Navigating the Great Game: India’s approach to Eurasian connectivity

China’s and the European Union’s initiatives on connectivity corridors in post-Soviet Eurasia are bound to impact the geopolitics in this region. This is because of the nature of these connectivity projects. On the other hand, India’s approach to connectivity projects in this geopolitical space is sustainable in the long run. This is because partner countries in India’s connectivity projects in this space are equitable stakeholders and rooted in securing cooperative peace, stability, and sustainable development.  

The two regions of the world, post-Soviet Eurasian space and West Asia, are in a state of perpetual flux due to the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war as well as the Iran-Hamas war in the beginning and later turned into the Israel-Iran War, thus creating new geopolitical challenges to both regional and global geopolitical structure. These developments are shaping new geopolitical trajectories of the respective regions, and many analysts are even predicting an imminent Third World War.

While these geopolitical developments greatly impact global and regional security, as highlighted above, one can also notice their impact on energy geopolitics and connectivity projects. The same can be evident from the fluctuation in pricing and the emergence of new pipeline routes and connectivity corridors, which affect the geopolitics of regional and global energy security. For instance, the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war propelled the European countries to look for alternative energy sources as the traditional route from Russia through Ukraine was disrupted.

Similarly, these European countries also looked towards the Caspian countries, minus Russia, as an alternative energy source. In this context, one can see the role of China in adding new connectivity routes through the Caspian countries to expand its sphere of influence. Hence, post-Soviet Eurasian space has become the focal point of pipeline geopolitics and connectivity projects. One may recall here that Israel’s attack on Iran will further impact the geopolitics of the adjoining Caspian region and thus will propel a new form of the geopolitical cauldron.  

In this background, two major connectivity routes that will accentuate geopolitical complexity in this part of the world are the Northern Corridor, the Middle Corridor, and the Trans Caspian, connecting China with Europe through the Central Asian and Caspian regions along with the Southern Corridor, which aims at bringing the Caspian energy from the energy-rich Caspian region, thus connecting the European energy grid promoted by EU countries.

One may recall that in 2005, the West constructed another pipeline route known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, changing the geopolitics of post-Soviet Eurasia. The operationalisation of the BTC gave a preponderance to the West and, to a great extent, curtailed the role of Russia in this part of the world. Even though the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), led by Russia, tried to checkmate the BTC. However, the BTC pipeline is still operational and bypasses Russia, thus reaching out to the European market through Georgia and Turkey.

The reason for giving a historical narrative about the two major pipeline routes is to provide a context for the present geopolitical developments that are taking place in this region as far as connectivity projects are concerned. However, unlike in the past, Russia is trying hard to retain its dominance in the post-Soviet Eurasian geopolitics. This is largely because of the imposition of prolonged economic sanctions since 2014 on Russia, which weakened Russia considerably.  

In this background, there is a need to comprehensively assess the significance of these two corridors, North and South, through the post-Soviet Eurasian space in propelling a new geopolitical rivalry in this space. At the same time, India’s initiatives in the form of connectivity projects in the post-Soviet Eurasian space need to be examined.

Are Northern Route and Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian Corridor) sustainable?

The Northern Route and Middle Corridor Trade Routes originate from China and reach Europe. The Northern Route originates from China through Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus and finally reaches Europe, as literature highlights. On the other hand, the Middle Corridor originates in China. It covers all four Central Asian countries (Minus Tajikistan), crisscrosses two South Caucasus countries (Georgia and Azerbaijan) through Turkey, and finally reaches European countries as various reports suggest.  

As per a study conducted by the World Bank in 2020, it has been observed that while the Northern Routes take around 14–18 days to reach the container from China to Europe, the Middle Corridor takes around 16–20 days to reach products. Available studies suggest, including statistical data from the German Statistical Team, that it covers a “4,400 km rail line and 500 km sea route” route. On the other hand, the Northern Corridor covers a distance of 10,000 kilometres, as per a study by Rail Freight, an independent consultancy firm. Similarly, these two routes predominated China’s ability to carry out trade with Europe.

Though both transport links allow China to expand its sphere in post-Soviet Eurasia, Europe also faces numerous difficulties. The most important challenge these two infrastructural links face is geopolitical in nature. For instance, the study by the World Bank titled Middle Trade and Transport Corridor, published in November 2023, highlights the problems associated with the Middle Corridor. As the study suggests, though theoretically, the World Bank study conducted in 2020 suggests 16-20 days, the World Bank study conducted in 2023 highlights that, on average, it takes 50 days on an average transportation time.

Similarly, there are infrastructural problems, and differential tax structure is impeding the functioning of this route. The same study also suggests that though this route makes tall claims, the port infrastructure has not been developed much in practice. Along with this, the geopolitical complexities associated with this route have also impeded its functioning. It is a fact that Azerbaijan and Georgia are still under the influence of the United States and Europe.  

The same is true with the Northern Routes reaching Europe through Russia and Belarus; thus, reaching Europe has also faced difficulties in recent years. As per a report by Market Insight, a consultancy firm, in 2023, the trade declined substantially in the first quarter of the year. In 2023, the trade volume through the corridor fell by 44 per cent.  This is due to the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war as well as the global recession, as the above report suggests. Since the Russia-Ukraine war is prolonged and not showing any sign of achieving a truce, and the sanctions by the Western countries on Russia prolong the future of this transport corridor, the future is quite bleak.  

Along with these technical and infrastructural blockages, China has earned a negative reputation for itself as an imperial country aiming to bring post-Soviet countries under its sphere of influence.  The  “ negative image” of  China has not been confined to post-Soviet countries, even in many other parts of the world. The same can be seen in a study conducted by the Pew Research Centre titled “ China’s Approach to Foreign Policy Gets Largely Negative Reviews in 24-Country Survey” published in November  2023.The Pew Survey conducted in advanced  European countries like France 72 per cent,  Germany 76 per cent, the Netherlands 77 per cent, Poland  67 per cent, and Sweden 85 per cent etc. have negative perceptions towards  China, especially due to the authoritarian tendencies of Xi Jinping as the study suggests. Beijing’s expansionist tendencies have also influenced negative perceptions towards China. China has also been synonymous with debt-trap diplomacy.  Looking at the experience of Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan,   Central Asian countries, as well as African countries are the victims of debt-trap. Beijing’s debt-trap diplomacy has fueled the socio-political crisis, making these countries vulnerable.  China took advantage of these countries’ vulnerabilities.  

Though these transportation routes promoted by China are quite promising, in the long run, they may face difficulty.  The European Union envisaged a new transportation route, the Southern Corridor, to counter China’s initiatives.

Can the Southern Corridor provide an alternative to the China-led Transport Corridor? 

While the China-led infrastructure connectivity projects have many limitations, a natural question arises here is  will the Southern  Corridor be a viable one?  Ever since S Fredrich Starr wrote an article titled “ Missing Links: Eurasia’s Southern Corridor”, published in the Journal Horizon in  Spring 2018.  In this article, Starr dwells on connecting Central and East Asia with South Asia,  Caucasus, Russia, and Europe.   To quote Starr further, “The Southern Corridor endeavours to reconnect, via a series of land links, the economies of the Indian subcontinent with Europe and, ultimately, with South, East, and Southeast Asia”.  He further highlighted the geo-political and geo-economic imperative of the project by stressing the need to create a new regional market.  

It is imperative to mention here that the roots of the idea for a common regional market were emphasised long back in the form of the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia-Central Asia (TRACECA) project in 1993 which brought Central Asian countries and three Caucasus countries, including Moldova, Romania, Ukraine and Turkey minus Russia under a single economic integration process under the initiative of EU.  However, this corridor has not made much headway, which Starr himself dwells on in the above article.  Similarly, Starr, in the past, has also enunciated another geopolitical model of regional market integration known as “Greater Central Asia” (GCA), where he advocated the need for infrastructural linkages between South Asia and Central Asia, including Afghanistan,  Xinjiang and  Tukey and part of Russia.  Before him, Robert L. Canfield’s article, “Restructuring in Greater Central Asia: Changing Political Configurations”, was published in the Asian Survey in 1992. Similarly, Starr wrote a policy paper titled In Defense of Greater Central Asia in 2008, where he articulated the above view.    

In keeping with its geopolitical motives, the United States tried to start several infrastructural linkages, namely, the CASA-1000 Project (with funding from the World Bank), which aims to bring  Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan and connect Tajikistan and Afghanistan through a bridge over river Pyanj.  All these symbolic measures were taken under GCA by Washington to strengthen its strategic preponderance in South Asia and Central Asian geopolitics and other regions of post-Soviet  Eurasia. At that point in time, the United States was very much there in Afghanistan. Through the infrastructural linkages projects, the US wanted to strengthen its own geopolitical interest in the  “ Pivot” region of Eurasia, as enunciated by  Halford J Mackinder in 1904.  

The way the United States and the NATO forces moved out from Afghanistan in 2021, thus putting the country into chaos, which has a deeper impact on adjoining regions, generates suspicion about Washinton’s geopolitical intent.  

Coming to the context of the Southern Corridor, Starr, in the above-mentioned article, further proposes “to create and work through an overarching structure to plan and coordinate the larger enterprise” for facilitating the initiation of the proposed corridor. In this regard, it can be highlighted that given the geopolitical complexity, can an institutional structure be possible to regulate the South Corridor?

Some of his infrastructure connectivity projects, like connecting  South and Central Asia, are only imaginative given the tenuous geopolitics prevailing in the Afghan-Pakistan border. Though the construction of the  Turkmenistan- Tajikistan-Afghanistan railway project began in  2015, it has not made much headway.  So also, the uncertain political situation in Bangladesh can prevent the fruition of an effective Southern corridor. The TAPI pipeline project is slowly fading away and shows no sign of revival.  Similarly, Starr proposes linking the Chabahar Port of Iran with the Gwadar Port located in Balochistan, the troubled province of Pakistan, part of the Southern Corridor project, appears quite imaginative only because of the geopolitical cauldron prevailing in this part of the world.  

In the concluding part of the above-mentioned article published in   Horizon, Starr admits, “While the economic and security risks of inaction may or may not materialise, the Southern Corridor project”.  

Thus, it can be stated that Washington’s dream project of the Southern Corridor is highly utopian and this project will have deeper geopolitical repercussions.  

India’s approach to post-Soviet Eurasian connectivity projects

Since India is a major player in the post-Soviet space due to geo-cultural, geopolitical and geo-economic interaction with this space, there is a need to relook at  New Delhi’s engagement with this part of the world.  In this regard, one may underline that in the post-1991 phase, India attempted to connect with post-Soviet space. However, the political turbulence in Afghanistan, as well as the obstructionist tactics of Pakistan, hindered India’s access to Central Asia and other regions of post-Soviet Eurasia. Numerous alternative routes came up, and the most prominent among them connecting the post-Soviet Eurasian space is the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), along Iran’s Chabahar port.  

In this context, one can underline here that INSTC has emerged as a major flagship connectivity project for India to connect with the vast-post Soviet Eurasian space as well as  Europe since its inception in 2000.  Like another connectivity project, this multi-modal project involves rail, road and sea transportation. The most significant aspect of this project is that the INSTC links India with Iran and then connects with Russia and other post-Soviet countries through the Caspian Sea. One of the prominent features of this route lies in the fact that India imported much of Russian energy in the post-2022 era using the INSTC Corridor.  Similarly, Iran’s Bander Abbas (as part of INSTC) is emerging as the major port in terms of connectivity, so the port of Astrakhan is also important for India in connecting with the international market.  While discussing INSTC, there is a need to give primacy to the connectivity route linking India with Iran, Armenia, and Georgia and connecting with Europe through the Black Sea. This will help India to avoid the Azerbaijan route. It is a known fact that Azerbaijan is mired in controversy because of its unholy nexus with two failed states, Turkey under President Erdogan and Pakistan.  

Along with the INSTC route, Chabahar Port in Iran is emerging as another entrepot for  India’s engagement with the post-Soviet space.  One may recall that India has made tremendous progress in getting a foothold on the Chabahar Port over the years.  The signing of an agreement between India and Iran to develop the  Shahid-Beheshti terminal of Chabahar Port will facilitate  India’s further engagement with Central Asian countries through Afghanistan. Apprehension was raised over the  Zehdan, Zaranj-Delaram highway operation, which aims to connect with Uzbekistan through Afghanistan. This is because of the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan.  However, the Taliban allowed the delivery of food grains, including wheat, from India to Afghanistan. This demonstrates Taliban will not obstruct India’s connectivity project through the above route with Central Asia because of  Afghanistan’s own economic compulsions.  Central Asian countries are also keen to engage with the outside world, including the Chabahar port, the INSTC corridor, and the Indo-Pacific Corridor, to end their economic isolation through Afghanistan.    

Because of the West Asian geopolitical imbroglio, there is apprehension over the viability of the Iranian route in boosting connectivity with post-Soviet Eurasian space. However, the point that must be mentioned here is that even Western countries, including the US, will not impose sanctions on the INSTC and Chabahar Port. This is because it will adversely impact the global economic structure.   Secondly, the US will also not annoy India as it is a fact that both  New Delhi and Washington are strategic partners. In this regard, one can take from past experience that the US exempted India from carrying out trade with Iran for a considerable time. It is a fact that despite sanctions on Iran,  European countries are keen to engage with it.  

Two other connectivity routes must also be considered while looking at India’s economic engagement with post-Soviet Eurasian space.  These are the Chennai-Vladivostok maritime connectivity project.  As available studies suggest, it will take only 24 days to reach  Vladivostok port in the Far Eastern part of Russia. In a way, this route will also reduce India’s dependence on the Suez Canal route. Similarly, the Kazakh energy grid will be connected to the Altai region through the Obb and Itrysh rivers, and the river port Sabetta will be used, located on the former river bed in the Western part of  Siberia, Russia, as reports suggest.  The Sabetta port can also be linked to the Indo-Pacific Energy Corridor. This will give India a strategic leeway in the geopolitics of Central Asia and the Siberian and Far East parts of Eurasia. It may be recalled that Japan and South Korea use this route to source energy from Kazakhstan using the same route as available studies suggest.

The reason for giving a longish perspective on India’s connectivity projects in post-Soviet Eurasia is to provide an alternative to the existing and proposed corridors being enunciated by the EU with the US’s support on one side and China’s initiatives on the other. The problem with some of these corridors lies in the geopolitical character of these infrastructure connectivity corridor projects.  

For instance, the Chinese corridor projects passing through Central Asia, Caucasus, Russia, and Belarus pose substantial security challenges to these countries. It has been observed that these infrastructural projects will pose a substantial challenge to the security of these countries, as available studies suggest. Instead of bringing development in the longer run, these countries will be vassals of China. This is the ulterior motive of China.  The negative fallout of OBOR   can be noticed in many parts of the world. Even Central Asian countries, as well as Russia, are also victims of China’s expansionist tendencies.  Thus, the Middle Corridor or the  Northern Corridor will substantially challenge post-Soviet Eurasian security.  The same is the case with Western countries promoting the Southern Corridor.    

In a nutshell, it is a utopian project that Starr envisages in the above-mentioned article. He has also proposed similar ideas in his utopian idea of Greater Central Asia. The TAPI project also came out with much fanfare in the past but has moved ahead. The reason is the political instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in promoting and patronising terrorism, thus threatening peace and stability in Central Asia and South Asia. Hence, any kind of connectivity project linking South Asia and Central Asia will fail. Though the US has the upper hand in Bangladesh’s politics after the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina, any kind of connectivity project through Bangladesh connecting   South East Asia is also not possible, considering the nature of geopolitical development in this part of the world.  

A question that naturally arises here is why India should avoid the Southern Corridor and, at the same time, play an important role in the fruition of the IMEC Corridor.  This is because India shares good relations with member countries of IMEC, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, and European countries, such as Italy, Germany, France, etc., in this project. On the other hand, the proposed Southern corridor, as Starr proposes, is inherently unstable and imaginative.    

India’s approach to promoting regional connectivity was aptly highlighted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi when he  underlined:

  “India will work for ensuring that our efforts promote regional connectivity, trade and commerce, including to and from the landlocked Afghanistan and the Central Asia region. This is also embedded in our vision to promote connectivity, including through the International North-South Transport Corridor, as also the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor”.  

The above statement of the Prime Minister reflects the need for India to develop multiple connectivity projects to link with the post-Soviet Eurasian space as well as in West Asia.  

Conclusion 

While assessing the plethora of connectivity corridors being promoted by external actors like China, the European Union, and the US in the post-Soviet space, one can say that it will pose a substantial security challenge to the existing geopolitical structure of post-Soviet Eurasia.  

It is imperative to mention here that both China and the EU, along with the US, are more interested in bringing countries of this region under their sphere of influence. This accentuates geopolitical competition as well as geoeconomic rivalry in this geopolitical space.  For instance, the Chinese initiative in the form of OBOR or the Middle Corridor project basically put the countries of post-Soviet Eurasia hostage to China’s geopolitical manoeuvring. On the other hand, the  EU and the US  are more interested in bringing this space under their respective sphere of influence, thus isolating Russia.  

In this context, India can play a major role in building bridges with post-Soviet Eurasian space.  Some of India’s initiatives like the INSTC, Chabahar,  Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor, and connectivity through the Indo-Pacific corridor by connecting  Kazakhstan with Altai region through with West Siberia of Russia can provide an opportunity for India to re-strategise its connectivity with this space.  In fact, some of the above-mentioned India initiatives helped post-Soviet Eurasian countries to be equal partners in the development process. The same can be inferred from the fact that Armenia, Georgia, Central Asian countries, and Russia are keen to have India as the preferred partner in the connectivity projects. Even Iran is a valued partner of India as far as augmenting connectivity projects with post-Soviet Eurasian space is concerned.  

In a nutshell, it can be added here that India’s growing prowess as a global power and a major manufacturing hub will certainly give New Delhi a major role in post-Soviet Eurasian geopolitics.  

The author teaches at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.