Power through ports: A look at India and China’s dockage diplomacy

India’s strategic footprint in the Indo-Pacific region received a significant boost in April 2024, with the Indian government’s approval of India Ports Global Ltd’s (IPGL) proposal to take over the operations of Sittwe Port on the Kaladan River in Myanmar’s Rakhine province.

Following the successful management of the Shahid Beheshti Port in Chabahar, Iran, Sittwe Port marks India’s second overseas port venture. IPGL, a subsidiary of Sagarmala Development Company Limited, is wholly owned by the Ministry of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways, ensuring complete Indian control over the port’s operations.

India’s acquisition of Sittwe Port not only strengthens its maritime influence in the Indo-Pacific but also underscores its commitment to regional connectivity and economic development. As India and China contend for influence in the Indo-Pacific, strategic acquisitions like Sittwe Port will inevitably play a crucial role in shaping the region’s geopolitical dynamics.

Why is Sittwe important for India?

The strategic significance of Sittwe Port lies in its pivotal role in the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP), approved in 2008, which aims to establish multimodal connectivity between India and Southeast Asia. Situated on the Kaladan River delta, the port is designed to accommodate deep-sea vessels of up to 20,000 Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT). Its strategic location not only enhances regional connectivity but also facilitates India’s access to Myanmar’s energy resources, thus strengthening India’s energy security.

The inauguration of Sittwe Port on May 9, 2023, by Sarbananda Sonowal, Union Minister of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways, marked the beginning of a new era in regional connectivity.

The port’s operation holds promising prospects for Indian states like Mizoram and Tripura, which stand to benefit significantly from improved access to maritime trade routes. The reduced transportation time and costs facilitated by the port will significantly boost trade and investment in sectors like agro-horticulture, bamboo, rubber, and processed food. Moreover, the port offers a strategic alternative for trade between India’s north-eastern states and the rest of the world, bypassing Bangladesh. This not only reduces dependency on Bangladesh’s transportation infrastructure but also opens up new trade opportunities for India’s north-eastern region.

Furthermore, the port provides a direct maritime route for cargo from major Indian ports like Vizag and Kolkata to reach Myanmar and beyond. By circumventing traditional routes that often involve transhipment and delays, Sittwe Port significantly reduces transportation time and costs.

With its capacity to accommodate deep-water sea vessels, including those of up to 20,000 Dead Weight Tonnage (DWT), Sittwe Port also facilitates efficient and cost-effective maritime trade. This enhances India’s maritime capabilities and strengthens its position as a regional trade hub. Thus, with initiatives underway to enhance connectivity between these states and Myanmar via the Kaladan River, Sittwe Port is poised to become a linchpin in the region’s transportation network. Its strategic location and capacity make it a key asset in India’s pursuit of greater regional integration and cooperation.

Strategic importance: China’s growing port build-up

The Sino-Indian security dilemma has been exacerbated by China’s rise and growing military power. With China’s rapid modernisation of its military and its rapid growth trajectory, India has grown more vulnerable to China’s increasing military power both on the land frontier as well as in the maritime domain in the last decade. As a consequence of this increasing security dilemma, India has shifted its military strategy vis-à-vis China to one of deterrence by punishment.

In the Indo-Pacific, China and India are engaged in a struggle to expand their economic influence. Ports have become highly significant in this rivalry. China, in particular, has been aggressively seeking to acquire operating rights for numerous ports.

To describe China’s attempts to gain a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean, Booz Allen consultants coined the term ‘String of Pearls’ in a Pentagon report published back in 2003. In contemporary strategic debates, the String of Pearls has become one of the most widely discussed subjects. China’s efforts to build ‘nodes’ of influence in the Indian Ocean Region have gained traction in recent years. Several argue that this initiative is driven by Beijing’s military-strategic interests.

Experts highlight that China has developed a system of encircling ports as a commercial and strategic military deployment base in the past few years to check India’s progress. For example, Kyaukpyu Port in the Bay of Bengal, Woody Island in the Paracel archipelago, Port in the Spratly Islands, Sihanoukville of Cambodia, Istmo de Kra of Thailand, the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, the Marao port of the Maldives, and the Gwadar port in the south-west of Pakistan’s Baluchistan province.

With the rise of China, the great game to increase its influence and control vital strategic choke points and sea lines of communication in the region is on. Analysts believe some of these ports could have potential dual-use. According to David Brewster, a senior research fellow with the National Security College at the Australian National University, “Djibouti is only the first step in what is likely to become a network of Chinese bases across the Indian Ocean.”

The port of Hambantota was leased for 99 years to China by Sri Lanka in December 2017. In addition, China has created an underwater surveillance system to enable its submarines to have a better grasp on targets while safeguarding the nation’s interests along the Silk Road, which runs through the Indian Ocean. China is also rumoured to be building a naval base in “Jiwani,” located 60 km west of Gwadar and another 20km to the Iranian border, according to an American report. The former already hosts a small Pakistan naval base, and thus doesn’t come as a huge surprise.

According to Beijing-based military analyst Zhou Chenming, since Gwadar is now a civilian port, China must establish another base near Gwadar for its warships. It would serve as a dock and maintenance facility for naval vessels, as well as a hub for logistical support services on the Arabian Sea. In this regard, Jiwani’s proximity to the Chabahar Port has significant implications for India.

Up until 2017, Chinese officials insisted China would never seek overseas bases—until they opened a base in Djibouti, Africa. According to the US State Department, even though PLA Navy Marines are stationed there with armoured vehicles and artillery, the PRC refers to its base in Djibouti as a “logistics facility”.

Even though some analysts argue that China may not convert its ports in the Indian Ocean to military bases, these bases are largely commercial bases similar to those in the Maldives, which make them difficult to defend in war. However, their mere presence and influence pose a risk to India’s aspirations. Official Chinese media outlets call for the establishment of 18 military bases by the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) in the Indian Ocean Region. There is little doubt that China has a vested interest in the Indian Ocean.

China’s lucrative economic offers make it irresistible, especially to economically weaker but resource-rich nations. However, the ability to wield economic suzerainty over such nations can prove disastrous for the latter in the future. It is possible that countries supporting the PRC’s military expansion and thus Beijing’s geopolitical revisionism inadvertently serve Beijing’s interests by providing ports and other facilities to PRC entities.

Here, a question arises: “Can such port accumulation tactics be perceived as modern day military bases?” A military base is defined as an extraterritorial unit with an external actor’s sovereign or semi-sovereign rights. It is a facility directly owned and operated by or for the military or one of its branches that shelters military equipment and personnel and facilitates training and operations.

While military bases still hold significant value in the current geopolitical and global security architecture, they possess enormous disadvantages. The long-term, permanent presence of a country in a host state can result in political, environmental, and social problems. Foreign military bases lead to major power rivalry, which undermines spheres of influence or intends to shift their boundaries, intensifying great power competition and the arms race.

In present times, great powers are increasingly avoiding full military installations in countries considered either as the sphere of influence of another great power or simply located in their adversary’s close neighbourhood. The official opening of external states’ bases would be indeed perceived provoking for geopolitical rivalry and the domestic audience might suffer the brunt.

Thus, analysts believe that while port acquisitions cannot completely replace military bases, they can serve as alternatives in most cases. The cost-benefit ratio skews heavily in favour of port acquisition, as the establishment of permanent bases requires self-sufficiency, which reduces the country’s resources for developmental activities. Such port agreements are cheaper, more operationally sound, and less provocative ways to deter adversaries than permanently stationing troops overseas.

Work ahead and conclusion

India’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region has been increasing over the years because New Delhi realises that the maritime domain presents an opportunity to expand India’s footprint across the region. And as India strengthens its maritime capabilities, strategic acquisitions like Sittwe Port will play a crucial role in shaping the region’s geopolitical landscape.

It is thus, in this regard, the completion of the road component of the Kaladan project is crucial for unlocking the full economic potential of Sittwe Port. Once the highway between Paletwa and Zorinpuri is completed, India’s north-eastern states will no doubt have improved access to the Bay of Bengal, facilitating trade and investment in the region and furthering India’s strategic and economic ambitions.

The author is a researcher at the East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.