PM Modi’s China visit may signal thaw in ties, but India must not lower its guard

The recent visit of Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, to India, including his interactions with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, as well as a meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, signalled a thaw and forward movement in India-China ties, still impacted by the ghost of Galwan.

Wang Yi’s request for a meeting with PM Modi during his last visit in Mar 2022 was politely and firmly turned down. Since then, much water has flowed down the Brahmaputra.

While the trigger this time for a reset in relations between the two Asian powers is claimed to be sanctions and tariffs on India and China by US president Donald Trump, the reality is that both states have been working steadily to reduce tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and restore bilateral ties. Trump’s tariffs only added a boost to the process.

PM Modi will be travelling to China for the forthcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit at the end of the month, where he will interact with Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, as well as a possible trilateral involving Russia-India-China (RIC). India and China have both refused to bend to Trump’s pressures on tariffs.

Simultaneously, the US administration is working overtime, with Peter Navarro, Trump’s trade advisor, giving multiple interviews to highlight that the road to Moscow and ending the conflict flows through New Delhi. This has led to a distancing of Indo-American ties, with New Delhi moving closer to China, Russia and Brics nations.

In the past few days, PM Modi has had a briefing on Alaska talks from President Putin, Wang Yi visited New Delhi amidst improvement of ties, and Jaishankar landed in Moscow, where India recommenced dialogue for a trade agreement with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, stalled by the Ukraine war. He also had a meeting with President Putin. Tianjin city in China is now being watched.

Rebuilding of India-China trust is indicated by the reopening of traditional trading routes, Lipulekh, Shipki La and Nathu La, recommencing direct flights and sharing river data. China also agreed to address Indian concerns on export curbs on fertilisers, rare earth minerals and tunnel-boring machines.

PM Modi tweeted after meeting Wang Yi, ‘Stable, predictable, constructive ties between India and China will contribute significantly to regional as well as global peace and prosperity.’ The Chinese foreign ministry handout mentioned, ‘The stable and healthy development of China-India relations is in the fundamental interests of the two countries’ people.’

The visit of Wang Yi also set the ball rolling on resolving the border conflict. As per inputs, there would be two parallel tracks adopted, bilateral and border, a long-standing Indian demand of linking resolution of the border with bilateral ties. This is also in accordance with the 2005 Indo-China agreement.

On the border issue, an ‘expert group’ under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China border affairs (WMCC) would ‘explore early harvest in boundary delimitation’, implying possibly China accepting the LAC in Sikkim. Simultaneously, a working group would advance ‘effective border management’ to ensure peace and tranquillity in border areas.

There is already a military-led ‘General level Mechanism’ between India and China in the Ladakh sector. Similar ones would also be established for central and eastern sectors. The central sector mechanism would be headed by the Uttar Bharat Area, while the eastern sector by one of the two Corp HQs responsible for operations in the region. The two sides have also decided to utilise border-level mechanisms at diplomatic and military levels to work out ‘border management and de-escalation’.

A major problem which continues to exist is the trust deficit and infrastructure imbalance between the two sides. Historically, it has always been the Chinese who have intruded. Sumdorong Chu, Depsang, Chumar, Doklam and Galwan are some examples. Even today, another incursion attempt could be around the corner.

The current enhanced deployment along the LAC, largely in Ladakh, continues because of distrust. Adding to it was military, diplomatic and intelligence support provided by China to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor. Pakistan would never have launched Pahalgam without Beijing’s approval.

Chinese infrastructure in Tibet is far advanced and enables faster deployment. A senior unnamed Indian army official briefing on the same, post the visit of Wang Yi, mentioned, ‘The way China has built roads, bridges, tunnels and habitats along the entire LAC, from eastern Ladakh to Arunachal, over the last five years, People Liberation Army (PLA) troops can easily afford to pull back 100-150 km and then come back again in 2-3 hours. Our forces cannot. This huge time differential in mobilisation between rival forces will have to be factored in during any de-escalation talks.’

China is currently making Tibet its hub for trade with South Asia, hoping to change its economy while also sending a firm message of its integration into the mainstream. Major roads and rail networks in Tibet, all running parallel and close to the LAC, are being billed as nodes for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In January 2024 China announced an $11.2 billion plan to boost infrastructure in Tibet, including airports, railways and highways, with the aim of integrating its civil and military requirements. It is expected that by 2035, China will have developed the requisite infrastructure to support major operations against India.

This implies India has limited time to enhance its military capabilities as well as its infrastructure to meet the China challenge. Strong military and technological power and developing deterrence capabilities are the need of the hour, alongside diplomacy to resolve the border dispute. The successful launch of the Agni V is one such move.

To counter any Chinese misadventures, which remain localised and likely, the Indian armed forces need to restructure themselves into theatre commands at the earliest. This would enable exploiting maximum combat power. Whether we need one northern command or two, the second to include emerging threats from Bangladesh and Myanmar, is debatable.

Simultaneously, there is a need to reconsider the current structure of forces deployed along the LAC, in tune with the concept of a single command responsible for a single theatre. This will provide far more options for countering any incursion.

India’s Northern Command is currently managing active borders with two different adversaries (Pakistan and China) in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh along with the internal security of the state. This goes against the very concept of the forthcoming northern theatre command, which will be responsible for the complete northern theatre. Any incursion by China along the current LAC in northern command provides limited opportunities for a counteraction by our own forces in another sector, thereby projecting a no-nonsense stand.

It must also be noted that maximum Indian army retaliation, targeting Pakistan’s terrorist camps, during Operation Sindoor was in this sector. The LoC with Pakistan would always remain active. Ideally, Northern Command should handle the Pakistan front and internal security, shifting the Ladakh sector to Central Command, which already manages the LAC in Uttarakhand and Himachal.

This would enable better coordination and concentration of forces and also open doors for counter-incursions to any intrusions in the future. Finally, it would result in easier assimilation of forces into the Northern Theatre Command once created. We need to change with time, as better connectivity has opened far more access to Leh than just the erstwhile Srinagar-Kargil-Leh axis, as also the possibility of a Chinese incursion remains large, despite the current thaw.

The author is a former Indian Army officer, strategic analyst and columnist. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.