The Navarro ambush: Navigating India-US friction without losing the plot

The recent outburst by Peter Navarro, senior counsellor in the Trump administration, has jolted the atmosphere around India-US relations. Navarro went on record to brand India’s Russian oil purchases as “Modi’s war” and declared Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, alongside Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, as “a shame”. In tone and timing, the comments looked like an ambush, designed to needle rather than negotiate. But the real question is whether this represents a deeper shift/rift in the India-US partnership or merely a passing episode in a relationship that has endured turbulence before.

For much of the past two decades, India and the US have painstakingly built a strategic convergence—through shared security concerns, trade expansion, the Quad, and a broader push to balance China’s rise. India, however, has never abandoned the principle of strategic autonomy. The Tianjin summit symbolised this pragmatism. While visuals of Modi with Xi and Putin were flashed worldwide, the optics should be read as India’s attempt to maintain working equations with all major power centres. This balancing act is rarely simple, and it becomes even more complicated when Washington reacts with blunt rhetoric.

Navarro’s criticism is striking because he has no history of anti-India sentiment. His career has been defined more by hostility toward China. That he should suddenly frame India as a “laundromat for the Kremlin” is less a matter of strategic doctrine than of political theatre. The immediate trigger was Washington’s frustration with India’s continued intake of discounted Russian oil, which, according to US officials, undermines sanctions pressure and helps finance Russia’s war in Ukraine. The US has coupled the rhetoric with trade weapons—tariffs rising from 25 per cent to 50 per cent—and Navarro has even suggested that relief is possible only if India halts these imports. This is not just economic leverage; it is an attempt to politicise India’s energy security.

There are two possible ways to interpret this escalation. The first is that it signals a deeper re-evaluation of India within US policy. When India was earlier buying energy from Russia the US never objected. By targeting New Delhi’s energy purchases, Washington now is hinting at limits to tolerance for India’s multi-alignment. Coupled with Modi’s visible warmth at the SCO with Xi and Putin, Navarro’s words could be read as an early warning that the US sees India drifting too far eastwards. In this view, tariffs and rhetoric are not aberrations but an opening gambit in a harsher phase of Indo-American relations. Treading a fine path is always subject to ambushes.

The second interpretation is more persuasive: that this is an aberration driven by the style and temperament of the current US administration. Trump’s foreign policy has always thrived on unpredictability, tariff threats, and personalised attacks. Navarro’s broadside fits that pattern. It is consistent with Washington using trade as an instrument of political signalling but inconsistent with the institutional reality of India-US ties. Defence cooperation, intelligence exchanges, Indo-Pacific maritime security, and high-level dialogues within the Quad all continue, unaffected by sound bites. India’s purchase of Russian oil, moreover, has been declining as discounts narrow and as suppliers diversify. Officials in Delhi are careful to stress that these decisions are driven by economic necessity, not political defiance.

Where does this leave the relationship? Much depends on how both sides handle the immediate aftermath. If India takes Navarro’s language as policy and hardens its position, escalation could follow. If instead New Delhi responds with calibrated diplomacy—acknowledging US concerns, explaining energy imperatives, and pointing to the decline in Russian imports—the friction can be managed. It’s all about strategic communication; how an argument is conveyed by each side. The US too cannot take India for granted. This is not the first time the two countries have sparred in public while quietly continuing cooperation behind the scenes as is wont to happen in all strategic relationships where aberrations arise.

For India, the path forward lies in negotiating the minefield with clarity and confidence. Institutional ties must be reinforced. The more weight that is placed on Quad consultations, defence dialogues, and technology partnerships, the less impact intemperate rhetoric can have. Trade diplomacy must be recalibrated. India cannot capitulate to demands that undermine its energy security, but it can negotiate transitional arrangements, emphasise humanitarian grounds for stable fuel prices, and propose timelines for adjustments. This approach demonstrates responsibility while refusing to be cornered.

India must defend its strategic autonomy not out of frustration of being pressured but as a positive principle. A diverse network of partnerships allows India to remain an independent actor rather than a junior ally. This needs to be framed explicitly in diplomatic language. India is not choosing Moscow over Washington, but choosing a diversified path that serves stability and is actually good for the world.

The impending arrival of a new US ambassador presents a timely opportunity. Proactive engagement—through outreach, strategic briefings, and an emphasis on shared democratic values—can help reset the narrative before Navarro’s words calcify into broader perceptions. Personal diplomacy here matters: India should welcome the envoy with warmth while signalling its willingness to address irritants constructively.

Finally, India must not cede the international narrative. At multilateral platforms like the G20 or UN, it can highlight its role as a stabiliser in energy markets, as a climate leader, and as a democratic partner in global supply chains. By doing so, it reminds both Washington and the wider world that India’s choices are made in the spirit of responsibility, not defiance.

In sum, Navarro’s ambush may have generated headlines, but it does not undo the foundation of Indo-American relations. It’s a rant used to pressure India and our diplomacy is far too developed to be affected by it. It has revealed stress points, yes, but these are the inevitable consequence of a multipolar world where India is increasingly central. The US may bristle at India’s insistence on autonomy, just as India may bristle at Washington’s coercive tone. Yet both sides need each other far more than they admit in moments of irritation. With careful diplomacy, India can turn this turbulence into an opportunity—demonstrating that it can engage Washington robustly while preserving its independence. If managed well, the episode will be remembered not as the start of a rift, but as proof that the world’s largest democracies can argue, disagree, and still move forward together.

The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.