Not just spectators: Why Gulf states matter in Israel-Iran escalation

On June 13, Israel carried out a targeted and unprecedented assault on Iran’s primary nuclear facility located in Natanz, Fordow, Parchin, Isfahan and military installations. The precision strike eliminated several high-ranking commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and leading nuclear scientists. The cycle of strike and counterstrike between the two nations continues unabated since then.

By arguing that Iran has enough enriched uranium, Israel’s Operation Rising Lion portrays it as a preventative measure against an existential danger and voices doubts about the feasibility of peace. However, Iran has denied these claims, describing the strike as an act of unjustified aggression and asserting that its retaliation should not be viewed merely as vengeance but as a calculated deterrent aimed at restraining Israel and the West.

Iran signals that provocation will lead to significant regional consequences. A broader concern arises from the perception that Israel is no longer acting solely in its national interest but rather as a proxy for Western interests, attempting to assume the role of a regional hegemon enforcing Western objectives in the region.

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This characterisation has significant implications. Iran, feeling cornered, sees little incentive to engage in diplomatic negotiations. The prospect of Tehran withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has emerged as an important topic in Iranian policy discussions. Such a move would fundamentally alter regional nuclear dynamics and represent a notable shift from Iran’s previous stance.

To the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, this action risks destroying years of careful diplomacy to reduce regional tensions and avoid this confrontation. The strike’s timing is also vital, as this escalation may be completely undermined by the already tenuous US-Iran nuclear negotiations, slated for June 15 in Oman. In recent years, all six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have advocated for dialogue rather than confrontation. They have persistently encouraged both Washington and Tehran to negotiate a renewed nuclear agreement that could prevent a catastrophic regional conflict.

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This stance was driven by a desire for stability and an internal political shift. Gulf states are concentrating on ambitious domestic economic transformations that require a secure and predictable regional environment. Israel’s actions against Iran are disrupting this path, leading to Iranian countermeasures and potentially drawing the United States—and, by extension, the Gulf region—into a broader conflict.

Acknowledging these risks, several Gulf states have, in recent years, actively pursued rapprochement with Tehran. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have all initiated bilateral dialogues with Iran to diminish hostilities and avoid involvement in conflicts. This diplomatic initiative represents a calculated strategy to safeguard their interests. However, Israel’s abrupt offensive against Iran has now placed this strategy at a critical juncture of failure. Adding to the unease in the Gulf is the ambiguous role of the United States. While there is no clear evidence that Washington approved Israel’s attack, there is also no indication that it actively opposed it. This ambivalence may give Israel the confidence to act assertively while allowing Washington to maintain plausible deniability with Tehran.

At this critical juncture, the Gulf states hope that the United States remains uninvolved in the military confrontation. Should Washington become directly or even indirectly engaged, Iranian retaliation against US military assets or allied infrastructure in the Gulf could become a distinct possibility. The situation represents a moment of strategic peril for the entire GCC. With minimal control over the events unfolding between Israel and Iran, Gulf states are compelled into a reactive stance to monitor developments closely. Still, they are largely unable to affect the trajectory of the conflict.

Positioned at the forefront of regional instability, these states possess a keen awareness of Iran’s capability and intention to retaliate, particularly by targeting critical oil infrastructure and United States military installations located within their territories. Iran’s past actions, like the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais and the 2022 Houthi-led strike near Abu Dhabi International Airport, are a few signs.

While some may interpret the Gulf states’ condemnations as mere political hedging, such a reading is overly simplistic. These statements are part of a broader, carefully crafted Gulf strategy of de-escalation aimed at managing the fallout from intensifying Israel-Iran tensions. More than symbolic, the Gulf states’ diplomatic efforts are aligned with their larger objectives: accelerating economic diversification, enhancing global connectivity, and asserting greater regional influence.

That said, Gulf reactions have not been monolithic. Subtle differences in timing and tone reflect varying strategic priorities and national security calculations. Oman was the first to respond; as the host for upcoming US-Iran talks set to resume on June 15, Oman’s statement reflected both concern and dismay. The sultanate has long leveraged its historic ties with Iran to mediate regional tensions, and a shift toward military confrontation threatens to undermine this delicate balancing act.

A robust statement from Saudi Arabia emerged shortly thereafter, denouncing the “blatant Israeli aggression”. The kingdom has progressively positioned itself as a regional and Islamic leader, with its prompt and assertive response reverberating positively throughout Arab media.

Qatar’s condemnation followed closely, echoing Saudi Arabia’s language — a likely indication of coordination. Both Gulf countries that signed the Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain, have condemned Israel’s strike. While unequivocal in their language, particularly the UAE’s denunciation “in the strongest terms”, their tone suggested a more balanced approach. Both focused on restraint and prudence, seemingly directed at all actors, not just Israel. Bahrain and Kuwait’s statement echoed Washington’s call for a resumption of nuclear negotiations with Iran.

What the Gulf states will do with the growing tension remains to be seen. To reduce the risk of further escalation, would they seek to engage with Iranian officials or approach the Trump administration directly? The Gulf countries will likely adopt a multi-step approach, involving various levers and positioning themselves as leading players steering the regional diplomatic direction in the coming days.

Sreshtha Chakraborty holds PhD in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University and is currently an Assistant Professor at Bennett University. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.