Bonhomie with US, pact with Saudi: Is it a diplomatic spring for Pakistan or just a passing thaw?

In recent months, Pakistan appears to be enjoying an unusual diplomatic momentum. For a state that has long been described in international discourse as isolated, dependent, and perennially in crisis, the sudden flurry of external engagements and reconciliations is striking. The question worth asking is whether this is a passing tactical reprieve or the beginning of a broader upward curve in Pakistan’s geopolitical standing.

The signs are visible across multiple theatres. Pakistan has quietly improved relations with Bangladesh, a neighbour that for decades harboured historical bitterness over 1971 and the bloody circumstances of independence. While Dhaka remains cautious and its ties with India still provide the anchor for its security, recent engagements with Pakistan suggest a new tone. Pakistan has adopted more conciliatory rhetoric, worked through back channels, and sought to emphasise economic and cultural linkages rather than political fault lines. This may not transform the relationship overnight, but it does reduce Pakistan’s diplomatic burden in South Asia.

The bigger breakthrough has come with Saudi Arabia. The signing of the September 2025 defence pact formalised a relationship that has had many ups and downs but never lost its strategic depth. By positioning itself as Riyadh’s military partner of choice at a time when Saudi Arabia feels insecure and distrustful of American constancy, Pakistan has regained a role it had partially lost.

The symbolism of the pact is as important as its content: Pakistan is back in the Gulf security equation in a visible way, not merely as a supplicant for bailouts but as a declared partner in deterrence. For a country often defined by economic weakness, that shift matters.

Equally noteworthy is the warming with Washington. The US has historically oscillated between treating Pakistan as an indispensable ally and a troublesome partner. In the last few years, ties were relatively off, shaped by America’s pivot away from Afghanistan and its tilt towards India. Yet there are indications now of renewed dialogue. Reports suggest quiet understandings on counterterrorism, limited intelligence sharing, and even strategic consultations on regional stability.

It all commenced with the $475 million support for the refurbishment of the ageing F16 fleet of aircraft by the Biden Administration a few months after withdrawing from Afghanistan. In 2023 Washington arranged to buy a reported 600 million US dollars’ worth of ammunition from Pakistan to supply to Ukraine in order to sustain the war. The US sees value in keeping a channel open to Islamabad at a time when it worries about Afghanistan’s trajectory, Iran’s posture, and China’s growing reach. For Pakistan, even a modest improvement with the US carries significant diplomatic weight, not least because of the signalling effect to other partners.

On its western flank, Pakistan has been mending fences with both Afghanistan and Iran, especially after the spats with both over the last two years. The relationship with Kabul has long been fraught, shaped by border disputes, Taliban sanctuaries, and mutual accusations of interference. Yet pragmatism seems to have crept in. The Taliban government, facing isolation and economic collapse, needs neighbours willing to deal.

Pakistan, after periods of confrontation, has recalibrated to a more cooperative posture, aware that instability in Afghanistan only spills over to its own soil. With Iran, too, there has been cautious rapprochement. For years, Islamabad’s closeness to Riyadh and Washington, coupled with suspicions about sectarian influence, complicated the relationship. But recent gestures—energy talks, cross-border security dialogues, and shared concerns over militant groups—suggest that both capitals are willing to lower the temperature.

Pakistan has also been exploring a warmer relationship with Russia. Moscow, which historically leaned towards India during the Cold War, has in recent years sought more diversified partnerships, particularly as it faces isolation in Europe. Pakistan offers Russia a partner in energy sales, defence talks, and a channel into South Asia. While this relationship is still embryonic, it adds another dimension to Pakistan’s diplomatic portfolio. Combined with its long-standing “all-weather friendship” with China, the Russian angle strengthens the impression that Islamabad is broadening its external network.

The cumulative effect of these moves is striking. After years of inward focus and repeated economic crises, Pakistan has managed to reposition itself as a more engaged player. Some of this is the product of its own diplomacy; some flows from regional turbulence that makes Islamabad relevant again. Either way, the result is a discernible upward curve in its geopolitical status, at least in the short term.

For India, these shifts merit close observation. Pakistan’s newfound confidence, if sustained, could translate into a harder diplomatic line on issues of direct concern to New Delhi, from Kashmir to cross-border militancy. It would be premature to conclude that this confidence could translate into the possibility of another terrorist act on Indian soil, but precautions would be needed.

More importantly, the sense of renewed external backing—whether from Riyadh, Beijing, or even a cautious Washington—may embolden Islamabad to once again test limits. The memory of Operation Sindoor still looms large in India’s narrative of resolve, but Pakistan may see its current openings as a chance to offset that setback.

Yet caution is warranted before exaggerating the scale of transformation. Many of Pakistan’s relationships remain fragile. Its economy is still heavily indebted, dependent on bailouts, and vulnerable to external shocks. Its political system is volatile, with civil-military tensions unresolved and institutional stability in question. Bangladesh may engage more warmly, but its alignment with India is unlikely to shift in a fundamental way.

Saudi Arabia’s defence pact carries symbolic weight, but Riyadh’s commitment to deploy real resources in Pakistan’s cause, especially in a conflict with India, remains uncertain. The United States may seek cooperation, but its core strategic focus continues to be China and the Indo-Pacific, where India remains more central. Even with Russia, Pakistan is more a supplementary partner than a pivotal one.

Moreover, the same volatility that creates openings can also turn against Islamabad. In Afghanistan, Taliban infighting and extremist threats can spill into Pakistan’s borderlands. In Iran, the rivalry with Saudi Arabia remains unresolved, and Pakistan risks being caught between patrons. Even the Saudi relationship has seen abrupt reversals in the past when trust eroded. What seems today like an upward trajectory could just as easily flatten or dip tomorrow.

The real measure will be whether Pakistan can translate its diplomatic engagements into durable strategic and economic gains of some worth. If these relationships help stabilise its economy, attract investment, and moderate domestic extremism, then the shift could be structural. If, however, they remain limited to symbolic agreements and episodic support, Pakistan’s geopolitical spring may prove short-lived.

For India, the best response is steady vigilance without alarm. Recognising that Pakistan is more active diplomatically does not mean assuming that its power has dramatically expanded. India’s own partnerships in the Gulf, with the US, Europe, and across the Indo-Pacific, remain robust. The diaspora advantage, trade links, and defence partnerships give New Delhi enduring leverage that Pakistan cannot easily match. Nevertheless, India must keep a close watch on how these external openings embolden Pakistan’s strategic posture.

The last few months may indeed represent an upward curve for Islamabad’s geopolitical status, but curves bend. Whether this one continues to rise will depend not only on Pakistan’s diplomacy but also on its capacity to reform at home. For now, New Delhi would be wise to neither dismiss the developments as cosmetic nor inflate them into a looming threat but to keep its focus on both South Asia and West Asia, where Pakistan is clearly attempting to script a return to relevance.

The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.