Proxies, pressures and push: China’s new playbook in the subcontinent

The thaw in India-China relations following the border disengagement in October 2024 appears both contradictory and precarious. The resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra has served as a cultural pacifier for the Indian public, while both governments have notably avoided sparring over the Dalai Lama’s succession announcement. While External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has said ties are “moving in the right direction,” reports suggest that Prime Minister Narendra Modi is likely to visit China for the SCO summit in Tianjin. Yet, China’s growing footprint across the subcontinent continues to undermine India’s interests.

The long-suspected China-Pakistan collusion was laid bare during the four-day India-Pakistan conflict. While maintaining a diplomatic façade, Beijing backed Pakistan with military hardware, technical support, satellite intelligence, and psychological warfare—turning India’s western front into a live laboratory for Chinese systems. Reports suggest that Chinese media outlets and embassies also ran a misinformation campaign against India’s Rafale jets, promoting their indigenous arms industry and feeding Pakistan’s war narrative.

Even earlier, China had been steadily undercutting India’s regional position. Bangladesh’s unelected leader Muhammad Yunus visited Beijing to sign key agreements, including establishing a Chinese Industrial Economic Zone. A China–Pakistan–Bangladesh trilateral soon followed Operation Sindoor. In Bhutan, China ramped up construction in Doklam and laid new claims west of Tawang. In Nepal, there has been a surge in connectivity and tourism, with bilateral trade doubling in just one year, driven by Chinese tariff waivers and easier access to high-tech goods. When these dots are connected, it becomes evident that China’s strategy towards India has shifted in response to evolving geopolitical realities.

China pivots to a new strategy

While China made inroads in the region over the last decade, it deployed multiple strategies for unsettling New Delhi, including dismissing India as a second-tier partner of the West and probing India’s capabilities at the border. Two significant shifts have forced China to change its tactics.

First, the cooldown in India–US relations near the end of the Biden Administration, followed by President Trump’s hardline position on trade and the recent India–Pakistan crisis, has blunted Beijing’s narrative of painting India as a Western stooge. Second, India’s position of linking border stability with the normalisation of bilateral ties has proved effective. China has learned that New Delhi will bear heavy costs but will not blink in a head-on standoff. Further, U.S. intelligence and diplomatic support—from Doklam to Ladakh—has shown that prolonged standoffs risk uniting international opinion against China, inviting greater Western support for India.

While these factors nudged China toward a tactical rapprochement in October 2024, shifting dynamics in the region have presented opportunities to exploit India’s setbacks. It began with Maldivian President Muizzu’s India Out campaign, which culminated in his audience with President Xi in Beijing in January 2024. By August 2024, Yunus came to power in Bangladesh on the back of anti-India radical Islamists. Although he enjoyed support from Democrats in the US, his fraught history with President Trump and the suspension of USAID pushed him closer to China by early 2025. The final piece was set by Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir last April, whose vitriolic speech triggered the Pahalgam attacks.

Unlike during the Ladakh standoff, when regional miscreants remained passive, India’s borders today are unstable on multiple fronts. This volatility has created an opening for China to aggravate India’s security environment without deploying its own capabilities.

Proxies and pressures

China’s strategy in Southern Asia rests on two primary objectives. First, it seeks to contain India’s maritime capabilities to safeguard its energy lanes. To that end, it aims to convert India’s smaller neighbours into proxies, stalling India’s naval ambitions. Second, China wants an iron grip over Tibet by engineering a smooth Dalai Lama succession and winning the narrative on legitimacy. For that, it must deny India the space to host the next Dalai Lama—a goal that risks conflict, with China launching operations along the border for a quid pro quo.

Through proxies, China advances both aims at minimal cost. It seeks to create “reinforced fronts” across the subcontinent, forcing India to expend diplomatic energy and strategic resources just to maintain the status quo. The region becomes a strategic Whac-a-Mole game for India: in Pakistan, Chinese support erodes India’s military edge; in Bangladesh, Beijing counters India’s leverage over logistics and trade; in Nepal, the target is cultural and economic influence; in Bhutan, India may be drawn into permanent troop deployments.

Proxies can also be used to mount calibrated pressures while maintaining plausible deniability. As seen during Operation Sindoor, China aided Pakistan in both military and information domains. In Bangladesh, it can back an anti-India regime while fuelling radical Islam and illegal migration. In Bhutan, infrastructure development would threaten the Siliguri corridor. Meanwhile, Nepal could be emboldened as China replaces India as the principal provider of public goods.

All the while, the illusion of stability in India–China ties will persist—simply because the border remains quiet. Post-Galwan, China is unlikely to provoke a fresh standoff unless its core interests are threatened. With India’s resolve tested for nearly five years, the utility of border probes has diminished. Any future action will likely be swift, executed before India can mobilize troops or rally international support.

The Big Push

The succession of the Dalai Lama is poised to become a flashpoint in India–China relations. To project an image of normalisation, Beijing is likely to maintain a quiet border—while drawing India’s attention toward its destabilised periphery. From an emboldened Pakistan to a volatile Bangladesh, all with China’s tacit support, India will find its strategic bandwidth stretched.

China, meanwhile, is preparing for a larger escalation—one that aligns with its long-term objective of controlling the succession of the next Dalai Lama. The most plausible scenario for a limited war is a fait accompli territorial grab—most likely on Tawang, given its spiritual symbolism and historical resonance in Tibetan Buddhism. Such a move would not only bolster China’s claim to religious legitimacy but also impose high costs on India, precisely when its attention is divided.

Conclusion

China’s evolving playbook—anchored in proxies, pressures, and push—reflects a strategic shift: to keep India boxed in the region while Beijing secures its interests in Tibet and the Indian Ocean. By avoiding direct confrontation and dispersing India’s focus, China seeks to forestall a coherent Indian response. As the Dalai Lama succession looms, the appearance of calm may endure. But beneath the surface, Beijing is laying the groundwork for a limited, high-stakes escalation. India must now prepare not just for a border challenge—but for a theatre of conflict stretching across its entire strategic neighbourhood.

Ambuj Sahu is pursuing his PhD at Indiana University Bloomington. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.