Risks in the nuclear order in the wake of Ukraine war

For a country to emerge as a pole, possession of nuclear weapons is not a prerequisite. Even the permanent membership of the UN Security Council in 1945 was not predicated on possession of nuclear weapons. In 1945, when the UN was established, only the US possessed nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union in 1949, followed by the UK in 1952 and France in 1960, used their P5 membership to acquire and legitimise their nuclear weapons.

Today, power and influence do not flow from nuclear weapons. Economic power and the capacity to offer ethical alternatives for peace and progress are far more important. For example, the DPRK may have nuclear weapons. But it can never hope to be a pole in an emerging multipolar global order.

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During the Cold War era, the two superpowers engaged in an arms race, yet acknowledged the need for restraint on account of “mutually assured destruction”. Today, no single power has the capacity to dominate others on all issues at all times in all geographies. In a flatter world, even weaker states and non-state actors have acquired the capacity to bridge absolute gaps in military and economic power, often through asymmetrical means.

Some non-state actors, over time, have acquired temporal, spatial and military power and transformed themselves into quasi states, like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. In the case of the Taliban, it is now a state actor.

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Nearly eight decades after the use of atomic weapons, nuclear deterrence is increasingly seen as indispensable by those that possess nuclear weapons. Ironically, those that gave up the nuclear option, like Ukraine did in 1994 under the Budapest Memorandum, appear to regret their decision.

Notably, nuclear deterrence has failed to prevent wars. In fact, the nuclear overhang and second strike capabilities have created a new paradigm in which states readily engage in conventional conflict and proxy wars. Wars of attrition as the one witnessed in Ukraine, however, are dangerous. They harbour the potential to subscribe to existential threats, real or perceived. These, in turn, could elevate the chances of resorting to nuclear weapons.

In recent decades, international arms control and disarmament mechanisms have seen deep erosion. The Open Skies Treaty (OST) which provides for state parties to conduct short-notice, unarmed, reconnaissance flights over the entire territory of other member states to collect data on military forces and activities, is a casualty of the Ukraine war. The US withdrew from the Treaty in November 2020 followed by Russia in December 2021. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, long considered a bedrock of global nuclear strategic stability, ran aground with the withdrawal by the US in 2019.

There has been little progress on disarmament initiatives between the two biggest nuclear-weapon states, the US and Russia. The START-1 Treaty lasted from 1991 to 2004 and the START-2 Treaty lasted from 1993 to 2002. The New START Treaty, signed in 2010, is expiring in 2026. There is no hope of an extension. In fact, Russia walked out of the Treaty in February 2023 on grounds that it was not ready to permit the US and NATO to inspect its nuclear facilities. The NPT Review Conference in 2022 achieved nothing. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), pushed through a UN General Assembly Resolution in 2017, did not acquire traction due to flawed content and procedure. The P-5 nuclear-weapon states opposed the Treaty, favouring the NPT instead. India did not participate in the negotiations. Many countries, like India, maintain that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the only legitimate negotiating forum for disarmament.
Significantly, the five nuclear-weapon states have failed to act in good faith, under Article 6 of the NPT, to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

The CTBT has unilaterally listed 44 countries in its Annexe 2, including countries which are not party to the treaty. This, and the fact that even signatories to the treaty have balked at ratification, have limited its relevance. The negotiations on a possible Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) can succeed only if they are based on the Shannon mandate, which emphasises the goal of a universal, non-discriminatory, and verifiable treaty.

Ironically, at the beginning of 2022, the P-5 countries had issued a joint statement giving assurances that nuclear weapons, for as long as they continue to exist, should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent war. Soon thereafter, Russia put its nuclear forces on alert. Now, there is renewed focus on the role of tactical nuclear weapons. There is also renewed focus on an arms race in space. These can lead to new threat perceptions and misunderstandings in an era of network centric warfare, given the lack of consensus among the P-5 nuclear weapon states.

A key concern today is proliferation and the threat of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists and non-state actors, as seen in the reports of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee. India traditionally co-sponsors a resolution in the First Committee aimed at preventing this.
An even more worrying prospect should be the impact of hypersonic nuclear delivery systems on nuclear deterrence, missile defences and second strike capabilities. Scramjet hypersonic missiles pose a new threat that is difficult to counter.
Technological advances have made nuclear weapons more lethal as well as more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The surge in Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities around the world raises the disturbing spectre of vulnerability of command and control systems governing nuclear weapons and missiles.

The key question is whether AI can replicate the sense of intuition, doubt, suspicion and morality that human operators rely on to detect false alarms. There also exist legal and ethical concerns over the use of AI, especially in the context of the Lethal Autonomous Systems (LAWS).
The long-term impact of AI on nuclear stability, arms control, escalation and accidental confrontation needs greater scrutiny. Recently, several experts have emphasised the need to establish a global regime to regulate AI.
Today, all major nuclear powers are modernising their nuclear arsenals. In China’s case, reports suggest that the arsenal is growing at a very rapid rate, including long-range delivery systems.
Rapid military modernisation and development of advanced early warning capabilities have led to speculation about changes in No First Use (NFU) postures.

The inability of the major nuclear powers to forge new arms control treaties that include China will have a long-term fallout on global peace and security.

India has an unblemished record in non-proliferation. India’s traditional initiatives include support for a resolution on the role of S&T in international security and disarmament. It has long advocated general and complete disarmament on the basis of a step by step process that is universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable, to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

The author, a former Ambassador, is the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; he has served as India’s representative to the First Committee at the UN in New York. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.