Russia recognised Taliban, but India must tread cautiously

In a significant turn of events, on July 3, Russia became the first nation to officially recognise the Taliban-ruled “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, a political entity not recognised by any other state in the world. Ever since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, it took 4 years for the Kremlin to extend de jure recognition to the Taliban.

However, Russia has been engaged with the Taliban at the highest level since 2021 and has treated Taliban authorities as de facto rulers. The Russian embassy was kept open and had been fully functional throughout. Besides Russia, other states also have a pragmatic or de facto relationship with Afghanistan, such as the UAE, Azerbaijan, Turkey, China, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, for their respective diplomatic reasons and have allowed the Taliban to man their embassies in their respective countries. Still, they have stopped short of formally recognising it as a ‘state’.

It can be anybody’s guess that it is just a matter of time before recognition of the group as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan happens. China welcomed the Kremlin’s move, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said, “Beijing supports the international community in strengthening engagement and dialogue with the Afghan interim government.” Despite diplomatic overtures by other regional players, the Chinese still withhold formal recognition of Afghanistan.

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Prima facie, Russia’s engagement and sustained cooperation with the Taliban in Afghanistan is primarily to keep a check on the Taliban’s rival terrorist groups, mainly the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP), and seeking the Taliban’s guarantee that Afghanistan will not be used as a launchpad against Russia and its allies necessitates the Kremlin’s recognition of the regime. ISKP’s terrorist attacks in Moscow in 2024, which left 133 people dead, created a common enemy, forcing the Kremlin to explore pragmatic cooperation with the Taliban it loathed.

As ISKP consists mainly of defected Talibani commanders and soldiers, a sworn enemy and ideologically hostile to the Taliban, it has openly declared it an apostate regime. The militant group is known to commit terror acts not just in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan, Iran, and even Central Asia, which is a de facto strategic and security realm of Russia.

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However, the urgency shown in the formal declaration by Russia warrants scrutiny, as it carries signals for other regional players, including India. Some scholars believe this is a Russian gift for the Taliban in recognition of its cooperation on counter-terrorism and its sensitivity towards Moscow’s security and strategic concerns.

Geography Shape Choices

Afghanistan sits at the crossroads of three geopolitical hotspots in Asia: West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia. A region with the latent potential to cause instability across its periphery. For Russia, imperatives of stability and security in Central Asia and the North Caucasus compel it to reassess the strategic utility of Afghanistan, regardless of the regime’s nature. Russia cannot afford to alienate a state that holds the geographic keys to its regional strategy and, most importantly, security in its backyard—even if that state is unstable, isolated, or untouchable among a comity of nations. Russia’s dalliance with the Taliban underscores the enduring truth of the geopolitics that geography dictates state moves and motives. Russia already uses Afghanistan as a transit route for energy exports heading to Southeast Asia.

In geopolitics, the moral or normative considerations associated with the regime type often succumb to geographic and economic necessity. Unlike the West, for Russia, interests take precedence over values. In the case of Afghanistan, geography doesn’t guarantee affluence, but it certainly guarantees relevance. Historically, its significance has not been restricted to only regional powers; even global powers in the past have attempted to exercise levers in the country.

US Withdrawal

The hasty withdrawal of the US from Kabul in February 2021 resulted in a power vacuum. As with any vacuum, it has attracted a range of regional forces—some overlapping, others disjoint—each seeking to assert influence driven by their respective national interests. As preceding sections of the article underline, the security of its southern realm drives the Russian active engagement with the Taliban. Similarly, despite initial inhibition, other countries in the region, such as India, Iran, and China, made diplomatic overtures to Kabul through informal channels.

A Game of Optics

Beyond the structural factors motivating Moscow’s engagement with the Taliban, the Kremlin seems to convey a broader message regarding the shift towards multipolarity in the world, where regime legitimacy is no longer rooted in liberal democratic norms. This initiative can be interpreted as part of a larger resistance against the Western approach of normative universalism. It is an opportune time, as under Trump’s leadership, marked by his transactional foreign policy approach, the American liberal agenda has been relegated to the back burner.

Simmering Tension in West Asia

A more far-fetched explanation for this move could be that it is a proactive step on the part of Russia amidst the unravelling of the West Asian regional order. Russia has already lost a regional ally in Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In the recent conflict between Iran and Israel, Russia could not help Iran as much as was expected. For Israel, Iran’s nuclear question has not been settled and can be a flashpoint between Iran and Israel/the US, for which Russia, in the present geopolitical context, can do little for its ally, Iran.

A regime change in Iran can further upend the regional order in the West’s favour. A favourable balance of power in broader West Asia is vital for Moscow’s security and economic interests. The US’s design of regime change in Iran, which involves Russia and China and undermines Russian influence over Central Asia, necessitates an astute reading of the evolving situation. It demands proactive engagement with countries like India, Uzbekistan, and other neighbouring powers. In essence, many factors could undergird the Russian strategic gambit in Afghanistan.

How should India react?

India should approach Russia’s recognition of the Taliban with careful pragmatism, rather than simply mirroring Moscow’s actions. A more effective strategy involves increasing engagement through diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian channels while avoiding formal acknowledgement. This approach allows India to protect its interests in Afghanistan, counterbalance competing influences, and maintain the flexibility needed for future policy adaptations as circumstances evolve. The most suitable course of action is to deepen involvement through various channels while stopping short of formal recognition. This strategy enables India to safeguard its interests, counter rival influences, and stay adaptable to future policy shifts based on changing conditions.

It is important for India to see Russia’s recognition not as a direct template to follow but as part of a wider regional change that presents both opportunities and challenges for its policy in Afghanistan. By practicing strategic patience in its engagement, India can achieve its goals in Afghanistan while preserving its principled stances and maintaining relationships with other partners. India’s response should be carefully calibrated to maximise strategic advantages while minimising diplomatic repercussions, ensuring that any engagement aligns with its long-term objectives in regional stability, counter-terrorism, and economic ties to Central Asia.

Given the fragile security landscape and many competing forces vying for influence in Kabul, placing exclusive bets on the Taliban, which has yet to prove its authority across the length and breadth of the country, would be strategically unwise. In the current scenario, a people-centric engagement policy that keeps informal diplomatic channels open and working is the most prudent framework.

Amitabh Singh teaches at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Ankur is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.