On August 12, as the longest civil war in Myanmar will soon complete five years, the UN Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar released a report of ‘serious abuses’ committed during the systematic commission of torture, including sexual slavery and other horrendous crimes by the Junta in its detention centres, even as an election is around the corner.
While sporadic fighting continues anchored in a stalemate, the Junta is nowhere near collapse and defeat. On August 1, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing ended the emergency and announced elections sometime in December/January without fixing a date. On 30 July Irrawaddy News announced the appointment of a new union government and the “National Security and Peace Commission” to
oversee defence and manage elections. The Junta declared a 10-year jail term for anyone disrupting elections.Of the 51 million population, census data of 15 million is not available. The Resistance Forces—21 Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs), the National Unity Government and its People’s Defence Force—and sundry rebel outfits have rejected elections. Most of the Resistance have said they will disrupt elections and warned of military action against those who participate in them. On 5 July the ruling Junta made a rare call to armed groups, also called anti-coup forces, to cooperate with it and join elections.
Fusion of political and military factors persuaded Hlaing to order elections. China, the pivotal player, has been promising its full backing for elections for more than a year. It is the most dominant and influential external force, which plays a double role: supporting the Junta and selected EAGs. Its writ runs largely along the 2,129 km Myanmar-China border with Yunnan province opposite Kokang, Shan and Kachin states. Its power can be judged by its ability to broker ceasefires last year in the north between the Junta and EAGs, as well as in making them return, in April 2025, Lashio, the largest town the Junta’s Northeast Command lost in battle. Quite some feat! The Three Brotherhood Alliance played havoc with the Junta forces during their 1027 Operation last year.
The fighting this year has resulted in marginal gains for Junta; it recaptured Moybe from the Karenni Nationalities Defence Forces in Kayah state; recovered territory near the national capital Naypyidaw and Sagaing. Clashes occurred in Bhamo with PDF; there were scattered encounters against the Arakan Army in Rakhine state with Sittwe and Kyaukphu Deep Sea Ports holding out. The Arakan Army is the strongest EAG and once had links with China.
The Junta controls and holds around 40 per cent of territory, including the Bamar heartland, which contains more than half the population, including big towns like Mandalay, Yangon and Maugong, and major air bases and seaports. Resistance Forces control more geography than people. Military gains are due to forced enlistment (nearly 20,000 new recruits) and Chinese assistance.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsThe political reasons affirming Junta confidence derive from Russia’s military support, which is the largest supplier of lethal weapons, including six Su30 aircraft. Hlaing made his fourth visit to Moscow in May 2025 since the 2021 coup and also had a full delegation-level meeting with Chinese president Xi Jinping, his first with him. Russia will be building a seaport at Dawei and a 110 MW power plant. But it is China which is the major stakeholder: its critical component is regional security focused on the Indian Ocean Region and the vital offset to its Malacca dilemma, the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, whose investment tops $15 billion.
A Chinese security company has been deployed at Kyaukphu for security of its gas, oil, rail and road connectivity hub. Coupled with its control of EAGs operating in the north and Myanmar’s economy, Beijing calls the shots, though anti-China sentiment abounds. China and Russia together provide strong political cover in the UN, though with so many other genocidal wars being waged globally, Myanmar is off President Trump’s radar.
India, with a 1,643 km border with Myanmar—with Chin, Sagaing and partially Rakhine states—is largely a secondary actor. It has offered near unqualified support to the junta without securing commensurate gains from it like Beijing has. New Delhi fears cultivating EAGs in Chin or Rakhine states or even PDF/NUG in Sagaing, as it is reluctant to annoy the military, which in turn affects its Act East policy, stuck due to fighting among the Chin National Defence Force and Chinland Defence Force as well as differences between the Arakan Army and Chin Defence Forces.
The Junta has lost control to these EAGs and can now only bomb these areas. Nearly 40,000 refugees, mainly Kuki-Zo tribes from border areas, have taken refuge in Mizoram and Manipur due to infighting and aerial bombing by the Junta.
India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project passes through Rakhine state and the Trilateral Highway to Thailand transits across central Myanmar roiled in conflict. An alternate route through Bangladesh was abandoned after “unfriendly comments” by caretaker ruler Mohammad Yunus in Beijing about northeast India being landlocked. A fast-track Siliguri to Shillong corridor is under construction.
Indian Ambassador to Myanmar Abhay Thakur visited Sittwe port recently, and though Sittwe is partially operational, it is surrounded by the Arakan Army. Its full capacity utility is contingent upon cooperation with the Arakan Army. India delivered major assistance in Operation Rama following the 7.7 magnitude earthquake centred in the Sagaing region in March. A military field hospital along with 100 tonnes of food and medicines was provided, earning goodwill among Myanmarese.
On 13 July, India carried out its third Hot Pursuit operation in Myanmar against ULFA (Paresh Baruah), PLA and NSCN (K), which enjoy safe havens, and some assist the Junta against the Resistance. Nearly 150 armed drones were launched 15 to 20 km across the international border, targeting these insurgent groups which coordinate their activities with local groups, including NSCN (K). Junta forces assisted in these operations, which took out top commanders and caused heavy casualties. This is the first employment of armed drones in the Eastern frontier.
India-Myanmar defence cooperation is multifaceted and outsourced to Headquarters Eastern Command, responsible for the northeast, mainly LAC. A tabletop exercise is held annually near Shillong with the Myanmar Army on future UN peacekeeping missions if and when the junta becomes eligible for UN duty. Indian UN instructors monitor the UN-mandated games. Still, India needs to do a lot more homework to establish its clout among EAGs in border regions like rival China.
The Rakhine humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh, which is reportedly a US-sponsored project, has made little progress. Myanmar, always a blind spot for the US, has recently come of interest due to rare earths in the Kachin region. Burmese scholar Amara Thiha at the Stimson Centre in the US has said mining for rare earths will not be easy due to complicated logistics, limited processing facilities, legal hurdles and resistance from civil society groups. But China is giving it a shot.
The Myanmar peace process to end the civil war to restore a modicum of democracy has never been realistic and realisable. The Asean 5-point consensus was rejected by the Junta, and despite several Track II efforts centred on Myanmar and its immediate neighbours, none has taken off. The idea of elections is to be scrutinised by Malaysia, the rotating chair of Asean on September 19, with the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines visiting Naypyidaw.
On the prospects of elections being held, the editor of Mizzima News, Soe Myint, also author (with Nandita Haksar) of Resisting Military Rule in Burma (1988-2025), told me last week, “Elections will be held in areas controlled by Junta. People will vote though under duress; violence and disruptions will occur.” A sham election will not legitimise the restoration of a hybrid government under the 2008 constitution, for which 53 political parties have already registered. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the pro-Junta political party of the 1988 generation are likely to provide the civilian face of the government.
Till all resistance forces are united and agree on a future federal structure, it is difficult to foresee a new model of government for Myanmar. Soon to be ‘facilitator’ of a record number of ceasefires, if not peace processes, around the world, Donald Trump can have a shot at Myanmar too.
The author is former GOC IPKF South Sri Lanka and founder member Defence Planning Staff, now Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.