 "Permanent solutions elude as China plays the long game on Tibet and India’s borders")
On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Qingdao, China, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met his counterpart Admiral Dong Jun and called for a “permanent solution” to their decades-old Tibet border dispute. The question that immediately emerges here concerns the timing—especially when there have been several narratives about India and China moving toward peaceful disengagement in Depsang and Demchok since last year, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping at Kazan on the sidelines of the BRICS summit and an agreement was drawn up.
China had stated in October last year that disengagement had been completed at Depsang and Demchok, two of the friction points that emerged post-2020 when China violated India’s sovereignty and martyred 20 soldiers of the Indian Army during the Galwan Valley clash. However, a December 2024 Pentagon report noted that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had not fully drawn down its forces since 2020 and continued building infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), indicating that despite the agreement, full disengagement was yet to take place.
In this context, the use of two terms by Defence Minister Singh during his meeting with Dong in June this year—“permanent” and “Tibet”—carries significant meanings and signals. The deliberate use of “permanent” implies that India understands China’s actions do not match its words, particularly regarding disengagement at friction points. Second, the temporary nature of so-called agreements for maintaining peace at the disputed borders becomes glaring when the need for a permanent solution is stressed.
Despite multiple rounds of talks between India and China at various levels, the fact remains that conflict is used as the first resort by the Chinese PLA. Examples range from 1962 to 1967, 1987, 2018, 2020, 2021, and 2022. Moreover, China’s response to Singh’s statement on the need for a permanent solution to the decades-old Tibet border question clarified that China does not actually seek a solution to the dispute. Just days after Singh’s statement, China remarked that the boundary dispute with India is “complicated” and will “take time to settle.”
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More ShortsThis is reminiscent of the 1950s. In 1954, Zhou Enlai stated that China’s India policy should strive for co-existence based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, seeking to make it anti-US aggression and anti-war. He added that India was still under British and American influences, so China wanted to win it over. As for the border issue, Zhou said questions regarding areas such as Tawang and Lhoyul—excluded by the McMahon Line—and issues regarding the “ownership” of these areas would be resolved in the future at an appropriate time due to “insufficient documents.” He further noted that the stronger China became, the more India’s attitude would change.
In 2025, there are striking similarities with 1954. In April, China urged India to stand with it against U.S. tariffs. Since 2024, China has been actively pushing narratives of how it is trying to stabilise the borders with India. As seen in China’s response to Singh’s call for a permanent solution, this is reminiscent of Zhou’s 1954 view that the future would determine the resolution of the dispute.
The timing of Singh’s focus on the border with Tibet is also pertinent. In the run-up to the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday, Chinese attempts to Sinicise Buddhism and obliterate everything about Tibet—including replacing its name with the Chinese term ‘Xizang’—need to be noted. A few weeks before the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday, Xi met with the China-chosen Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu. Gedhun Choeki Nyima, the Panchen Lama recognised by the Dalai Lama in 1995, has now been missing for 30 years since being taken into custody by Chinese authorities at the age of six.
The Panchen Lama is the second-highest spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism after the Dalai Lama. Norbu, while meeting Xi, stated he would keep in mind Xi’s earnest teachings and firmly support the leadership of the ruling Chinese Communist Party.
A few weeks later, China announced it had started the third phase of work on restoring and preserving Buddhist scriptures, most written in Sanskrit. When the Dalai Lama celebrated his 90th birthday and announced that the Gaden Phodrang Trust—the religious authority managing his affairs—will oversee his succession, stating that the CCP will have no authority, China flared up yet again, as it has in the past, and called for no interference in China’s internal matters. Leading up to the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday, China also invited Indian journalists to Tibet. Even the most credible among them, perhaps not fully grasping strategic concerns, referred to Tibet as ‘Xizang’ in their reports.
The continued use of the Chinese term for Tibet not only obliterates Tibetan identity but also normalises China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh. ‘Xizang’ implies “Western treasure trove” in Chinese, while China calls India’s Arunachal Pradesh ‘Zangnan’ or “Southern treasure trove.” Erasing Tibet’s identity through manipulation of media narratives also furthers China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Zangnan.’
The fate of Tibet is closely tied to China’s claims on India’s sovereignty. The timing of China’s renewed attempts to Sinicise Buddhism and appropriate everything about Tibet—from its sovereignty to culture to language—in the lead-up to the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday cannot be missed. Singh’s statement on the need for a permanent solution to the Tibet dispute must also be seen as a carefully timed pushback.
China’s attack on India in 1962, with skirmishes leading up to it, all started in the 1950s after the PLA forcibly occupied Tibet. The parallels between the 1950s and now must be carefully studied by India. China’s overtures to push narratives of friendship with India to counter the West, its military onslaught on Tibet then, its attempts to obliterate Tibetan identity now, and the permanent delaying of resolving the border question—back in 1954 and again today—are all ominous signs. India must take cognisance of these realities and understand that China can never be trusted in any sphere of any relationship.
Prof Sriparna Pathak is a Professor of China Studies at O.P. Jindal Global University and serves as a Senior Fellow at the Jindal India Institute. Sagar Naidu is a Doctoral scholar at the University of Basel, Switzerland. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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