Renaming places in Arunachal showcases China’s immaturity and desperation

Although it can be unequivocally said that the history of India-China relations is fraught with a surfeit of mistakes which worsened after l’affaire Doklam and Galwan, sundry efforts were made by both sides to put the past behind them and make a new beginning.

However, it has been noticed that Beijing has a pathological disposition whereby it seeks to unnecessarily provoke India from time to time. Misunderstandings may continue to simmer over certain fundamental issues such as a continuing misperception of the exact alignment of the LAC, but China has never resorted to embracing the charity principle.

Humankind has been endowed with a tremendous power to overcome the greatest of odds. But for some reason or the other this has not been the case with India and China, especially as it pertains to the resolution of the 3,488-km-long boundary that stretches from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh.

Demography is an important component when nations decide to become “us-and-them. Therefore, the tendency to push out towards the frontiers has a price: it is always accompanied by a grave risk of miscalculation. Such a narrative—in most parts—is due to a misconstruction of the objectives of the other side. In the late 19th century, a British officer Col Algernon Durand—of the Durand Line fame—observed that “the man on the frontier sees but his own square on the chessboard and can know but little of the whole game in which he is a pawn.”

It is, therefore, of essence to keep such an outlook in mind when one countenances frontiers, borders and boundaries. Not all squares on a chess board are worth fighting over, or as Nehru quipped about Aksai Chin as a desert “where not a blade of grass grows”.

But the fact of the matter is that when an adversary overreacts and acts with belligerence, rearguard action must be undertaken. It is not as if India has not made friendly overtures towards China.

In a webinar in June 2020, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran said that although the Chinese, including the top leader of the Peoples’ Republic, Deng Xiaoping had put forward a “package deal” to India whereby an “as-is-where-is” resolution could be worked out, China reneged on the deal a few years later. It has become quite clear since then that the Chinese position is a shifting one.

During a visit to China in October 2002, I was able to personally interact with the best India-China boundary minds of China. These included Ma Jiali, Wang Hongwei, Rong Ying and former Chinese envoy to India, Cheng Ruisheng. At the time, I sensed that all of them wanted detente with India. I was fed on niceties such as “why are you bringing in Pakistan? That country should not come between India and China friendship” and “China is willing to walk the extra mile to solve the boundary problem. You must convince your leaders to be more benevolent.” The atmospherics in Beijing, Zhejiang and Shanghai were so endearing that I thought that it would be a matter of time before the boundary problem would be resolved. A few months later, I left for higher research in the United States. While I was there, I wrote a joint article on India-China relationship titled “Giants at Peace” with top Chinese scholar and author of “Himalayan Sentiment”.

On 26-27 August 2014 during the course of an “India-China Track II Dialogue” in which I was a member of the Indian delegation I proposed a way out of the boundary logjam. With the knowledge that neither India or China would surrender ground (the instances which were quoted were that of Thagla Ridge held by the Chinese and the southern bank of the Namka Chu River that runs south of the Ridge held by the Indians) as well as the fact that the only solution lie in converting the “Line of Actual Control” (the “as-is-where-is” basis) into an International Boundary, I took recourse to semantics.

The phrase “Line of Actual Control”—if even a step is to be taken in the direction of later-day resolution (even by the generation that is to come!)—must be replaced by a classification that does not ring of belligerence. “Line of Amity” was the name that was proposed. If unyieldingness is inevitable and status quo is the only outcome of protracted negotiations, it is my considered opinion that at least a change of nomenclature that resonates of accommodation could herald a positive mindset change from continual and non-progressive status quo. I also laced my plea by stating that altering the name from “Line of Actual Control” to “Line of Amity” would not have any legal implications or bring forth questions about the principle by which delineation of boundaries are normally undertaken. I hazarded this aspect even though the watershed principle is generally applicable to the Thagla Ridge which the Chinese presently occupy. I also realised that the natural feature by way of the Namka Chu would lend it elegantly into a boundary. As Curzon, one-time viceroy of India had said during a speech in the University of Oxford.

He said that “rivers make attractive features for those negotiating boundaries…The position of a river is unmistakable, no survey is required to identify or describe it…rivers are lines of division as a rule very familiar to both parties, and are easily transferred to a treaty or traced on a map.”

The name “Line of Amity” also has the distinct possibility of bringing future leaders of both countries to the table without the baggage of the past as well as the suspicion that has accompanied almost all India-China boundary dialogue and could well be the prerequisite for entente cordiale.

But I have come to realise in recent times that even though there is a goodly constituency in China that seeks resolution of a boundary resolution with India and consequently peace, however, the Chinese leadership and the PLA have been against rapprochement with India.

The most belligerent of persons in the People’s Republic is Xi Jinping. He has indeed anointed himself as the leader for life, almost in the mould of Mao Tse Tung. But it seems that there could be, sooner than later, a “palace coup”. Indeed, it is the present Chinese leadership who said that “the fortress is most likely to be breached from the inside”.

Such apprehension points to the leadership’s “innermost fears about the fragility and brittleness of their vaunted system despite their outward display of confidence”.

It is perhaps such fears and insecurity that had led China to attempt intrusion into Doklam and Galwan. I can state with some certainty that fearful of the growing India-US military and such other ties, China opened up Galwan for three reasons. First, it wanted to message the United States that it cannot use India as a countervail to China, second, it was attempting to message India’s South Asian neighbours that they cannot depend on India for their security and third, by enacting Galwan, China was trying to straitjacket India to its land commitments and away from a growing power equation and appeal from maritime quests which China in recent times are coveting as its sole preserve. But the fact of the matter is that it failed in all its endeavours.

Today, as in earlier years, China has renamed places in Arunachal Pradesh which they refer to as South Tibet. This, to my mind, has been triggered by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inauguration of the 12-kilometre-long tunnel under the Se La on 9 March. The recent successful visit by Modi to Bhutan (readers need to note that the Indian prime minister wore a Mao coat. Was it deliberate?) and his receiving the Order of the Druk Yul has also got Beijing into a tizzy. It is just as well that Prime Minister Modi has begun to carefully course-correct his government’s Neighbourhood First policy.

Also, it must be understood that China has realised that India can no longer be militarily pushed around.

Reacting to China renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh, foreign minister, S Jaishankar rightly said, “If today I change the name of your house, will it become mine? Arunachal Pradesh was, is and will always be a state of India. Changing names does not have an effect.”

Such Chinese immature overtures are best avoided. India will reach a zenith of maturity soon. Prime Minister Modi has ascertained it by unveiling a quiet spirituality that has his people’s well-being and prosperity uppermost.

Of course, it has to be from a position of strength and on India’s well-ingrained and own terms. Doklam, Galwan and Yangtse have showcased what India under Modi’s leadership is capable of.

The author is a conflict theorist and bestselling author. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.