Ramification | China’s changing colours in Myanmar should ring bells in Delhi

It is said that China’s frustration was with the Tatmadaw’s inability to control cybercrime, cyber slavery, trafficking, money laundering, and illicit gambling that had a direct impact on its citizens. This resulted in China backing the Three Brotherhood Alliance with the very successful Operation 1027 and later 1107.

It was easy enough to achieve as the leader of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Peng Jiasheng, who was also known as the ‘King of Kokang’, was one of the most influential people in the Kokang region of Shan state. Peng had been ousted to China by none other than the present senior general, Min Aung Hlaing, who led the coup in 2021. Consequently, with the success of Operations 1027 and 1107, there was much hope around the world that Myanmar would stabilise, democracy would return, and the region would no longer be lawless.

But more than analysis, it is common sense that tells us once groups are armed, gain territory, and with it power, the chances are that they will assert autonomy. And this is what happened in the case of the Three Brotherhood Alliance that consisted of MNDAA, the Ta’ng National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA). China had, at the outset of the military coup in 2021, been ambiguous about its acceptance of the junta regime, backing the Three Brotherhood Alliance against the Tatmadaw. But once the clash between the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and the Tatmadaw became uncontrollable, even for China, their stance towards the junta significantly changed. Instead of opposing the junta, China started supporting its offensive against the EAOs.

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China is not only fearing its investments in Myanmar in oil and gas pipelines, Kyapkhyu port, and its Belt and Road Initiatives, like the railway line that proposes to connect Kunming with the Bay of Bengal, which are being jeopardised because of the Tatmadaw’s inability to protect Chinese assets, but also the growing proximity of EAOs (that it backed) to the West-supported National Unity Government (NUG). It was recently that China sent special envoy Deng Xijun to negotiate with TNLA, MNDAA, the United Wa State Army, and the Kachin Independence Army. This came after KIA, despite the order from China to cease fighting, captured Kanpiketi in Kachin State, with it taking control of rare earth mines near the China border.

However, China’s pressure yielded results after MNDAA announced that it would not support the NUG and would stop fighting the junta. While the military regime stopped the supply of fuel to Kachin, Shan, Rakhine, and Chin states, as well as to 26 townships in the Sagaing region, Beijing closed border crossings of all KIA-controlled territories. Chin state relies now on India for its fuel. China also gave shelter and later returned 300 junta-aligned Border Guard Force (BGF) soldiers who, after intense fighting in Kanpiketi, had crossed the border to China.

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Furthermore, China invited Senior General Min Aung Hlaing for the first time on November 5 to attend the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) summit held in Kunming that also included representation from Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Though not perceived as a firm acceptance of Gen Hlaing’s regime by China, it is without a doubt a recognition of Gen Hlaing as the head of state and a clear message to all the EAOs that China’s pro-EAO policy has changed.

However, it may be correct to say that the EAOs have captured majority territory in Myanmar, but it may not be prudent to expect the EAOs to be able to successfully govern these areas under the umbrella of the NUG. Unfortunately, the only common agenda amongst the EAOs is to overthrow the junta. Beyond this common goal, there is no clear roadmap, especially when many EAOs have their own turf wars. Also, the junta may control lesser territory but has control over the majority of the population. Therefore, the junta since 2021 has only increased its military spending. The 2024-2025 fiscal year budget has not been released as yet, but second in command Gen Soe Win stated in the financial committee meeting that defence would take precedence over agriculture, electricity, and even health.

The 2023 defence budget was over $2.68 billion. The increased budgets may account for the recent revamping of the abandoned Pakokku airport in the Magwe region. The airbase can provide essential air support to the heavy fighting in Chin state. Incidentally, it was this year that China delivered three FTC 2000G mid-range fighter jets to the Tatmadaw. Three were delivered in 2021. Additionally, as winter sets in, it promises to bring clearer skies. The rainy seasons till now had limited the Tatmadaw’s air capabilities.

It has dawned upon China that it cannot control EAOs any longer. The realisation of Western vested interests in many EAOs, as well as the NUG, followed by attacks on Chinese-owned cement and nickel manufacturing companies, consulates, and other assets, are failures of the State Administration Council (SAC). To this end, China has proposed a Joint Venture Security Company (JVSC). Though this has caused ripples in the military ranks as well as in the media, Beijing has been insisting on this collaboration. The acceptance of this venture would formalise China’s anti- EAO policy.

While China has given political legitimacy to the SAC, publicly supported Gen Hlaing’s plans for elections, controlled the EAOs, and effectively, for now, countered any dependence on the US, India has played a wait-and-watch game. It has kept channels of communication open with the junta and the NUG. However, with China’s growing presence, India should also worry about EAOs across its northeastern borders. Much has already been said of the Chin EAOs across the border, and various transnational ethnic ties have already been blamed for the unrest in Manipur that is threatening to spread across neighbouring states.

With their knowledge of the terrain and routes, drug trafficking and arms trade, including drone warfare, the threat to India is not an alarmist review of the situation but a realistic one. The Sagaing region has over 2.5 million people displaced, many of whom have already found refuge in India, considering other countries like Bangladesh are not an option for them. In Rakhine state, the last military outpost in the city of Ann was taken by the Arakan Army (AA) earlier this month, which also happens to be a short distance away from Myanmar’s Western Command Center. AA drawing support from the state’s Buddhist majority today controls nearly all of Rakhine. Though India is a seasoned player in Myanmar and realises that it has to negotiate with EAOs that can have an impact on its northeastern borders while keeping the junta engaged, it is important for India to keep an eye on the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingyas in Bangladesh.

Reports suggest that ARSA has ties to Rohingyas in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. ARSA, previously known as Harakat al-Yaqin (HAY), is also led by a Pakistani national, Ataullah Abu Ammar Jununi. While observers and the Tatmadaw itself are distracted by the ongoing conflict, it is possible that ARSA and the over 1 million Rohingyas in Cox’s Bazaar and the Tombru border have become more geopolitically savvy. AA’s takeover of Rakhine will substantiate their claims of being persecuted and stateless people, at least for the consumption of the international community. If AA takes full control of Rakhine, the chances of the Rohingyas ever returning are bleak, making a case for their permanent settlement on the borders of Bangladesh a reality.

It is imperative for India to focus on its northeastern border. Politics in Myanmar has never been without the interference of the Tatmadaw. Realising this, India must create strong military-to-military ties with the junta. The way the armed forces can understand each other, civilians rarely can. On the other hand, India must engage with EAOs as well, sending scholars and ex-servicemen to create networks. It was recently that some members of the rebel forces met Indian scholars in Delhi. Engagements such as these must continue in Myanmar as well. Only then will we begin to understand the changing contours of the chaos in Myanmar and assess what is in store for India in the near future.

Rami Niranjan Desai is an anthropologist and a scholar of the Northeast region of India. She is a columnist and author and presently Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of Firstpost.