Ramification | Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka: How Bay of Bengal has become a hotbed of global power play

The Bay of Bengal (BoB) region has once again become a pivotal part of discussions concerning security and connectivity in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The region has witnessed a regime change in Bangladesh with alleged US interests in the country that lies to the north of BoB. The ensuing internal conflict in Myanmar that lies to the east, with China, the US, India, and most recently Russia being stakeholders in key important strategic infrastructure projects, suggests overarching impacts on the region.

Sri Lanka too has recently seen a change in dispensation, with many observers suggesting that the new President Anura Kumara Dissanayake could be more favourable to China. Other countries in the BoB region, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, are basin countries of the Bay of Bengal.

It was in the 18th century that colonial powers like the British, Dutch, French, and Portuguese made the BoB a theatre for their maritime competition and struggle for dominance on trade routes. With these changes came fragmentation of the region and corresponding political powers and different forms of governance. The unnatural divisions in the region over a period of time created a geographical as well as a psychological distance. Though maritime routes across the BoB and the Indian Ocean have been in operation since ancient times, promoting cultural and commercial routes evident in archaeological and literary findings, the importance of the BoB region was somewhat sidelined in the latter half of the 20th century. With nations being carved out and a division made between South Asia and Southeast Asia, findings from Buddhist sites such as Anuradhapura, or polished ware found at Korkai, or the Roman and Sasanian coins at different sites across Sri Lanka, or the mention of coastal routes in the Arthashastra, were forgotten.

But today the BoB has once again become an arena of strategic competition. With India uncomfortable with Chinese expansionism and with new actors like the US eyeing the region, the BoB has once again become the centre of geopolitical scrutiny. Especially after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, strengthening the rumours that she was antagonistic towards the US and unwelcoming of the American agendas, a new regime was supported to replace her.

She had alarmingly said, “I could have remained in power if I had surrendered the sovereignty of Saint Martin Island and allowed America to hold sway over the Bay of Bengal.” It is well known that the strategically important St Martin’s Island in the BoB has been a point of interest for not just Myanmar and Bangladesh but many other global powers.

It was during the 1971 war that the US, led by President Richard Nixon and encouraged by his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, ordered the US Task Force 74, led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, to enter the BoB. Pakistan’s military had been annihilated by India in the east, and the west was close to the same fate. The US in this context was keen to have China counter India and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Further, during the tenures of General Yahya Khan, Gen Ziaur Rahman, and General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, allegations were rife that they were leasing St Martins to the US to use as a naval base while giving a foothold to the US to assist them in countering India.

For the US, outposts on the island would be critical for monitoring maritime movement as it is situated near key sea lanes. Today, it is also an essential component of the US vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” to counter Chinese expansionism, to continue having a foothold in Myanmar through its support for the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the National Unity Government, as well as to find inroads in Bangladesh while keeping an eye on India.

First, as China is trying to challenge the US supremacy across the globe, the US is interested in curtailing Chinese interests. Myanmar, a resource-rich region, saw a military coup in 2021, which has resulted in the crumbling of its democratic regime.

This has naturally pitted the US against the military junta in Myanmar, both for ideological and geopolitical reasons, as military regimes in Myanmar have often been propped up by Beijing.

Consequently, the US is actively supporting the National Unity Government (NUG), which is nothing but an umbrella organisation of various ethnic armed groups. To sustain its ability to support these groups, the US in most probability required a foothold in St Martin’s Island, which is off Bangladesh and Myanmar’s coast and which has the potential to be a good staging post to support NUG-supported EAOs who have captured substantial territory in northern Rakhine state.

It appears that Sheikh Hasina’s reluctance to provide the US with this vital grip created a coup that resulted in her toppling. After the change of the Sheikh Hasina-led regime, the new Muhammad Yunus-led interim government is seen collaborating with the US, while it has been noted that the NUG has made substantial gains in northern Myanmar.

China has accordingly come out with an open statement supporting the regime in Naypyidaw while asking the EAOs to maintain peace along its border. Therefore, we are seeing a new geopolitical contest between the two major global powers, namely the US and China, in the Bay of Bengal. However, the recent resumption of dialogue between Russia and Myanmar to develop the Dawei deep sea port in the south probably also has added a new dimension for the US as well as China.

Second, China’s objective of keeping India confined to the subcontinent has resulted in its active engagement with all of India’s neighbours. This saw their active involvement in Bangladesh winning contracts in Chittagong hill tracts. It was in 2016 that the Chinese premier Xi Jinping made a historic visit to Bangladesh. The first by a Chinese leader in 30 years.

Bangladesh being a key location in the BoB is indispensable for any regional or global powers trying to gain a foothold in the Bay. Just consider the Payra Deep Sea Port strengthening the string of pearls (the Chinese maritime bases across the Indian Ocean). As part of its Maritime Silk Road, China has contributed to the construction and operation of several ports in South Asia, including Myanmar (Kyaukpyu), Sri Lanka (Hambantota Port), and Bangladesh (Chittagong).

Third, the recent elections in Sri Lanka, wherein president Ranil Wickremesinghe, perceived to be pro-West, has been replaced by president Anura Dissanayake from a party with strong left-wing ideology, which has led to a Marxist insurgency in the past. This ideological affinity could present China with another opportunity. However, Sri Lanka’s engagement with the neighbourhood, especially India, could be dependent on how India engages with Sri Lanka.

The relationship has been on a stronger footing off-late, making China’s ambition in Sri Lanka not easy. Last year, when President Wickremesinghe visited New Delhi to meet with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the outcome of the Neighbourhood First policy was evident. India and Sri Lanka agreed to strengthen the maritime, air, energy, tourism, power, trade, and education sectors.

Furthermore, strengthening of the security cooperation with India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval attending the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC) in Sri Lanka has sent a major message to Beijing, especially the Memorandum of Understanding signed to establish the CSC secretariat. This has been seen by analysts as a significant move by India to counter China’s expansionist agenda in the island, while China has also been accused of docking spy surveillance ships. In response, India has also invested in a part of the Colombo port, Kankesanthurai port, Trincomalee port, Jaffna and Hambantota airports, amongst other infrastructure projects like a two-way petroleum pipeline. Sri Lanka also preferred India over China for its power projects.

Finally, both Bay of Bengal basin countries, Thailand and Malaysia, are presently governed by regimes that are seen as extremely fragile and vulnerable. Malaysia has a coalition government led by Anwar Ibrahim that faces tough challenges from hardcore Malay chauvinists. In Thailand too, the regime is vulnerable. Paetongtarn Shinawatra comes from a family that has in the past been persecuted by the establishment. It is also important to note that Thailand and Malaysia have a large Chinese diaspora.

While India plays a crucial role in the security of the Bay of Bengal region, with the Indian Navy being the primary security provider, it is also important to note that the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ as well as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will continue to evolve.

These geopolitical contests, in addition to unstable regimes and the ensuing conflict in the region, will naturally lead to the BoB further attracting global and regional power competition. India must not forget the US Navy is arguably the implementer of US foreign policy. After all, it was Admiral Mahan, known as one of the most important American strategists of the nineteenth century, who espoused the importance of a powerful navy large enough to strike at will worldwide and make a country a superpower.

Rami Niranjan Desai is an anthropologist and a scholar of the northeast region of India. She is a columnist, author and presently Distinguished Fellow at the India Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.