RIC can be promising only if China assuages India’s core concerns

The fresh Trump tariffs, which have specifically targeted Brics countries, and India in particular, have once again made New Delhi suspicious of the US and its so-called pro-India geostrategic stance. There has been a flurry of visits by National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister S Jaishankar to Moscow and China; also, top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi recently visited New Delhi.

Meanwhile, Pakistan Army Chief Asim Munir has been invited to the US twice in a span of two months. Transactional Trump has something cooking with Pakistan. Is it the oil and gas in Balochistan? Russian media has aggressively been supporting India to stand up to American bullying and take a strong stand. Russia has also, more openly, offered Russian top-end military hardware, including Su-57 fifth-generation aircraft, to India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit Beijing for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, where he is expected to hold bilateral meetings with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on the sidelines.

India will take time to forget the unprovoked Chinese military actions in Galwan in the summer of 2020. More recently, China very actively supported its strongest ally, Pakistan, with hardware, intelligence and command and control, and global narrative building during India’s Operation Sindoor. US-led Nato was most openly supporting Ukraine against Russia. Trump is now trying to mediate a peace between the two warring nations. This has left European leaders and Zelenskyy long-faced.

An adversary of the US, China has been tacitly backing Russia. In its desire not to antagonise the US, India has chosen a neutral stand on the Ukraine-Russia conflict. It is obviously not working with Trump. China, and to some lesser extent, Russia, are not happy with India becoming active in Quad, a visibly anti-China grouping. Much to India’s chagrin, Russia continues to engage with Pakistan, which it considers geographically important to safeguard its interests in Central Asia but also to keep reminding India to not close up too much with the US.

With India already the fourth largest economy and among the fastest growing, both Russia and China have an interest in continuing to engage with it. If Russia can woo India away from the West, then Russia, India and China (RIC) can become a very significant bloc. In 2025, the combined GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), of China (19.6 per cent), India (8.23 per cent), and Russia (3.48 per cent) amounts to 31.31 per cent of the world. The Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) nations’ economic influence exceeds that of the G7. In 2025, RIC accounted for 37 per cent of the global population. RIC is among the top 2025 global defence spenders after the US ($895 billion), with China ($266 billion), Russia ($126 billion), and India ($77 billion).

In 2025, Nato member countries spent $1.506 trillion on defence, which was 55 per cent of global military expenditure. Nato is practically opposing only one country, Russia. Does it even have a raison d’être to exist after the Warsaw Pact was wound down? But the recent conflict has underscored the Russian military might.

With this background, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed on May 30, 2025, Moscow’s strong interest in reviving the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral dialogue, citing improved India-China border ties. Russia accuses the West of trying to support friction between India and China.

RIC Formation

RIC is an informal trilateral strategic grouping, originally conceptualised by Russia in the late 1990s to counterbalance Western dominance. Over the years, it facilitated over 20 ministerial-level meetings, fostering cooperation in foreign policy, economics & security among the three nations. The RIC comprises the three largest Eurasian countries that occupy 20.6 per cent of the global landmass. All three are nuclear powers. Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council. All three countries are also members of Brics, G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, etc.

The group opposes unilateralism and supports the idea of a multipolar global governance model. It offers an alternative perspective on global issues, advocating for equity and reforms in global institutions. The group supports Eurasian integration through projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) & the Eurasian Economic Union.

For India, the RIC format presents both opportunities & challenges. As India prioritises strategic autonomy, it must balance opportunities in RIC, avoiding being locked into any single camp, whether Western or non-Western. The grouping faced a major setback and became dormant after the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes between India & China.

Some level of thaw did take place when PM Modi and President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024. India’s growing ties with the West and its role in the Quad also complicate its simultaneous engagement with the RIC grouping. Russia’s growing closeness with China, especially in the wake of the Ukraine conflict, might raise concerns in India about the impartiality of the RIC platform.

RIC Summit Osaka

There have been 18 meetings of RIC (Russia-India-China) foreign ministers. The last RIC Summit was held at Osaka on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit, June 2019. It was just the third heads of state meeting of the group in 12 years. Frequency has been rather low. The last ministerial-level RIC meeting was held online in November 2021.

At Osaka, the three leaders essentially spoke on the geopolitical situation, peace and stability and economic challenges. They emphasised the need to strengthen the international system led by the United Nations. The need to promote a multipolar world, a world in which there are many centres of influence and stability and also democracy in international relations. They felt the World Trade Organisation (WTO) needs reform.

All three felt that globalisation and a free and open trading system must continue and opposed protectionism. The agenda of the developing countries and of the least developed countries must be imbibed in WTO reforms. Terrorism as a global scourge was discussed. To promote trilateral cooperation, more specific areas needed to be developed.

Russia-China Relations

Russia and China are two neighbouring large countries with global influence. Both once spearheaded global communism. They did have serious differences and a border clash in the 1960s-70s, but since 1991, when the Soviet Union imploded, they have maintained close relations. Russia primarily exports crude oil, coal, and gas to China, while China exports manufactured goods like cars, broadcasting equipment, and military hardware to Russia. China and Russia’s trade reached a record high in 2024, totalling $244.8 billion, despite Western sanctions on Russia.

This reflects strong economic ties between the two nations. The close economic ties between China and Russia are seen as part of a broader strategy to challenge Western influence. In the long term, when China becomes the leading global power, how will the China-Russia relations pan out? Only time will tell. If the West were to woo Russia and wean it away from China, the situation could change.

Russia-India Relations

India and Russia share a long-standing, multifaceted relationship characterised by strong political, economic, and cultural ties. The two share a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership”, characterised by strong cooperation in various fields. Both nations cooperate in defence, nuclear energy, and space. Both endorse the importance of a multipolar world order. India is a major customer of Russian military equipment. They collaborate on projects like the production of T-90 tanks, Su-30 MKI aircraft, BrahMos missiles, and AK-203 rifles, among many other things.

Bilateral trade has grown significantly, exceeding $65 billion in 2023-24. Indian companies invest in Russia’s oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and IT sectors, while Russian companies invest in India’s energy, infrastructure, and manufacturing sectors. Russia has been a key partner in India’s nuclear energy programme, with the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project being a major example. The two are exploring new areas of cooperation, including deep sea exploration, space technology, and the development of the Russian Far East.

While bilateral trade has grown, India’s imports from Russia significantly exceed its exports, creating a trade imbalance. Efforts are underway to address this. India has maintained a balanced approach to the Ukraine conflict, maintaining good relations with both Russia and the West (keeping the Trumpian storm aside). This has allowed India to benefit from increased access to Russian resources, including oil.

India-China Relations

India and China share a complex relationship marked by periods of cooperation and tension, particularly regarding the unresolved border dispute. While they are both major regional powers and have significant economic ties, their relationship is also characterised by strategic rivalry and mistrust. China wants a bipolar world and a unipolar Asia with its dominating influence. Russia and India want a multipolar world.

India was the first non-communist nation to recognise the People’s Republic of China in 1950. The two countries signed the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954, emphasising peaceful coexistence. But a major conflict erupted in 1962 over disputed border territories, particularly in Tibet, leading to China occupying part of Indian territory in Ladakh and elsewhere. In the 1980s, efforts were made to normalise relations through diplomatic engagement, with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visiting China in 1988. In 2014, the two sides redefined their bilateral engagement as a “Closer Developmental Partnership”.

The Line of Actual Control (LAC), the border between the two countries, is not officially demarcated, leading to disagreements and occasional clashes. Recent incidents include the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. China is India’s largest trading partner, but India has a significant trade deficit. India and China see each other as strategic rivals, with competition for influence in South Asia and beyond.

The two sides continue to engage. Negotiations on the border issue continue, and there have been efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control. The future of the relationship will depend on how they manage these competing dynamics. India-China relations remain the weak link of the RIC triangle.

Leaders, Chemistry and Country Importance

Between 2014 and 2020 there was great personal chemistry between Russian President Putin, Indian PM Modi, and Chinese President Xi Jinping. That could have worked wonders. Modi and Xi had 18 bilateral one-on-one meetings in 2014-19. Then all of a sudden there was a lull due to Covid and Galwan. The two met at Kazan in October 2024 for the first bilateral meeting in five years. Xi Jinping has made three visits to India, four visits each to South Africa and Vietnam, five visits to France, Kazakhstan, and the United States, and eleven visits to Russia. Over a much longer period of Putin being in power, he has made 9 visits to India but 20 to China. All this indicates the importance each country gives to the other.

India-US Relations Dynamics

India and the United States have a complex and evolving relationship characterised by both cooperation and areas of disagreement. The relationship is rooted in shared values, including democracy and the rule of law. With the dawn of the new century, cooperation between the two increased. This was also driven by the US’ interest in the Indo-Pacific to counter rising China. India became a significant defence partner of the US and acquired many military platforms. Key enabling defence agreements, including Gsomia, Lemoa, Comcasa, and Beca were signed. The bilateral economic relationship is growing, with increased trade and investment, but also tensions.

Indian analysts and the public view the US with a level trust deficit. The two differ on regional dynamics. The US continues to closely engage Pakistan. Even the approach to China differs. The US considers India the weak link in the Quad in terms of commitment. India’s move to Tier-1 of the US Department of Commerce’s Strategic Trade Authorisation licence exception was meant to facilitate defence trade and also technology transfer. But the latter has still to actually happen. While the overall trade is strong, there are trade imbalances in India’s favour. The new Trump administration has withdrawn India’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and imposed tariffs on Indian goods, causing serious frictions.

The US-RIC Dynamics

The US is not very amused by Russia, India and China coming together in RIC and Brics. Washington is concerned about losing pre-eminence in the global order. Americans are worried about de-dollarisation. The US has been trying to use the Western financial muscle for sanctions against Russia, Iran, North Korea and some others through its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Caatsa). But this has been of not much avail. In fact, Russia managed to sell much more oil and gas after the sanctions were imposed.

The other two RIC members, China and India, were hit by trade tariffs. Upon the second inauguration of Donald Trump in January 2025, the average effective US tariff rate was 2.5 percent. Today India faces 50 per cent tariffs, including 25 per cent for buying Russian oil. The highest level in over a century. China, the world’s second-largest economy and second-biggest trading partner for the US, has had tariffs up to 34 per cent. In 2024, the US recorded its largest trade deficit with China, importing nearly $440 billion worth of goods from the country, accounting for nearly 17 per cent of total goods imports into the US.

RIC Challenges and Opportunities

While India remains an important member of QUAD in the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, the recent tariffs may cast a negative shadow on the broader US-India strategic ties. It is no coincidence that strengthened bonhomie among the three RIC leaders has come amid these difficult times. Speaking at a security conference in Perm on May 29, Sergey Lavrov declared that “the time has come” to bring back the RIC mechanism, citing signs of de-escalation in India-China border tensions. While trying to push multilateralism, each country has to defend their national interests.

Undoubtedly Russia has a strong and genuine interest in strengthening RIC. But will strengthening RIC help New Delhi manage American tariffs? India’s balance of payments with both RIC partners is very unfavourable. While China and Pakistan were running an anti-India nexus, Russia was forced to turn a blind eye while ostensibly assuring support.

Will Russia be an impartial balancing partner between India and China in RIC, considering China’s larger influence? Does Russia have the political heft and muscle to get India and China to resolve boundary issues? Will China stop propping up Pakistan to pin down India? Can Russia ask China not to support Pakistan to the extent it does? Can China give a strong assurance to India on maintaining peace and tranquillity on the LAC? Unlikely. Where will the give-and-take be?

If RIC becomes an anti-US group, it will not be good for China either, as its economy hugely depends on trade with the West. Can the scope of RIC be expanded, with foreign policy, economic, trade and financial agencies of the three countries working more closely? Greater give and take on minerals, on rare earths, microchips, and other technologies? With Russia and China being powerful autocracies, will democratic India get subsumed in the grouping? Are RIC members ready for substantial military exercises between them without significant distrust? The answer is no.

India wants Russia to join the India-led Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) to signal that it’s not just a US-centric plan. India’s focus on economic links with the Russian Far East and activation of a Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor may help persuade Russia that its interests in the Pacific are compatible with our interest in diluting Chinese dominance in the Indo-Pacific. This also goes with President Putin’s concept of a Greater Eurasia. The ongoing India-Iran-Russia project for a sea/road/rail link from western India through Iran to Afghanistan and Central Asia is an important initiative for achieving an effective Indian presence in Central Asia, alongside Russia and China.

China and Russia have had conflicting territorial claims in the far-east. Russia’s declining demographics and much more powerful China could take advantage one day.

Some analysts believe that by imposing harsh tariffs, the US is pushing New Delhi into Beijing’s lap. Would RIC incline towards becoming an anti-American alliance? As India prioritises strategic autonomy, it would prefer balancing opportunities in RIC, avoiding being locked into any single camp. Meanwhile, has Washington really come in support of New Delhi? India’s China dynamics remain a question without answers.

Until recently, China and India accounted for nearly 70 per cent of Russia’s arms exports, and often both India and China bought the same systems (S-400, Su-30). But now China is becoming independent on that count. More and more Chinese-made copies of Russian equipment are finding their way to Pakistan.

RIC countries, with important influence at international and regional levels and emerging market economies, need to further strengthen practical coordination on global and regional issues in the spirit of openness, solidarity, mutual understanding and trust. Notwithstanding the bilateral asymmetries, India and China have no choice but to engage bilaterally and multilaterally on a range of issues, even while firmly protecting their own interests.

Being India’s leading trade partner, China has a significant role indeed in driving the Indian economy and creating high-quality manufacturing jobs. Chinese analysts have taken note of a recent shift in the Indian policy to attract more Chinese investment.

The Chinese economy is heavily dependent on the American market. Some understanding on trade between the US and China will emerge, sooner rather than later. This will also have dynamics for RIC. With American global standing dipping a little, there could be some shift in the years ahead. Meanwhile, Russia is also uncomfortable with the growing Chinese influence in its backyard in Central Asia.

Russia’s call to revive the RIC format reflects its strategic intent to bolster regional cooperation and counterbalance Western influence. It is in Russia’s interests to be a facilitator in the India-China relationship. Strengthened RIC will give India greater leverage to resist Western pressures and also to maintain strategic autonomy.

Partnering with the two most populous and among the biggest economies gives Russia strength. The success of this trilateral initiative will depend on the political will of all three nations to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics and prioritise mutual interests to become the symbol of the multipolar world and its core. The US will continue to exploit contradictions in the RIC.

For Russia-India-China trilateral to succeed, India remains a key player, and its sensitivities about Chinese actions have to be assuaged. China has to pull back on its support to Pakistan and stop using it as leverage against India. It is time to reinvigorate and give RIC a fresh chance. Participating in RIC helps India showcase its strategic autonomy and send a message to Washington, which has repeatedly expressed its displeasure over India’s close ties with Russia.

The writer is former Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.