 "Operation Sindoor: For India, deterrence lies in hard military power")
After 88 hours of clinical and precision strikes, the Indian Armed Forces, who had been given full ‘operational freedom’, achieved their objectives in a calibrated, controlled and decisive manner. What also stood out in an era of unending conflicts was the wise drawing of a finish line.
Operation ‘Sindoor’ represented an evolution in our war-fighting doctrine, showcasing the capability and ability of our Armed Forces. There was a marked escalation in the scope, intensity and precision targeting compared to India’s earlier responses to terror attacks. Soon after the prime minister articulated India’s ‘new normal’. The doctrine was clear and unambiguous. This watershed moment marked the unveiling of a new national security posture, one that treats state-sponsored terrorism as an act of war.
Parliament, Mumbai, Pathankot, Uri, Pulwama and now Pahalgam all had one thing in common: Pakistan’s use of terror as an instrument of state policy, but now the Indian armed forces had drawn the ‘sindoor line’ and targeted terror sites in the heartland of Pakistani Punjab, literally going for Pakistan’s ‘jugular’.
The fact is that India’s actions were aimed at forcing Pakistan to change its behaviour as far as using terrorism as an instrument of state policy is concerned. The question remains as to whether our political will and military action have ensured deterrence.
Understanding Deterrence
The challenge of deterrence, implying discouraging states from taking unwanted actions, especially military aggression, is a principal theme of a nation’s defence policy. In his press briefing after the initial operation, the Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated that Pakistan’s failure “to take action against the terrorist infrastructure on its territory” necessitated a military operation “to deter and to preempt”.
Deterrence can be further amplified as the practice of discouraging or restraining someone in world politics, usually a nation-state, from taking unwanted actions. It involves an effort to stop or prevent an action, as opposed to the closely related but distinct concept of “compellence”, which is an effort to force it to do something. If a state considers attacking an adversary but refrains due to concern over that adversary’s military power, it has been deterred.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsDeterrence typically takes two forms: deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. Deterrence by denial strategies seeks to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives by deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat a design, in other words, convincing an adversary that its attack would be unsuccessful because it would be physically blocked.
Whereas deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, threatens severe penalties if an attack occurs. It is based on the threat of imposing costs through retaliation. Steps taken include placing significant military capabilities directly in the path of an aggressor, which speaks loudly and clearly.
Deterrence is usually unnoticed by the public since it is about preventing aggression rather than taking visible action. However, crises reveal where and how deterrence is failing or succeeding, since visible military decisions are now made public.
India earlier deterred terror attacks attributed to militants based in Pakistan by threatening a conventional military response. Following the Parliament attack India mobilized its troops all across the border with Pakistan. As per Jaswant Singh “the objective of India’s mobilisation was to defeat cross border terrorism and infiltration without conflict”.
Pakistan, in turn, looked to prevent retaliatory conventional military action through the threat of nuclear weapons. The fact is that if these terrorist incidents keep happening at a regular pace followed by India’s retaliation, it suggests there were gaps in deterrence.
The failure of deterrence has led to leaders and policymakers sometimes referring to military operations as being designed to “restore deterrence”. However, even this can be a misleading phrase, as Professor Debak Das of the University of Denver states, “There may be something wrong with the method of deterrence”.
Over the coming weeks and months, analysts and policymakers will assess how successful both sides’ military operations were in restoring deterrence, a key question with the potential to shape regional security dynamics going forward.
Nuclear Deterrence
The most powerful deterrent a state can possess is nuclear weapons. Soon after the development of nuclear weapons, scholars argued that these capabilities were so powerful that no two nuclear-armed states would dare to fight one another. In other words, they would be deterred from doing so.
But while nuclear weapons may ensure stable deterrence at the strategic or nuclear level, instability and conflict are likely to occur at lower levels because both sides believe in controlling escalation till that point. This led to Pakistan feeling there was space to conduct a sub-conventional proxy war against India.
India has taken action to punish Pakistan militarily in response to terror attacks. Notable examples have included Operation Parakram in 2001; the development of the Cold Start military doctrine intended to quickly capture territory to extract concessions; “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control in 2016; and the airstrike at Balakot in 2019. Each response pushed the envelope further both vertically and horizontally, displaying the ability to impose costs within a nuclear overhang.
Following Pahalgam, India dramatically increased the scope of its military action against Pakistan in response to terrorism. This represented an expansion in its willingness to conduct conventional operations beneath the nuclear threshold.
Operation Sindoor has proved that conventional power, wielded with precision, can eliminate threats and convey a message without the attendant fear of a mushroom cloud. Pakistan’s military-backed terrorist groups would no longer be able to operate with impunity, secure in the knowledge that India won’t risk nuclear escalation. Pakistan’s space for nuclear deterrence has been shrunk due to India’s non-contact kinetic actions facilitated by newer technologies.
Escalation During Operation Sindoor
What was witnessed were multiple rounds of retaliation, including strikes on major military bases, and the use of capabilities never previously employed between the two countries.
On the opening day of strikes, the Indian Armed Forces demonstrated the ability to identify and destroy terrorist-linked infrastructure in Pakistani territory, employing stand-off weapons to deliver precision strikes at speed without crossing the international border. The intent was clear: India was focused on degrading the terrorist ecosystem that exists in Pakistan.
In the following days, operations expanded in scope, as Pakistan chose to retaliate, and India then penetrated Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defence network to target selected airbases for the first time since the 1971 war.
Further India’s multi-layered air defence ensured the security of Indian airspace by eliminating Pakistani drones and missiles. Operation Sindoor was a calibrated use of force, intended to signal resolve, degrade terrorist infrastructure, demonstrate capability, and impose costs for supporting terrorism.
Escalation control depends on taking carefully calibrated actions in the fog of war. As per Walter Ladwig of RUSI, ‘This conflict illustrates that limited military engagement under the shadow of nuclear weapons can be contained provided escalation thresholds are mutually understood, signalling remains disciplined, and objectives are narrowly defined.’
Application of Military Power
Operation Sindoor demonstrated India’s ability to apply military power with restraint and precision. India’s signal of intent to retaliate against cross-border terrorism marks a clear shift in posture. Yet deterrence by punishment carries inherent risks – chief among them the possibility that fringe actors may attempt to provoke confrontation in order to manipulate state responses.
Hence, in a strategic environment shaped by tempo, perception, and public pressure, preserving space for discretion may be as vital as projecting resolve, particularly when domestic audiences may expect increasingly forceful responses in the wake of future provocations.
Equally salient is the operational challenge of maintaining the effectiveness of coercive military action over time. As targeted groups adapt, dispersing their assets, improving their concealment techniques, and altering their operational rhythms, the demands placed on India’s intelligence and targeting means will intensify. An iterative contest of adaptation may also play out in which each side seeks to outpace the other’s capacity for detection and response.
Conclusion
As the damage to Pakistani assets increased and their vulnerabilities were exposed, the Pakistani DGMO reached out over the hotline to his Indian counterpart in asking for a ceasefire.
There was no doubt that India had achieved its stated objectives. Its decisive response was not a product of improvisation but due to the professionalism of Indian armed forces and the result of structural reforms and investment in India’s defence capabilities to include doctrines, weapon systems and infusion of cutting-edge technologies.
The contours of its response toolkit had been redefined. The instrument of force was now more calibrated and precise. There is no doubt that in future, India’s response in degrading assets enabling terrorism will be of a greater magnitude. Given the fact that India was able to use force over a long trajectory and attack Pakistan at will with precision and lethality, degrading its capabilities.
One of the lessons that stands out is that hard power matters, though building deterrence through hard power may be costly, but wars are even more costly, which is a lesson Europe is facing presently, having prematurely celebrated victory at the end of the Cold War by downsizing military structures and capabilities. Hence, there needs to be an urgency while addressing military imbalances, as despite being tactically and operationally successful, we cannot afford to be prone to coercion. Hard military power is the key.
While India has demonstrated its muscular policy, the instrument of force needs to be continuously nourished to ensure that it always retains the element of deterrence.
The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
 "Russian drones over Poland: Trump’s tepid reaction a wake-up call for Nato?")
 "As Russia pushes east, Ukraine faces mounting pressure to defend its heartland")
 "Why Mossad was not on board with Israel’s strike on Hamas in Qatar")
 "Turkey: Erdogan's police arrest opposition mayor Hasan Mutlu, dozens officials in corruption probe")
 "Russian drones over Poland: Trump’s tepid reaction a wake-up call for Nato?")
 "As Russia pushes east, Ukraine faces mounting pressure to defend its heartland")
 "Why Mossad was not on board with Israel’s strike on Hamas in Qatar")
 "Turkey: Erdogan's police arrest opposition mayor Hasan Mutlu, dozens officials in corruption probe")
