The next Heads of Government Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) will be held in Pakistan on October 15-16, 2024. Prime Minister Modi has been invited to the event by Islamabad along with other SCO leaders. It is highly unlikely that he would attend.
It would be recalled that Modi had not attended the Heads of State Summit in Astana last July and deputed External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar instead. Earlier in 2023, when presiding over SCO, India took many by surprise by opting to host the Heads of State Summit in the virtual format.
This has led to speculation about India losing interest in the organisation. After all, India had actively sought its membership for years. It (along with Pakistan) was given observer status in 2005 and inducted as a full member as recently as in 2017. So, what has changed, and how does India view SCO today?
The six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was constituted on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai (China). Led by China and Russia, it had four Central Asian states (CAS) namely Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as its members. The fifth central Asian country, Turkmenistan, did not join as it follows a policy of active and permanent neutrality. All business is transacted in Chinese and Russian, its two official languages. Decisions are taken by consensus.
The grouping, according to the 2001 Shanghai Declaration, sought to establish “a new, democratic, just, and rational political and economic international order.” It pledged to accord priority to regional security by combating “terrorism, separatism, and extremism” in Central Asia. It was noted that SCO was not an alliance directed against other states and regions.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsThe grouping has taken notable strides in enhancing security cooperation. In 2002, it was decided to establish the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) as a permanent body in Tashkent. In addition to capacity building, coordination, and information exchange, it regularly undertakes joint anti-terrorism exercises since 2006 to facilitate interoperability.
China, meanwhile, has managed to leverage its influence in SCO to deepen bilateral security and defence linkages with Central Asian nations. It secured, for example, a military base in Tajikistan for its People’s Armed Police in 2016. The Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism (QCCM), a so-called counterterrorism forum, was also established in 2016 between Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and Tajikistan outside of SCO’s framework.
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in its 2020 report opined that “SCO is a strategic platform for China to protect its interests at home and abroad. Beijing is using the SCO to enhance its ability to project power beyond its borders”.
In close to a quarter century of its existence, the agenda, size, and character of SCO have undergone significant changes. The scope of its engagement has widened to qualitatively enhance trade, economic, and energy cooperation, consequent to the signing of a 20-year Programme of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation in September 2003. Newer areas of collaboration include the digital economy, local currency settlements, environmental protection, information security, and food security.
With its deep pockets and unbridled ambition, China has emerged as the biggest gainer, gradually eclipsing Russia’s influence in the Central Asian region, much to the latter’s chagrin.
It has invested heavily in the region in a wide range of infrastructure projects both within and outside the framework of BRI. This includes a network of oil and gas pipelines to source its energy needs from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
Official figures of Chinese investments are not available but are variously estimated between 60 and 80 billion dollars. A lion’s share has gone to Kazakhstan. Chinese trade with the Central Asian states has grown from $1.5 billion in 2001 to $89 billion in 2023 (Chinese exports exceeded $60 billion). India’s trade with Central Asia by way of comparison is around $5 billion.
Since the lifting of the moratorium on expansion in 2010, SCO has expanded to become a 10-member grouping with the induction of India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023, and Belarus in 2024. Mongolia and Afghanistan have been admitted as observers. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Egypt, Kuwait, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the UAE (14 nations) have been given the status of a dialogue partner.
That said, the biggest change that has come about in SCO is its approach towards the West. As noted above, SCO has aimed at creating a new and just international economic and political order since its very inception in 2001. However, it was not at odds with the West. The relations between China and the US were exceedingly cordial and cooperative back then. The US had in fact played a major role in helping China become a member of the World Trade Organisation in December 2001. Russia was most supportive of the US War on Terror post-the 9/11 tragedy.
India’s own economic and political relations with China were steadily growing. Both nations had signed the landmark agreement on political parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the India-China boundary question in 2005. India got the observer status in SCO the same year. In 2008, China relented in allowing the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive restrictions on nuclear commerce with India, albeit under US pressure.
Twenty years hence, the geopolitical dynamics have undergone a sea change. The West is at war with Russia. A bitter contest is underway between the US and China. Beijing has successfully blocked Washington’s desire since 2005 to become an observer at SCO.
India and China have been involved in an armed standoff along the LAC (Line of Actual Control) since 2020, and the ties have turned frigid. China continues to block India’s NSG and UNSC membership.
There is no denying that China, a founding member, plays a pivotal role in SCO and exercises considerable influence. It also has Pakistan, its ‘iron brother’, playing the cheerleader. Even so, India, the world’s largest democracy, is unique in SCO, which comprises largely authoritarian states. Yet it enjoys good relations with them (barring China and Pakistan), who welcome its presence in the grouping. India has also forged robust relations with the West as well as the Global South.
The “addition of India confers a new level of international legitimacy” on SCO, the US Council on Foreign Relations had noted in an essay in 2015. Besides, given its size and conviction, India can and is acting as a voice of moderation in SCO, which has been dubbed a ‘Dictators Club’ by certain quarters.
India regards Central Asia as its extended neighbourhood, and the SCO accords priority to enhancing engagement with the region. India is stepping up its outreach to Central Asia and exploring viable surface connectivity options. In January 2022, the first ever India-Central Asia Summit was hosted by India in a virtual format. The momentum needs to be sustained and further accelerated by both sides.
SCO similarly provides a vital platform for India to engage with Russia, Iran, the Gulf, and fellow South Asian states. Its presence restrains countries like Pakistan and China from taking positions that could be prejudicial to India’s interests. In any event, we are not destined to remain adversaries forever. Sooner or later, opportunities could present themselves for discreet and meaningful interactions to break the logjam. The name of the game is to keep channels of communication open.
Meanwhile, India would continue to remain constructively engaged with SCO, in a manner of its choosing and at levels as it deems appropriate, to safeguard national interests and advance the forum’s agenda. There is no second guessing!
The author is a foreign affairs specialist and an ex-envoy to Canada and South Korea. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.


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