How Pakistan has mastered the art of projecting defeat as victory

Field Marshal William Slim’s book Defeat into Victory, published in 1956, covered the retaking of Burma (now Myanmar) from the Japanese by Allied forces during the Second World War. The book was praised for its narrative style and detailed account of the offensive, including honestly accepting mistakes.

Pakistan has been the only country whose leaders may not have read the book but implemented ‘only’ its title to falsely project every defeat from India as a victory. Where it has failed, it has played a narrative projecting outside elements responsible for their failures.

Pakistani history books claim the 1947-48 conflict occurred when people rose against the Maharaja’s rule. The intent was to portray Pakistan as an innocent victim of Indian aggression, whereas the reality was that the attack by Pakistan’s tribal militias and army forced the Maharaja to accede to India, resulting in the Indian Army landing in Srinagar.

Pakistani books mention, ‘Hari Singh started a brutal campaign to drive out Muslims from Kashmir. Over 200,000 people in the princely state, supported by the tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier Province, were successful in liberating a large area of Kashmir from the Maharaja’s control. So Hari Singh was forced to turn to India for help and in return acceded to India.’

In 1965, Pakistan’s army chief, General Mohamad Musa Khan, launched Operation Gibraltar, which involved infiltrating special forces to create an uprising within Kashmir, which would coincide with an armed attack. The aim was to capture Kashmir. The operation began in August 1965, and within a month it collapsed, as there was no uprising within. India hit back, crossing the border in September. It went on to capture Haji Pir Pass, amongst other areas, which were handed back post the Tashkent talks.

About this failed Pakistani operation, the fifth-grade textbook in Peshawar mentions, ‘The Pakistan Army conquered several areas of India, and when India was on the verge of being defeated, she ran to the UN to beg for a ceasefire. Magnanimously, Pakistan returned all conquered territories to India.’ Pakistan also marks September 6 as National Defence Day as a tribute to the armed forces. Yet another defeat falsely projected to victory.

This process continued in 1971. It blamed its humiliating loss and largest surrender in history in the Bangladesh war on Hindu teachers in schools and colleges in erstwhile East Pakistan. Its Punjab school textbook mentions that Hindu teachers ‘continued creating a negative impression on Pakistan. No importance was attached to explaining the ideology of Pakistan’. It added that East Pakistan’s economy was impacted because Hindu teachers sent their income to India.

Though the army attempted to shift responsibility for the surrender on the then commander in East Pakistan, Gen AAK Niazi, by dismissing him from service without pension, the stigma remained.

The uprising in East Pakistan was largely due to his mismanagement and failed policies. To add to the misery, the womaniser and alcoholic, Gen Yahya Khan, was the martial law administrator. Defeat at the hands of India and the creation of Bangladesh led to the downfall of the military dictatorship, and Zulfikar Bhutto took over the reins.

The Pakistan Army accepted the ignominy of defeat for just six years, and in 1977 Bhutto was himself overthrown by Gen Zia ul Haq, and another dictatorship took root in Pakistan.’ Ironically, Benazir Bhutto became PM after Zia’s death in 1988. A graffiti on the walls in Karachi mentioned, ‘Sorry for the interruption; military rule will return shortly.’

In 1999, Pervez Musharraf, as the army chief, launched Operation Badr, which was the codename for infiltration and occupation of heights along the LoC in Kargil. Musharraf was certain, like many of his predecessors, that he would be the chief to provide Pakistan its first victory over India. This too failed when India launched Operation Vijay. Such was the embarrassment that Musharraf was forced to disown the remains of his dead soldiers and also deny their involvement.

Nawaz Sharif was compelled to order the withdrawal of whatever remained of Pakistani troops when Bill Clinton threatened him that India was preparing to escalate the conflict. Musharraf knew his plan had collapsed when his forces, occupying the heights, could no longer be replenished. The best example of projecting ‘defeat as victory’ came after Operation Vijay, when, a few months later, Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif and took over the reins of Pakistan.

During that period military rulers, as well as dictators, were acceptable as long as they were useful to the West. Musharraf was useful as the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom to remove al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and needed Pakistan’s support. It no longer holds true.

To cover its failures against the Afghans and terrorist groups it created, in recent days, Pakistan began playing a new game. It forced its suppressed media to hide its losses while claiming overkills of fighters it terms as India-supported.

The Pakistan Army has dominated the nation since its inception. Historically, no Pakistani PM has served a full tenure, despite bowing to the army’s demands, as egos clash with time. Its desire to control witnessed a change in recent years, especially during the tenures of General Bajwa and, following him, Asim Munir.

Bajwa was forced to bow down and release Wing Commander Abhinandan after his aircraft was hit post India launching Operation Bandar, destroying Pakistan’s terrorist camp in Balakote. Pakistan continues projecting the downing of Abhinandan’s aircraft as a victory, despite its own politician, Ayaz Sadiq, mentioning in the senate, “I remember Shah Mahmood Qureshi was in the meeting in which Imran Khan had refused to attend, and Chief of Army Staff General Bajwa came into the room; his legs were shaking, and he was perspiring. The Foreign Minister said, ‘For God’s sake, let Abhinandan go. India’s about to attack Pakistan at 9 pm.’”

Asim Munir has gone stages ahead. After having suffered massive losses in Indian strikes in Operation Sindoor, which destroyed or rendered unserviceable their air bases, terrorist camps, aircraft, missile defences and forward posts, he still claimed victory. Apart from pushing a fake narrative, he forced the government to appoint him as Field Marshal. It has taken Pakistan months to repair damages to their air bases.

Once ‘failed marshal’ Munir began dominating the country in every sphere, there was no major nation which Munir visited with the PM in tow. Internally, he began plotting on how to gain absolute power without being termed a dictator. He forced the government to reorganise the structure of the armed forces by making him the head, thereby removing political control. By this appointment, Munir controls all security forces (internal and external) of the country.

Munir also had a law passed extending his tenure by five years and also providing him immunity from any form of prosecution for life. Such powers are only provided to dictators prior to being compelled to relinquish power. There was not a single politician who had the gall to question this decision.

Global military strongmen seeking to overthrow governments and become dictators must learn from Pakistan. It is essential that they master the Pakistan Army’s handbook of projecting defeat into victory if they wish to succeed.

(The author is a former Indian Army officer, strategic analyst and columnist. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.)