Ramification | Why Myanmar is not a walkover for China

Myanmar has been in a state of chaos since the coup in 2021 by the Tatmadaw. The sudden developments in Myanmar became a matter of concern for the neighbourhood. India was specifically concerned about its ongoing infrastructure projects in the country that were to become the springboard for India’s ambitious Act East policy.

But that was not the only concern; China’s relationship with the military junta and their involvement in Myanmar through their own infrastructure projects were also a matter of scrutiny for Myanmar observers. However, geo-strategic relationships with complex countries like Myanmar are never easy, if India has its concerns, the relationship with China is not all that it seems.

It was almost three years after the military coup in Myanmar that Operation 1027 was launched against the Tatmadaw by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in the northern part of Shan state. Their success against the Tatmadaw encouraged the launch of Operation 1107, bringing together insurgent groups across the country. This was perhaps one of the rare occasions in the troubled history of Myanmar where Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) from a variety of ethnic groups had come together in a meticulously coordinated attack against the junta. While many observers saw this as a victory for democracy , the truth was far more complicated.

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The city of Laukkaing, in the self-administered region of Kokang, Shan State, was home to the infamous “four main families”. These families headed by Ming Xuechang, Wei Chaoren, Liu Zhengxiang, and Liu Guoxi (who died in 2020) were not old money elites of Shan State but rather the four men who played a part in converting this dusty town into a scamsters paradise.

The transformation of Lukkaing began to attract many gamblers from neighbouring countries, especially China, where gambling is illegal. The “four main families” expanded their business to trafficking, money laundering, and telecom scam centres, amongst other illegal activities. This, of course, would not have been possible without the support of the local police and the Tatmadaw.

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With online scams not just luring Chinese citizens but also these gangs attracting them with high paying jobs in controlled environments, commonly known as “cyber slavery”, China, bearing the brunt of this wild town, began to put pressure on the Tatmadaw to rein these families in.

But with billions of dollars at stake, the Mings, among the others, resisted. With China’s frustration with the Tatmadaw unabated and its concerns unaddressed, China decided to activate the Three Brotherhood Alliance last October with the very successful Operation 1027.

This was easy to achieve as the leader of MNDAA was the original warlord of Laukkaing, Peng Jiasheng, also known as the “King of Kokang”. Peng had been ousted by none other than the present prime minister, Min Aung Hlaing, who led the coup in 2021. Hlaing had used Bai Suocheng, who was Peng’s deputy at the time to overthrow Peng Jiasheng. Once they managed to expel Peng, who took refuge in China in 2009, Bai Suocheng rose as one of the “four families” of Kokang. Peng’s contentious relationship with the military junta was exacerbated by his proximity to China and his Chinese ancestry. After all, he was the one who negotiated the deal that led to Kokang becoming a special administrative zone, with Yuan as the currency and Mandarin as the language.

Interestingly, China has refrained from recognising Myanmar’s junta leader, Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, indicating continuing mistrust between the two countries. Previously, too, when President Thein Sein decided to open up Myanmar to the world, China was wary of its plans towards the West and vice versa.

Beijing saw it as Naypyidaw sidelining China for the West, or at the very least trying to play both sides. However, with Aung San Suu Kyi, relationships improved for a while. In fact, it was right before the elections in 2015 that brought her to power. China invited her on an official visit, where she met President Xi Jinping. Furthermore, her policy towards the Rohingyas saw a huge backlash from the West, bringing China back to the centre-stage of Myanmar with President Xi Jinping visiting Myanmar in 2020, the first Chinese premier to do so in over 20 years.

Though this blossoming friendship was short lived with Aung San Suu Kyi’s growing proximity to the military junta during the Rohingya crisis as well as public sentiment in Myanmar turning against China because of the visible Chinese migration. There have also been major concerns in Myanmar over China’s illegal mining for critical rare earth minerals, leaving areas the size of Singapore in northern Myanmar uncultivable and rivers poisonous, resulting in mass protests against China.

Additionally, China’s concern with the Tatmadaw is more than just the cybercrime and gambling rackets operating from Myanmar. The problem for China is the fact that the Tatmadaw has not been able to stabilise Myanmar nor consolidate its power effectively; as a result, China’s infrastructure investments are being jeopardised. Whether it is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), its oil and gas pipelines, or the Kyaukphyu deep seaport, without political stability and control over EAOs, China’s alternative to its “Achilles heel"—the Strait of Malacca—will remain compromised. Though China has made its way to restarting some of the projects with their influence on EAOs, Myanmar’s balancing act has once again made it anxious.

The Tatmadaw has chosen Russia to build its Dawei deep seaport located in the Tanintharyi region on its east coast, making it a gateway for the Greater Mekong region. China sees this development as undermining its Kyaukphyu deep seaport, with benefits for India. Russia’s interests in Myanmar will bring in a third player in the infrastructure projects aligning with India’s interests in containing the growing influence of China, paving the way for a secure Indian Ocean.

On August 15, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, met Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing and discussed border security and Chinese investments in Myanmar. There was a time when officials from both countries called their deepening relationship pauk phaw, meaning a fraternal brotherhood, but relationships have their limitations. In this case, China is concerned and frustrated with Hlaing’s inability to control the deteriorating situation with EAOs. It is also well known to them that Hlaing is particularly suspicious of China.

A second Operation 1027 was launched in June this year. While it is known that China backed the first Operation 1027 and subsequently brokered the ceasefire between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the military junta, there are strong signals that China is opposed to another Operation. However, the fact that a second operation was launched is indicative that these EAOs are not fully under the control of Beijing.

On the other hand, Hlaing too has given statements accusing foreign countries backing EAOs with weapons and not humanitarian aid. In most likeliness, he was referring to China. In an interview given to the Associated Press, Richard Horsey of the International Crisis Group said, “There is a deep well of anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar, particularly in the military, and Min Aung Hlaing is known to harbor particularly strong anti-Chinese views. I don’t think China really cares whether it is a military regime or some other type of government in Myanmar. The main issue with the regime, in Beijing’s view, is that it is headed by someone they distrust and dislike, and who they see as fundamentally incompetent.”

China will undoubtedly continue to safeguard its geostrategic investments in Myanmar. But ideally China would want a Tatmadaw that can control Myanmar but at the same time accommodate Beijing’s involvement in the country. For example, tacitly supporting Operation 1027 and brokering a ceasefire for it.

While India should keep a close eye on developments in Myanmar, it also must realise that Myanmar is not a walkover for China. India perhaps shares more goodwill with the military junta, the National Unity Government, as well as some EAO’s than China ever will. The general public sentiment would also be more tilted in favour of India rather than China. The chaos in Myanmar is here to stay; there is no guarantee that elections will abate the conflict either. Therefore, India’s best bet is to engage with stakeholders and protect its own interests in Myanmar while extending all humanitarian aid and indulging in the existing goodwill across the spectrum.

Rami Niranjan Desai is an anthropologist and a scholar of the northeast region of India. She is a columnist and author and presently Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.