Kursk counter-offensive: Ukrainian masterstroke or Russian tactical trap?

Ukraine launched an audacious counter-offensive into Russia’s Kursk Oblast region on 6 August, opening a new front. Named “Operation Krepost” (Slavic), it has sparked intense debate. Ukraine’s decision to extend the front line into a remote region of Russia is debatable, particularly at a time when the Ukrainian front in the Donbas is under severe pressure.

It was neither a counterstroke nor a counterattack, but instead a counter-offensive opening up another front. While “Operation Krepost” may have created an operational surprise and tactical success, it has so far failed to achieve any decisive leverage to stymie the Donbas front adversity. It created a vulnerability.

The Kursk offensive marked a pivotal moment in the war, reflecting a shift in strategy. Ukraine’s counterattacks in 2023 failed to achieve the desired end state, proving they didn’t have the numbers and resources against a well-fortified Russian deployment. This operation is possibly intended to take the pressure off the Russian Donbas offensive, improving Ukraine’s negotiating position, exposing Russia’s strategic weaknesses, and changing the narrative. Zelensky, meanwhile, stated that another goal of the operation was to show Kyiv’s Western allies that with the right support, its military could fight back and eventually win the war. He has failed to impress on that score too.

Russia’s Reaction to Kursk

Russia’s reaction to this unprecedented development had been unperturbed and focused on the primary Donetsk front. President Vladimir Putin made no public comments about the Kursk incursion for about a week and went on a two-day state trip to Azerbaijan, signalling that he had more important business in mind.

As the Ukrainian forces advanced deeper into Russia, Putin’s message was that while “enemies” indeed broke into Russia, they will be inevitably defeated.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continued to advance in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, closing in on the strategic town of Pokrovsk, not falling into the trap of diversion from Donbas to Kursk, which Kyiv expected. Zelensky’s tall statement that it would be a “real foundation for a fair end to this war this year”, seems to have gone awry. It was a symbolic egoistic strategic blunder by the Ukrainian hierarchy, which is facing headwinds. A Kursk trap that shall teach many lessons.

Ironically, the Western supply of military equipment and weapons to Ukraine, from Javelin and Stinger missiles and HIMARS rocket launchers to Patriot missile systems, to Abraham tanks lie exposed and could be captured. Ukraine’s strategic leadership played into Russia’s hands and against Ukraine’s interests.

The Military Realities

Ironically, Ukraine’s Kursk offensive force was operating on foreign land, in an area they didn’t know, making their mission uniquely challenging. Most of the units taking part in the Kursk operation were redeployed from areas they had familiarised over the past two and a half years. Thus an operational void of unfamiliar terrain set in.

With GPS and cell phone signals jammed, the Ukrainians have been relying on the Starlink internet service, which doesn’t work at all in certain parts of the Kursk region. Thus adding to the command, control, and communication dilemmas.

The Kursk incursion did not result in public pressure inside Russia and exposed the Western propaganda to undermine Putin’s position. It is important to be shrewd when it comes to Western propaganda and warmongering—to differentiate between fantasies and reality. If Putin’s background in intelligence is any indication, and Russia’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) credible, the offensive was known and trapped. Now the counter-offensive launched by Russia will be the biggest embarrassment and set back to Zelensky and his band of handlers.

War Exhaustion Sets In

Two and a half years of Russian offensive have decimated many Ukrainian units. Ukraine forces have been outnumbered and outgunned, leaving soldiers exhausted and demoralized. Desertion and insubordination are widespread problems in the ranks and files. Ukraine’s strategic advantage is debatable given the limited war stamina and resources. The tactical and operational success may not thus achieve the desired strategic end.

Kursk’s counter-offensive was a debatable decision at a time when Ukraine was struggling to defend key towns and cities in the east of the country. It resulted in an outstretch and reached its culmination point, exposing more vulnerabilities. Russia, now with a choice of place and time, is mincing Ukraine war machinery. The question remains to be seen: Who has the last laugh?

Russia Closes the Trap

Russia has now launched a major counterattack in its Kursk border region, more than a month after the invasion by Kyiv’s forces. Russia has recaptured ten settlements as a result of its counterattack in Kursk, while President Volodymyr Zelenskyy consoled that everything is going as per our Ukrainian plan.

Moscow has sent nearly 30,000 troops into the Kursk region, with possibly the Wagner fighters who are better equipped and are better trained and better equipped than even the Russian regular soldiers. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov also claimed that the Chechen special forces unit was in the area. Thus, without diluting the main effort at Donetsk, the Russians have trapped the Ukrainian forces and their Western equipment. The noose will only tighten in days to come.

The war of narratives continues. What remains to be seen is whether it represents the first step in a more concerted attempt to achieve a full-blown counterstroke or a probing of the ground for a bigger operation in the future. Whatever the Russian intentions, attacks in the Kursk area will increase the overall pressure on Ukrainian defences given that the intense Russian offensive is also continuing in the area of Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region.

But if Moscow succeeds in retaking its territory, it could deprive Ukraine of an ace up its sleeve in any peace talks to follow. It could also change the narrative that the operation had been a major success for Ukraine, a much-needed morale booster as manpower and equipment shortages continue to haunt it.

Lessons of Kursk

The Russian strategy in the ongoing conflict has been methodical and calculated. They allowed newly acquired NATO equipment and freshly trained Ukrainian forces to move into the Kursk region without reducing the execution tempo of the Donetsk offensive, where Ukraine’s vulnerabilities lie exposed. Pokrovsk is on the verge of falling. In Kursk, Ukrainian forces are now being trapped piecemeal, along with their recently acquired Western equipment. An encirclement could finally end in an embarrassing surrender.

It seems the sound military advice has either not been given to Zelensky or the political high-headedness of not heeding it led to the disaster. A lesson that other nations must learn too. While the initiation of war is a political decision, its conduct must be left to the military professionals.

While Ukraine may link the Kursk offensive to strategically dislocate Donbas operations, the leverage, time, and tempo were not in favour of the desired end state. For Russia, the Kursk offensive was a temporary setback till restoration operations were unleashed. It proved that a military balance of forces and that decision must have strategic clarity. No loss of territory is a fallacy of a defensive mindset; territorial integrity is the essence where restoration operations can at an opportune time ensure the same.

The principle of war of operational reach and culmination point was not in Ukraine’s favour with its current war stamina. While the Kursk has been innovatively planned, with deep interdictions, the strain on resources and personnel constrained the operational execution tempo and also impacted the operational balance in the Donbas sector.

The loss of critical equipment and personnel in the Kursk offensive could hinder Ukraine’s ability to launch future large-scale operations. The outcome of the operation will heavily influence Ukraine’s position in any potential negotiations, with success depending on the attrition they can inflict on Russian forces.

The war in Ukraine has shown that manoeuvre and firepower are complementary combat dynamics. Precision engagement (by distance punishment) like UAVs and HIMAR brings only one of the five elements of combat power (manoeuvre, firepower, leadership, protection, and information) to the battlefield. Adaptive manoeuvre is primary and firepower complementary. Boots and tracks on the ground matter.

Finally, Ukraine’s ability to maintain operational secrecy before the assault reflects innovative military planning, even if Russians could sense it. However, the operation’s success was the hype before the fall due to a shortage of troops and equipment, forcing Kyiv to commit its reserves, leaving them vulnerable to counterattack. They lost their strategic and operational balance. Tactical battles do not necessarily lead to operational victory, as battles may be won but war can be lost.

Despite the inter-theatre dynamics, there is still hope for an end to the war, albeit the advantage remains to Russia. The West must now face realities and not add fuel to the fire.

The author is former Director General Mechanised Forces. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.