers’. Xi may talk about China and India being “good neighbors” and “partners helping each other succeed”, invoke “cooperative pas de deux of the dragon and the elephant” as many times as he wants, it matters very little when China refuses to even accept India’s rise and seeks to perpetuate the prevailing asymmetry in ties.

Among the other interesting takeaways, both sides stressed on the framework of “development partners and not rivals, and that their differences should not turn into disputes”, as MEA stated. The Chinese side stressed that “As long as they remain committed to the overarching principle of being partners, not rivals, and providing development opportunities, not threats, for each other, China-India relations will flourish and move forward steadily.”

To a question during the foreign secretary’s press briefing on how both parties can see each other as “partners and not rivals” when troops are still deployed at the India-China border, Vikram Misri offered a lengthy reply.

I quote from the transcript of the briefing where the foreign secretary said, “the formulation of the two countries being partners, not rivals… Both leaders have done this framing of the relationship. This is what is desired. And this is what they see as the future of the relationship as well.” He called troops at the border “a reality” which is “moving towards normalization”, arising from a “crisis that we have dealt with, or attempted to deal with over the course of the last five, five and a half years… That doesn’t change the fact that the two leaders, and not just these two leaders, but previous leaders as well … what they have framed for the medium to long term future of the relationship… That, the future that we should aspire to, the future that we should aim at, the one that we should work towards, is one of partnership and not one of rivalry.”

It points to a certain iffiness in India’s approach, the taking of a gingerly step forward. I found it significant that the Indian statement contained a certain reference to the border that was completely missing from the Chinese document. It ties with the apparent contradiction in India’s approach.

While India states upfront that “peace and tranquility on the border areas” is essential for “continued development of bilateral relations”, it goes on to add, “The two leaders noted with satisfaction the successful disengagement last year and the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the border areas since then. They expressed commitment to a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable resolution of the boundary question proceeding from the political perspective of their overall bilateral relations and the long-term interests of the two peoples.” [ Italicized by the author]

It indicates a tacit acknowledgement from Indian side that the border issue cannot be fully resolved unless there is political consensus from both sides. The fact that such a formulation was missing from Indian statement post Kazan, may be interpreted as India subtly conceding strategic space to China. It indicates an admission from New Delhi that it cannot let the border issue be the sole determinant of ties especially at a time when the natural progression in ties is moving towards a tactical thaw. Rather, India is signalling that it is ready to engage and let the trajectory drive the resolution of border issue. See Misri’s reply above to the question on troops.

The Chinese statement is conspicuously silent on this issue, except quoting the Indian side to state: “India is willing to work with China to seek a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable solution to the border issue.”

This takeaway is reinforced if we look at the issue of trade where China enjoys an ever-expanding surplus that has now run into $100 billion and is becoming increasingly unsustainable.

The Indian formulation states: “On economic and trade relations, they recognized the role of their two economies to stabilize world trade. They underlined the need to proceed from a political and strategic direction to expand bilateral trade and investment ties and reduce trade deficit.”

I will add Misri’s comments from the press briefing, where to a question on this issue, he added: “it is important also to look at the issue of trade and trade deficit from the broad strategic direction and engagement between the two countries…”

Taking together, it seems political stability and strategic trajectory have emerged as the key elements of bilateral ties. It is a strategic conception close to Beijing’ heart. Whether it’s trade or the boundary issue, progress will depend on the state of overall relationship. It is a reverse linking of issues from India’s POV and a definite ‘win’ for China. It could point to the fact that New Delhi, under pressure from an unpredictable Washington DC, has less space for maneuvering against China.

I shall point to two more takeaways. One, there is no reference to terrorism in the Chinese statement, an issue that finds mention in the Indian document. The foreign secretary, however, mentioned that “the issue was discussed. It was raised by the Prime Minister, and he outlined his understanding very, very crisply and very specifically on this issue.” Misri added that Modi “asked for China’s support… And, as I said, the Chinese have extended their support in various ways on addressing this issue.”

The SCO joint statement would be interesting to note.

And finally, India’s readout mentioned the prime minister’s meeting with Cai Qi, a powerful member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC and someone trusted by Xi. Modi “shared with Mr. Cai his vision for bilateral relations and sought his support to realize the vision of the two leaders. Mr. Cai reiterated the Chinese side’s desire to expand bilateral exchanges and further improve relations in line with the consensus reached between the two leaders.”

The foreign secretary revealed that the Chinese side proposed to hold a banquet for Modi hosted by Cai, who holds “several important positions” in the CPC, “as a special gesture to show the importance attached by China to the visit of the Prime Minister, which was taking place after a hiatus of nearly seven years. However, as there was a scheduling conflict, it was decided to have a brief meeting between Prime Minister and Mr. Cai.”

Indian side’s reluctance to attend the banquet indicates that New Delhi is wary of overdoing the ‘being in the Chinese camp’ bit, especially when Beijing is not ready to meet India halfway to address New Delhi’s core concerns.

That said, the Modi-Xi meeting was not without positive outcomes. The revival of economic and people to people links, with indications that India “warming to Chinese investment in manufacturing, renewables and auto parts”, enhanced multilateral coordination, Chinese support for India’s autonomous foreign policy and the framing of ‘partners, not rivals’ amid intense geopolitical flux is substance enough. It points to a strategic reality that should put Washington DC on notice.

The writer is Deputy Executive Editor, Firstpost. He tweets as @sreemoytalukdar. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.