Modi’s visit to Russia: An urge for strategic autonomy in a polarised world

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was on a two-day visit to Russia from July 8 to 9 at the invitation of Russian President Putin. The prime minister participated in the 22nd India-Russia annual summit, which had been due for the past three years. PM Modi reiterated India’s position: “Peace cannot succeed amid bombs, guns, and bullets. For a bright future for the new generation, peace is essential. I assure you and the world community that India is on the side of peace.” To underline the importance of this visit, PM Modi was conferred Russia’s highest civilian honour, the Order of St Andrew the Apostle, by the Russian president, being awarded for outstanding civilian and military merit.

The Context

This visit was at a critical juncture as the world is in the vortex of ongoing conflicts, be it Israel’s onslaught in Gaza against Hamas or the seemingly unabated conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The world opinion is divided over these conflicts, and concerted efforts are being made by the collective West to galvanise international opinion in Ukraine’s favour and to isolate Russia on the global stage. The visit comes as a breeze of fresh air for Russia, which is facing the heat of Western isolation.

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India has so far adopted a balanced approach in the Ukraine conflict, neither publicly condemning Russian adventurism nor endorsing Russian aggression in principle. India remained neutral in the conflict, which effectively helped Russia’s cause. It abstained from successive UN resolutions condemning Russia for invasion. Speaking on India’s position, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar opined: “We have been clearly against the conflict in Ukraine. We believe that this conflict does not serve the interests of anybody. Neither the participants nor indeed the international community.”

Strategic Imperatives Behind India’s Position

India’s strategic imperatives in the Ukraine conflict have three dimensions: Continue a close strategic partnership with the US for its development needs and counter China’s bellicosity in the Indian Ocean region; maintain strong ties with Moscow; and avoid any perception of proximity to the emerging Sino-Russian axis. The intricate relationship triangle between China, Russia, and India and the evolving power balance between them and the outside world is the primary justification for India’s current position on the Ukraine conflict.

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Over the last two decades, India’s relationship with the USA has improved significantly. India is part of the Quad grouping, and the US has been instrumental in ending India’s non-inclusion in different international nuclear regimes. There is growing military-to-military and strategic cooperation between the two countries in the wake of the rising Chinese power profile vis-à-vis the US. India and the US share common strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific.

The shared goal of containing Chinese belligerence in the Indian Ocean region brought the two countries strategically closer. Despite growing bonhomie, they have different global visions, especially the US concept of its leadership role and its notion of alliance, and India’s long-cherished commitment to strategic autonomy and furthering the cause of the Global South. There is a tinge of suspicion among a section of the Indian strategic community about US intentions due to historical and other reasons. With a diminution in US global influence and stiff competition from China, globally in general, and Indo-Pacific in particular, India’s response in Ukraine is in tune with India’s vision and foreign policy choices to balance its regional and global relationship. India has been averse to being a part of any block.

India, Russia, and China Intricate Relation Triangle

India has historically looked at its relationship with Russia through the prism of the latter’s capacity and willingness to balance China. Russia and India share common strategic interests and are on the same page on the issue of multipolarity. Russia and India seek a multipolar world and a multipolar Asia without a hegemon. India can ill afford Russian international isolation, which, in turn, is pregnant with the possibility of the complete Russian embrace of China’s strategic vision. The tense situation along the LAC, declining Russian economic and military prowess, and its possible irreversible enmesh into the Chinese strategic embrace have necessitated the nurturing of close relations with Moscow despite sustained US pressure to take sides in the Ukraine conflict.

India remains the largest importer of Russian arms globally and is highly dependent on Russia for its defence systems and maintenance. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2016 and 2020, India absorbed 23 per cent of Russia’s arms exports. Moscow’s power in this domain derives from its sheer volume of sales and its willingness to provide weapons systems and technologies that no other country will export to India. To hedge against overdependence on Russia for arms requirements, India has diversified its acquisition of military hardware from the US, France, and Israel. In the face of the growing Russia-China strategic alliance against a common adversary, the US, and the fear of Russia becoming a junior partner to China, securing critical military hardware and ensuring Russian neutrality in the eventuality of an India-China confrontation is a cause of concern for India.

Taking advantage of the Western sanctions, India quickly became one of the largest importers of cheap Russian energy. The war deepened India-Russia economic ties, particularly in the energy sector. As per the report of ICRA, a rating agency, Indian oil purchases increased more than 20 times compared to 2021, exceeding two million barrels per day. India managed to save approximately $13 billion by importing cheaper crude oil from Russia since Western sanctions were imposed on it.

In sum, apart from the signing of nine MoUs and agreements in areas of trade, economics, and investment in the Russian Far East for the period 2024–2029, this visit is crucial for optics. When all eyes are on a much-vaunted Indian PM visit, India has been able to underscore the importance of the long-held doctrine of strategic autonomy. Its strategic and development requirements dictate India’s foreign policy choices and its global preferences . So far, India has been able to manage the pressure on its diplomacy despite the great tension surrounding the war in Ukraine. Managing triangular relationship dynamics—with India, Russia, China, and India, Russia, and the US—will test the ingenuity of Indian diplomacy.

Amitabh Singh is an Associate Professor at Central for Russian and Central Asian Studies, JNU. Ankur Dixit is a Research Scholar at Central for Russian and Central Asian Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.