Ramification | How the advance of Arakan Army is a turning point in Myanmar conflict

Myanmar has been in a state of chaos since the military coup in 2021. February 1, 2025, will mark four years since the military takeover of Myanmar led by Senior General Ming Aung Hlaing. Much has been said about the various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and their success against the Tatmadaw. By most accounts, the EAOs today control approximately sixty per cent of the territory. However, the majority of the population still remains in the territories controlled by the Tatmadaw.

One of the turning points in the conflict was with the launch of Operation 1027. Launched against the military junta by the Three Brotherhood Alliance members, comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) from the Kokang Region of Shan state, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, also from the Shan state and the Arakan Army (AA), based in the Rakhine State. The success of the operation, which was followed by other coordinated attacks, brought to light the role of China in temporarily supporting these EAOs. This was easy to imagine, as the leader of MNDAA was the original warlord of Laukkaing in the northern Shan State, Peng Jiasheng, also known as the “King of Kokang”.

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A second Operation 1027 was launched in June this year. While it is known that China backed the first Operation 1027 and subsequently brokered the ceasefire between the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the military junta , there were strong signals that China was opposed to another Operation. However, the fact that a second Operation was launched was indicative that these EAOs are not fully under the control of Beijing.

China had, at the outset of the military coup in 2021, been ambiguous about its acceptance of the junta regime, backing the Three Brotherhood Alliance against the Tatmadaw. But once the clash between the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the Tatmadaw became uncontrollable, even for China, Chinese stance towards the junta significantly changed. Instead of opposing the junta, China started supporting its offensive against the EAOs. China is fearing its investments being jeopardised in Myanmar with its oil and gas pipelines, Kyapkhyu port, and the Belt and Road Initiative (like the railway line that proposes to connect Kunming with the Bay of Bengal) due to Tatmadaw’s inability to protect Chinese assets.

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It was recently that China sent special envoy Deng Xijun to negotiate with TNLA, MNDAA, the United Wa State Army, and the Kachin Independence Army. This came after KIA, despite the order from China to cease fighting, captured Kanpiketi in Kachin state, with it taking control of rare earth mines near the China border. However, China’s pressure yielded results after MNDAA announced that it would not support the National Unity Government and would stop fighting the junta.

While the military regime stopped the supply of fuel to Kachin, Shan, Rakhine, and Chin states, as well as to 26 townships in the Sagaing region, Beijing closed border crossings of all KIA-controlled territories. Chin state relies now on India for its fuel. China also gave shelter and later returned 300 junta-aligned Border Guard Force (BGF) soldiers who, after intense fighting in Kanpiketi, had crossed the border to China.

However, during this chaos, it is the Arakan Army that has emerged as one of the larger players, with over 6,000 soldiers deployed in northern Shan state and another 50,000 stationed in Rakhine. Encouraged by gains in Shan state, the Arakan Army (AA) launched a full-fledged offensive against the Tatmadaw in Rakhine State in November last year. Since then the AA has captured 13 townships in Rakhine and the town of Paletwa in Chin State, with the recent capture being of Ann, which holds the western command headquarters of the Myanmar military. Alongside Ann, AA also managed to capture most of the Border Guard Police headquarters. It was as early as June this year that the AA captured Taw Hein Taung, the operational command base that guards Ann, but after a short ceasefire, they resumed the offensive. Furthermore, they took control of the Ann-Pandan highway, crucial for the transportation of troops as well as the generation of illicit income.

Though major strategic areas and the state capital of Rakhine, Sittwe, which is key to India’s ambitious Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) and where the Sittwe port was inaugurated in 2023, still remain under the control of the junta. Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, which is of crucial interest to China, also remains in control of the junta. Many analysts had speculated the Chin and Shan states would break free at the outset of the conflict, but with the continual success of AA in Rakhine and their offensive reaching right up till the Teknaf River that delineates Myanmar from Bangladesh, it has renewed the interest of observers in the AA.

It is now speculated that Rakhine might be the first state to break free from the control of the Tatmadaw. Though some news reports have been misleading, stating the entry of AA in Bangladeshi territory, the fact remains that neither has AA announced this development nor does entering Bangladeshi territory, especially areas that have Rohingya settlements, serve a purpose for AA. It is more likely that AA will spill over to Chin areas, resulting in intermittent clashes with other EAOs struggling for unification, which has not fructified till date.

However, some Western players are reported to have been trying to broker a deal among the various Chin groups. Meetings between Chin revolutionary groups such as the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council were mediated by the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), Helsinki, Finland. In 2023, the first Chinland Conference was held at Camp Victoria across the Mizoram border at the confluence of the Tiau and Harhva rivers, where 325 Chin representatives from the Chin state, including CNA/CNF, ratified a new Chinland constitution to set up a Chin government including a legislature, executive branch, and a judiciary. However, six Chin resistance groups broke away and formed the Chin Brotherhood. AA supported Chinland Brotherhood in Matupi Township, forcing the Chinland Council coalition to relent control.

While the Arakan Army gains more ground and speculation is rife about its interests across the Teknaf River, the question that is important to consider is the administrative abilities of the AA to provide services and basic necessities to the areas under its control. To break away from the State Administrative Council (SAC), which is in charge of administration for the military junta, would not just mean countering economic challenges but also the imminent threat of Rohingya groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) clashing with the AA, creating further instability in the region.

Therefore, the interest of India lies in establishing contact with all active players, including EAOs, especially along strategic long-term connectivity and infrastructure projects that are long overdue for completion. More importantly, it’s imperative to learn from the role of China in protecting Chinese assets in Myanmar. Additionally, if international organisations that have little experience in the region, such as CMI, can mediate between vested stakeholders, India needs to formulate and push forward a proactive approach in coordinating with like-minded countries working towards regional stability.

Rami Niranjan Desai is an anthropologist and a scholar of the northeast region of India. She is a columnist and author and presently Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.