 "Not only machines, but men behind them: Getting Indian Army future-ready")
The Indian Army is in the midst of a massive transformation. The plan for transformation is based on five pillars: force restructuring and optimisation to improve combat capabilities; refining systems and processes to increase efficiency; jointness and integration among the three services; modernisation and the infusion of niche technologies; and better human resource management.
Several programmes have been initiated at various levels in furtherance of this transformative initiative, which will help the army address future challenges and generate an effective deterrence posture.
The army has put in place a roadmap for upgrades and the infusion of niche technology. There is also a drive to reform human resource capability at the tri-service level. The interplay of the transformative potential of emerging technologies and human resource reforms will be an important determinant in the success of the army’s transformation drive.
The army’s initiative has drawn the attention of defence analysts, and there has been a spirited deliberation on the subject in the media. However, an issue that has not received as much attention as it should have is the role of technology in warfare and how the Indian Army should balance the requirements of human resources and force modernisation.
This article will attempt to fill the gap by putting in perspective the importance of technology in warfare and the markers needed to make an informed choice in the deliberations of size versus technology-intensive armed forces.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsWhat is the future of warfare? No one can accurately predict the future or the types of wars the Indian Army will be involved in. The best in that case—to paraphrase military historian Michael Howard—is that we can strive to get it less wrong than the enemy.
Assessment of the future becomes difficult because of the pace at which technologies are emerging and their applications are spreading around the globe. Spindle, one of the highlights of the first Industrial Revolution, took 120 years to spread outside Europe; in comparison, the internet established its presence around the world in less than a decade.
So, where experience cannot help define the contours of future wars, perhaps history can.
Technology and Changing Character of War
Ever since the publication of Clausewitz’s treatise On War in 1832, it has become indispensable for both military theorists and practitioners for several compelling reasons, including the framework it provides to understand the nature, conduct, and challenges of warfare. Clausewitz differentiated between the enduring nature of warfare and its changing character, unique to each period.
According to the typologies advanced by William Lind and Col T X Hammes, the modern era of war began with the rise of nation-states after 1648. First-generation warfare was characterised by the use of smoothbore muskets and the tactics of line and column military formations. Towards the end of the American Civil War, second-generation warfare evolved due to the technological advancements of the Industrial Revolution and reached its zenith by the end of World War I. The development of breech loaders, rifled muskets, and machine guns defined the wars of this period.
Third-generation warfare was conceived by the Germans and introduced at the outset of World War II. It was influenced by the technology of the period, but the primary driver was ideas. Third-generation warfare saw the advent of combined arms operations and the use of nonlinear manoeuvres to defeat enemy formations by infiltration and penetration rather than frontal assaults.
The end of World War II and the advent of nuclear weapons introduced a profound change in the organisation and conduct of war. Nuclear weapons made modern wars impossible, and governments employed military power below the threshold of war to achieve policy objectives. As a result, irregular warfare became the central feature of all conflicts between the two superpowers during the Cold War until the early years of the 1990s.
The First Gulf War (1990–91) is an important milestone since it revealed the power of technology, and analysts began deliberating on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and a paradigm shift in the conduct of warfare.
Reducing the salience of the state’s monopoly on violence has been debated earlier, but in 1999, two colonels in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Qiao Lang and Wang Xiangsui, gave substance to this theory in their Unrestricted Warfare. They theorised that the advancements in nanotechnology, biotechnology, material science, and the information revolution will allow a weaker actor to fight and defeat a more powerful opponent.
All through the early years of the 21st century, in the US-led Global War of Terror (GWOT), technology was exploited by terrorist groups and regular forces alike. The terrorist groups exploited the internet and social media for three main functions—survival, strengthening their own organisations, and weakening the enemy. The Internet blurred the distinction between the real and the virtual world and helped in recruitment, fundraising, and operations. The regular forces benefited from the advent of unmanned systems and precision weapons.
The Ukraine and Gaza wars have brought the role of technology front and centre in the conduct of war. If there is one lesson on which Indian elected and military leadership must focus, among numerous, it is the impact of innovations, adoption, and integration of new technologies on the conduct and outcome of war.
All pervasive sensors, artificial intelligence (AI)-integrated weapons platforms, and highly precise long-distance attack capabilities will define 21st-century wars, glimpses of which are visible on the battlefields of Ukraine and Gaza. Robotics and additive manufacturing will change the way militaries execute their logistic functions. These technological advancements and more, in addition to political, social, and cultural factors, will define the character of wars in the foreseeable future.
The Indian Armed Forces, like their counterparts around the world, constantly assess the future of wars and invest in capability development. The constant concern of the militaries is being surprised or getting caught unprepared by some technological innovation that may change the course of war.
Technology: The Silver Bullet Army is Seeking
It is not anyone’s argument that one single factor can overwhelmingly decide the outcome of war. That will never be the case. The attempt here is to put into perspective the impact of technology on the outcome of wars.
In the short to medium term, the Indian Armed Forces will have to prepare for both conventional and sub-conventional wars. Despite the best intentions and efforts of the government and the armed forces, it is possible that India’s adversaries and their proxies may acquire the same or even better technologies, which means reliance on technological capabilities will not be a sufficient condition to ensure victory in wars. This in turn puts a premium on organisational adaptability and operational flexibility backed by quality human resources to counter the adversaries’ advantages and restore deterrence.
Many times, technological breakthroughs and ‘revolutions’ have fallen short of expectations. The wars in the past have amply demonstrated the power of technologies to change the character of warfare. It is assessed that tomorrow’s wars will be defined by applications of autonomous systems, AI, robotics, nano technology, and quantum computing. However, history is testimony to the fact that many promising technologies and revolutions have fallen short of expectations, and their impact has been less than anticipated, even though they have changed the course of war in unexpected directions.
Impact of modern day Wunderwaffen (Wonder Weapons) at the strategic level is unclear. Technologies are known to provide advantages at the tactical level of war, and, even in that case, the window of opportunity closes very fast because of the dialectical nature of war. Technologies have rarely, if ever, compelled the enemy to follow a particular course of action or made a decisive impact on the outcome of war.
Whether it was the chemical weapons of World War I or the Wunderwaffen of the Nazis during World War II, technological innovations have always provided certain tactical and operational advantages until their countermeasures are fielded. The impact of these wonder weapons at the strategic level of war, which differentiates victory from defeat, remains unclear.
Technology can enable victory, not assure it. Technology by itself is not a war winning factor. Armed Forces, through the ages, have believed in the axiom that it is not the machine but the man behind the machine that is the determining factor. The side that masters rather than possesses technology wins the day and the war.
Human Resource Reforms
There are two important factors related to human resources that have a direct bearing on the fighting ability of the army. One of these factors is quantifiable, while the other is more of an abstract notion and relates to emotions and feelings.
The first factor relates to the age profile, educational qualifications, and training standards of soldiers. The second relates to esprit de corps, unit cohesion, paltan ki Izzat, and Naam, Namak aur Nishan, which cannot be quantified and reduced to mathematical formulae and equations.
Both of these issues are important for generating the fighting capability of the army, and one cannot be prioritised over the other. The Indian Army’s human resource reforms, which are underway to increase the youthful profile of soldiers, should ensure they do not negatively impact the esprit de corps and regimental cohesion of its soldiers.
Getting Army Future-Ready
Force modernisation and human resource management are both resource intensive activities and place great demand on the defence budget. The army’s force-restructuring and optimisation drive to improve the tooth-to-tail ratio by slashing non-operational flab and other human resource reforms is an attempt at greater budgetary allocation for force modernisation.
The manpower requirements of the army are dictated by operational requirements and cannot be reduced beyond a certain limit. At the same time, any other reform measure that may negatively impact regimental cohesion may become a self-defeating proposition.
The challenge for the defence establishment, which will test its expertise, professional competence, and maturity, is to find the right balance between human resource reforms and force modernisation. The question it needs to answer is: How much cost-cutting from human resource management is appropriate for military modernisation?
The author is a Research Fellow at MP-IDSA. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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