Three years after the military coup in Myanmar, there seems to be no signs of the conflict abating between the junta and the various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) across the country. Especially after the successful launch of Operation 1027 against the military junta by the Three Brotherhood alliance members comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) from the Kokang region of the Shan state, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army also from the Shan state, and the Arakan Army (AA) based in the Rakhine state.
After the success of Operation 1027, the rebellion quickly spread across Myanmar and by November 7, 2023, with the launch of Operation 1107 in support of Operation 1027, many other insurgent groups across the country joined hands. This was perhaps one of the rare occasions in the troubled history of Myanmar where EAOs from a variety of ethnic groups had come together in a meticulously coordinated attack against the junta. Subsequently, many Myanmar observers debated the pushback by the rebel groups as a victory for democracy, with some reports stating only 30-40 per cent of Myanmar was under the control of the junta.
However, whether that means it is a victory in the real sense for the disparate groups that are fighting the junta is arguable. The junta has been relentless in its own offensive against EAOs. Not only does the junta have larger access to weapons but also has decades of experience in dealing with EAOs. It was evident in the recapture of Myawaddy, a border town and entry point for Thailand. A town destined to be a full international crossing as part of the Asian Highway Route Network AH1, that will extend to Tokyo, Japan. It also is a route for border trade of over $1 billion.
There were various reports that claimed that the strategic town of Myawaddy was actually never captured by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Though KNLA didn’t claim it in explicit terms, through videos and strategic perception building, it gave the impression that it had captured the whole town. On the contrary, the truth might be that the town is actually under the control of the Border Guard Force (BGF), a Karen-dominated pro-junta militia group. And if not entirely pro-junta anymore, it is still playing a neutral role as the junta pays the salaries of its soldiers.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsEarlier this week the BGF warned, saying: “All foreigners who are doing online business around the Kayin state, Myawaddy township, must leave between May 1 (1-5-2024) and October 31 (31-10-2024). Foreigners who illegally cross the border must leave the country by the way they came. If found after October 31 (31-10-2024), effective action will be taken.”
This warning was aimed at online scammers and gambling operations that have found place in Shwe Kokko Myaing, the “new city” that is a short distance from Myawaddy funded by Chinese money and BGF partnership. The notice was posted in Burmese, Chinese and English. The statement in itself is reminiscent of the fate of the “four families” of Laukkaing in the Shan state who were involved in cyber-crime, cyber slavery and gambling operations that adversely impacted China.
With the launch of Operation 1027, Tatmadaw looked towards the Chinese for support and in return withdrew support from the “four families”. Operation 1027 was launched by the Three Brotherhood alliance that included the China-backed MNDAA. Today, trade between Myanmar through the northern Shan state has resumed.
Similarly, in the case of Myawaddy it might be pertinent to note that the warning by the BGF has come less than a week after the visit of Lt Gen Yar Pyae, Union Minister for Home Affairs, to China. Lt Gen Yar Pyae met with Minister of Public Security Wang Xiahong and Xu Datong, Vice Minister of Public Security, China. They signed agreements on assistance worth RMB 5 million to the Myanmar police force. The Chinese side also made it clear that they view the China-Myanmar relationship from a strategic perspective.
Simultaneously, more than 500 Chinese nationals have arrived in Kyaukphyu Township in the troubled Rakhine state. Kyaukphyu, which has Chinese investments in various projects, particularly Myanmar’s long-delayed deep-water port project, supported by the CITIC Group, China’s largest state owned transnational conglomerate. Kyaukphyu also has the China twin oil and gas pipeline that extends to the Yunnan province in China. Importantly, the EAOs, especially AA that is active in Rakhine, have given a guarantee of protection to these projects. The investments that go into billions of dollars will also give the junta a much-needed reinforcement.
India too has ambitions in Myanmar as a part of its Act East policy. India, Myanmar, and Thailand are building the Asian Trilateral Highway, which will connect India to ASEAN. The road is expected to boost trade and commerce in the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, as well as with the rest of Southeast Asia. India is also building the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport, a road-river-port cargo transport project, to link Kolkata to Sittwe in Myanmar and from Myanmar’s Kaladan river to India’s Northeast, a project of strategic importance giving India an alternative route to the Siliguri Corridor. However, in May 2023, Adani Group’s ports arm APSEZ had to sell its Myanmar port project for an enormous loss due to the sanctions imposed by the US on the junta-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited. This project could have established India’s port footprint in Southeast Asia.
Therefore, India too, armed with experience in navigating through complex security matters, in a mature diplomatic move, has kept its channels of communications open with all parties involved. While asserting strategic autonomy India has advocated for peace and democracy. India understands that China’s influence in Myanmar needs to be balanced. Naypyidaw is also playing a balancing act by keeping its channels of communication open with India to counter China’s excessive influence.
India has been watching developments closely. Their proactive stance on Myanmar was reflected in a recent meeting between India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and his Myanmarese counterpart Admiral Moe Aung in St Petersburg, Russia. Incidentally, it was at the same time that Lt Gen Yar Pyae met with his Chinese counterpart. Both the NSAs reportedly discussed concerns regarding India’s infrastructure investments in Myanmar, the refugee influx to India, and the current situation in Myanmar. Problems that require a larger security lens are best discussed between experts and counterparts and India, while dealing with the junta, has followed this track.
What India additionally needs to focus on is engagement with the EAOs. The conflict in Myanmar might become a long-drawn situation with a deadlock and some areas controlled by the EAOs for the foreseeable future. India, in order to secure its investments, has to create a multi-layered strategic engagement involving military and security experts, diplomats and religious and humanitarian leaders with expertise in the region. The reality is even if the pro-democratic forces led by the National Unity Government (NUG) manage to gain power and influence in at least some regions, it is uncertain if they will be able to fulfil the aspirations of the EAOs and other diverse ethnicities.
Technically, the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar drafted by the Tatmadaw gives substantial power to the Army. The Constitution of Myanmar gives 25 per cent reservation to military officers. This includes in the upper and lower houses. They are unelected. It also has vested its powers in the Commander-in-Chief of the military to take power in case of emergencies. This includes the executive, legislature and judiciary. Amendments to Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution is also difficult to achieve as 75 per cent of the parliamentarians need to approve the amendments with the Tatmadaw responsible for the final veto power.
India, therefore, stands to only gain and resolve matters to its benefit if it continues its proactive approach towards all stakeholders. The strategic autonomy that India has asserted has not only allowed it to decide its relationships with its neighbours but also limit the interference of international lobbies in regional matters. All that India needs to do now is engage with the EAOs. Whether we like it or not, they have become the new stakeholders in Myanmar’s conflict.
The author is an anthropologist and a scholar of the northeast region of India. She is a columnist and author and presently Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.


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