Rumble in South China Sea: Bellicose China versus law-abiding others

After months of blowing hot against the Philippines’ maritime forces over the South Thomas Shoal, communist China has on July 2 “agreed” to the need to “restore trust” and “rebuild confidence” to better manage maritime disputes.

But is this a sincere offer of peace from Beijing, and should Manila trust the Communist Party of China or verify its words with its actions? Tracing the history and recent developments of territorial and maritime disputes may help Manila draw the necessary lessons.

The first two decades of the 21st century saw relative peace if one looked at the world at large. While there was the now infamous global war on terror, the Arab Spring, and other disruptions, they were primarily confined to specific geographic pockets.

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The events had little bearing on areas beyond the vicinity of such events. The third decade of this century couldn’t have been more disruptive worldwide. Covid-19 dramatically altered the mechanics.

Livelihoods were destroyed, and nations were forced to rethink their futures. The over two years of the Russia-Ukraine war, illegal immigration taking an unprepared Europe by storm, the Hamas perpetrated conflict in the Levant, and lastly, the unpredictable and uncontrolled Houthis misadventures have had the world divided.

A resurgence of Somali pirates has only amplified the disruption of the maritime supply chain, triggering a price rise that could affect many poorer nations sooner rather than later.

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China’s flagrant violations of international rules, judgements from international tribunals, and belligerent behaviour in the South China Sea (SCS) add to the predicament.

The developed world is primarily distracted by events in Europe and the Arab region. Any change of status quo in SCS could perhaps lead to dark days and severely cripple the global economy.

The SCS is a critical geographic area for the global economy. It is on the western extremes of the Pacific Ocean, en route to the Indian Ocean, and has a history dating back to the second century BC.

During explorations and conquests, Portuguese sailors referred to the waterbody as Mare da China or China Sea in the 16th century. Europeans, in general, and the International Hydrographic Office adopted the name South China Sea to distinguish it from other nearby water bodies.

Territorial disagreements in the SCS have lasted for a few centuries now. However, these disagreements did not develop into significant, long-lasting global conflicts.

On the other hand, China’s excessive maritime claims in the SCS have been a consistent source of tension for almost four decades. Over the past six months, the rising pugnacious behaviour has been challenging to miss. It has the potential to destabilize the region and trigger a conflict that may pale the events in Europe and the Levant.

The Communist Party of China is facing unprecedented challenges. China advertises much glitter and glamour regarding the scale of its industrial development. With its Belt and Road Initiative, China gives the impression of a wholly developed world. The truth, though, is that much of its population has yet to transition from poverty.

A declining demographic number uncomfortably complements the situation. In stark contrast to Japan, which got rich before it started getting old, the case in China is vice versa.

The population is anticipated to shrink by as much as 100 million by 2050. A slowing housing segment that is the major contributor to its local manufacturing, an exodus of foreign manufacturers, and a cropping-up of alternative manufacturing options in Asia, in general, have all contributed to China’s distinct, undeniable economic downturn.

FDI in China has touched a three-decade low. The stock market in China has lost roughly $7 trillion since 2021. A fall in consumer prices in 15 years could cause a potential deflationary crunch.

President Xi Jinping is at the helm of affairs when China faces a once-in-a-generation crisis. China’s ‘Great Leader’ of the 21st century has not gone unscathed. So shaken was the CCP that for the first time in three decades, during the most prominent annual event, ‘Two Sessions,’ the closing press conference by the Chinese Premier was also scrapped.

Unsurprisingly, disgruntlement with Xi’s policy is rising, more from within the CCP than from the populace. Xi’s pretext of an anti-corruption drive to make ‘corrupt officials’ disappear is perhaps the only tool to hold the growing voices against him from within at bay.

Perhaps the obvious and only way out for CCP and Xi Jinping to survive and progress his ‘Chairman for Life’ agenda is to focus more on security than prosperity.

Increased violations of Japan and Taiwan’s ADIZs, repeated references to Taiwan’s reunification, and swelling maritime forays in the Western Pacific are only indicators. Yet, its most significant play in 2024 has been the SCS, especially in the Philippines.

Chinese actors, accredited to the state officially or not, have repeatedly blocked, hampered, harassed, and sometimes even attacked Indonesian, Filipino, and Vietnamese fishermen within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) to reinforce exaggerated Chinese claims.

Five to six years ago, such claims were predominantly made by unmarked maritime militia belonging to China. Increasingly, the Chinese Coast Guard is perpetrating such acts.

China has repeatedly treated all of SCS, in the worst case, as good as its territorial seas and, in the best case, as its EEZ. The old Chinese proverb ‘Kill the chicken to scare the monkey’ seems Beijing’s go-to option for exercising grey zone operations.

In an escalatory behaviour, Beijing uncovered its fangs through a law that empowers its Coastguard to detain trespassers without trial. The definition of trespassers and territory is not based on international regulations but on Beijing’s interpretation.

The regulation enables the detention of foreigners for up to 60 days, even if they are suspected of illegally crossing China’s borders.

Visuals of the Chinese Coast Guard ramming and obstructing the Philippines Coast Guard, other government-contracted vessels, and innocent fishermen are now familiar images on news channels across the world that have consequently outraged not just the countries abutting the SCS but well beyond.

However, the limits of tolerance to such evil behaviour are being breached. A few years ago, it was Indonesia setting fire to Chinese fishing vessels seized off the Natuna islands. Vietnam, generally a reticent country on China’s actions in SCS, has been increasingly vocal against its actions.

Despite efforts to interfere with elections in Taiwan, China couldn’t stop the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party from holding onto the mandate. Even an otherwise ‘neutral-image-conscious’ Singapore, through its Defence Minister, called out China’s aggression and appealed for peace. The biggest, though, has been a resurgent Philippines that has refused to follow the de-escalation path any further.

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague delivered a decision after four long years of deliberations. During this period, China fought a long, brutal campaign, believing in a positive outcome.

The court’s decision was overwhelmingly in favour of the Philippines and a crushing blow to China’s illegal claims. With the then court’s favourable verdict, the Philippines was expected to maximise its advantage, especially with a newly sworn-in President, Rodrigo Duterte.

Instead, the Philippines all but squandered the opportunity. A combination of a change of guard at Manila and a series of hyper-bellicose salami-slicing actions by China reminded the Filipinos to reclaim what was legally theirs.

It’s little wonder the Philippines’ foreign policy has shifted dramatically, giving way to a more robust diplomatic and military pushback. Under the present President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., though, the most significant change compared to previous years has been Manila’s willingness to back talk with action.

In apparent solidarity with Manila, prominent foreign leaders have been explicit in their statements and national policy. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida promised enhanced cooperation with the Philippines to maintain peace and stability in the region.

During his visit to Manila in March this year, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr S Jaishankar, emphasised the adherence to a rules-based order, including UNCLOS 1982, both in letter and in spirit. He reiterated India’s support for the Philippines in upholding its national sovereignty.

US President Joe Biden reiterated Washington’s commitment to defend the Philippines from any attack in the South China Sea, calling its support for Manila “ironclad.”

Not content with relying on its March 1947 mutual assistance treaty with the US, the Philippines has aggressively pursued military engagements. By 2028, the Philippine Navy is expected to operate at least 12 vessels from South Korea, including missile-armed frigates, corvettes, and OPVs.

Manila and Tokyo have already discussed holding exercises in each other’s territory to enhance their alliance. Tokyo has also expressed a desire to jointly cooperate with Seoul and Manila to build resilience into mutual military cooperation capabilities against errant powers in the region.

A bipartisan bill introduced in April this year in the US Senate proposed $2.5 billion (spread over five years) in aid to enhance the Philippines’ military capabilities. The US has also positioned the Typhoon medium-range ballistic missiles in Northern Luzon, which have a 1,600 km range and can hit the Chinese mainland.

Washington, Manila, Tokyo, and Canberra are developing a joint regional air and missile defence network. However, one of the most extensive military hardware enhancements came from India at the end of April when the first batch of supersonic BrahMos anti-ship missiles landed in the Philippines. These could severely test the Chinese Communist Party’s naval force in SCS in case of conflict.

Today, accounting for more than 60 per cent of global maritime trade, approximately 23 per cent of total international trade, and a third of global shipping, the importance of SCS in global macroeconomics cannot be overstated.

China is the most dependent nation on this water body, as approximately 65 per cent of its total trade passes through it. Japan is second, with about 43 per cent of total trade passing through the SCS.

The countries abutting the eastern Indian Ocean Region and SCS alone contribute to over 50 per cent of the world’s population. The state of affairs and peace in general in the SCS, therefore, not only affects the economic giants of Asia and the maritime nations abutting it but would invariably have second and third-order effects throughout the world.

Recent Chinese belligerence through grey-zone actions and its coast guard has only enraged those who have adhered to the rule of law and are concerned about the consequences of an unstable SCS.

The backlash is, therefore, hardly surprising. The confluence of law-abiding nations to preserve peace and stability in SCS is moving from the ‘talks and negotiations in board rooms’ approach to ‘arming the smaller powers’ in SCS. No wonder Manila told China it would be “relentless” in protecting its interests in the South China Sea during their July 2 talks, considering Beijing’s previous breach of trust.

NC Bipindra is chairman of Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-based think tank. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.