As the dust settles on the Indian general elections and the world watches polls in other parts of the world, questions continue to emerge on what sort of India would emerge further under the third term of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The oath-taking ceremony of the new cabinet saw the retention of several ministers from Modi 2.0, including External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar. This signals continuity in India’s foreign policy under Modi 3.0.
Even before the ministries had been announced, events affecting India’s foreign policy, particularly with regards to China, had been taking place. Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te congratulated PM Modi on X, and PM Modi reciprocated the wishes, stating that he looks forward to closer ties as India and Taiwan work towards a mutually beneficial economic and technological partnership.
China flared up, and the spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in India wrote on X that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and that it is an “undeniable fact, a universal consensus of the international community, and a basic norm in international relations”. The interesting part to note is that while world leaders took to X to wish PM Modi, China’s President Xi Jinping did not send a personal note of congratulations, and the Chinese foreign ministry instead congratulated him, the BJP, and the National Democratic Alliance, adding that China looks forward to a “stable and healthy China-India relationship”. China, along with the US, was among the last countries to wish PM Modi.
A few days earlier in May, when elections were on-going, China released an old video of the Galwan Valley clash of 2020 at Pangong Tso finger 4. The clash is four years old, but the timing of the release raises suspicions about influencing the Indian electorate’s choices regarding voting for a government that could not stand up to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, as portrayed in the video.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsBefore the last phase of elections in India, Meta released its threat adversarial report, in which it stated that they had removed 37 Facebook accounts, 13 pages, five groups, and nine Instagram accounts for violating its policy against “coordinated inauthentic behaviour”. The network originated in China and was running what has been called “Operation K”, targeting the global Sikh community, including Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, the UK, and Nigeria. The purpose was to divide the Indian electorate and interfere in India’s elections.
In April of this year, China released a list renaming 30 more places in Arunachal Pradesh. China also lodged a diplomatic protest with India over Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh, where he dedicated the Sela Tunnel to the nation, which is to be built at an altitude of 13,000 feet. All this happened while India was either gearing up for elections or was in the thick of it.
Reportedly, India is set to rename 30 places in occupied Tibet, which China claims is called ‘Xizang’ and is currently a special administrative zone in China. China’s behaviour in 2024 alone set the tone of the bilateral relationship. With its posturing, usage of disinformation during elections, and diplomatic flare-up immediately after elections, China has given a clear-cut message as to which direction it wants the relationship to flow in.
On June 8, on Chinese social media, another video with the narrative that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had thrashed the Indian Army was circulating in large numbers. However, neither country’s government has reported any clashes so far in 2024. Grey zone warfare, which operates in the absence of hot conflict, is an integral aspect of China’s three warfare strategies, which need to be factored in while analysing Sino-Indian relations and China’s posturing towards India.
In June this year, think tanks from India and Taiwan held military simulations that focused on scenarios about the Taiwan Strait and the India-China border in 2035. This is also not something that Beijing would view with kindness. However, while India adheres to China’s One China policy, it has active economic, technological, and civil society partnerships with Taiwan.
On the day of the swearing-in ceremony of the new cabinet, there was a terror attack in Reasi, in Jammu and Kashmir, in which nine victims on the bus carrying pilgrims succumbed to gunshot wounds. The Pakistan-supported The Resistance Front (TRF) has claimed responsibility for the terror attack. China has often blocked India’s attempts at the United Nations to blacklist Pakistan-sponsored terrorists. In March this year, India stated that blocking evidence-based proposals in the UN Security Council to blacklist global terrorists without justification smacks of “double speak” in dealing with the scourge, which was a veiled reference to China that has put holds on multiple bids by India to sanction Pakistan-based terrorists. Given that India has yet again suffered Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, Modi 3.0 will further double down on Pakistan-based terrorism while facing fresh hurdles from China.
On June 11, India’s EAM Jaishankar stated that the focus will be to resolve remaining issues along the India-China border and cross-border terror solutions with Pakistan. This is exactly in line with the party’s election manifesto, which mentioned strengthening border defences.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who retains his role in Modi 3.0, reaffirmed India’s commitment to safeguarding its borders and strengthening defence manufacturing and exports. He emphasised the priority of protecting India’s integrity and sovereignty during Modi 3.0. The focus is clearly on China.
Given the events that have unfolded so far in the bilateral relationship and the tone China has set to the relationship through its actions, be it at the border, through its grey zone warfare, or through its support for Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, the relationship between India and China under Modi 3.0 will continue to be a rocky one, if not rockier. New Delhi needs to be prepared for fresh surprises from Beijing and prepare accordingly.
The author is Associate Professor, Chinese Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, O P Jindal Global University, Haryana. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.


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