Season of summits: From Alaska to Tianjin and beyond

To aficionados of diplomacy, international summits are the ultimate attraction. They are somewhat like Indian weddings. They usually appear in three different phases: the prelude is marked by speculation, curtain raisers in the media, and elaborate preparations by diplomats and officials; the actual event offers its own drama, pomp, and show; and the dénouement, which is dissected endlessly to assess the longevity (or otherwise) of the partnership.

Of various categories of summits — multilateral, plurilateral, and bilateral — nothing triggers greater frenzy than a wartime summit between the leaders of two great powers. This explains the enormous coverage and debate about the planned summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which takes place in Alaska on 15 August.

Alaska Summit

The only major war in Europe since World War II is now three and a half years old. Since its commencement on 24 February 2022, there has been no dearth of mediators, negotiations, and secret initiatives to end the war in Ukraine. The combatants, Europe, and the rest of the world are tired of this long war of attrition. They all want it to end soon. Trump, who proclaimed that he would end the war in 24 hours — “it won’t take even that long” — has been struggling in his diplomatic efforts for the past six months. Is he now near a breakthrough?

To spell out an objective answer, there is a need to visit three locales: the Kremlin, Washington, and Chevening House in Kent. On 6 August, US special envoy Steve Witcoff met President Putin in the Kremlin. This was their fifth meeting. It took place amidst US warnings that Moscow would face new financial penalties if it did not agree to end the war by 8 August. Action then shifted to the White House, where Trump announced on 8 August that he would have a summit meeting with Putin on 15 August.

Speculation preceded the announcement on two counts: about the venue — the UAE was considered and then abandoned before Alaska was finalised; and whether Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy would participate in the summit. As of now, the summit is between the American and Russian leaders, although the presence of Zelenskyy in Alaska at the time has not been ruled out. Clearly, Putin is opposed to it, whereas Trump is under pressure to arrange it in some form.

The third locale — Chevening House — is where US Vice President JD Vance, conveniently on a family holiday, held a meeting with European officials. Prior to the meeting, select European leaders (of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Britain, Finland, and the European Union) articulated their position through a joint statement issued on 10 August. “The path to peace in Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine,” it insisted, even while welcoming Trump’s work to stop the war and achieve lasting peace.

On the issues of substance, a wide gulf persists. First, about the land: Ukraine and Europe assert that they are still “committed” to the principle that international borders must not be changed by force. In contrast, Russia insists on keeping a large chunk of Ukraine’s territory. The US President, in his dual role as the highest representative of the West and the mediator, has publicly said that there would be “swapping of territories for the betterment of both sides.” Other contentious issues include the question of a ceasefire, followed by detailed negotiations, security guarantees against future invasions, and the protection of the security interests of Ukraine and Europe.

In a moment of candour, Vice President Vance stated that no side would be “super happy,” and a negotiated settlement between Russia and Ukraine was unlikely to satisfy either side. He added that the US was aiming for a settlement that both sides could accept.

Optimists and sceptics/pessimists are busy offering their predictions. But gradually it is becoming clear that, given the heavy political investment made by Trump and Putin, the Alaska summit could result in making some progress. This gets reinforced by a realistic assessment of the ground situation by Nandan Unnikrishnan, a top Indian expert on Russia, who observed recently: “Currently Russia is winning, and Ukraine will be unhappy under all circumstances.”

It is noteworthy that both China and India have publicly expressed support for the direct meeting between the US and Russia. Prime Minister Narendra Modi held telephonic conversations with both Putin and Zelenskyy, emphasising his advocacy for an early diplomatic settlement.

Tianjin Summit

Before August ends, China, holding the rotating presidency of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) for 2024–25, will host the summit that runs from 31 August to 1 September. Established in 2001, the SCO – with its 10-member states, 2 observer states, and 14 dialogue partners – has come of age. It is viewed as a significant multilateral grouping focused on Eurasian affairs. “Its trajectory,” wrote Cambodian scholar Kin Phea, “reflects institutional consolidation and trust building among diverse member states, anchored in the Shanghai spirit.” As the host and president, China is likely to drive the summit discussions and conclusions in the direction that promotes its fundamental interests.

There could be a connection between the Alaska and Tianjin summits. If the Alaska meeting achieves some progress, the assembly of leaders in China may contribute to further easing of East-West tensions. On the other hand, if Alaska results in a fiasco, the spectacle of Putin, Modi, and Xi Jinping holding hands together with a large group of leaders may be viewed somewhat negatively in Western capitals, especially Washington.

An important angle on this SCO summit: Modi and Xi Jinping could hold a bilateral meeting on the sidelines to thrash out their bilateral and regional differences within the context of the ongoing reset of bilateral relations and the adverse impact of China-Pakistan strategic collusion during the recent India-Pakistan conflict. The challenge for them is to keep moving forward on the bilateral plane while expanding space for cooperation on multilateral issues. The growing tensions in India-US relations in recent weeks form the immediate backdrop.

Other summits

Before the year 2025 concludes, three other summits may draw considerable attention from everyone interested in world politics.

Since he took over as US President in January, there has been speculation about Trump’s visit to China or a possible meeting with Xi Jinping somewhere else. As and when this meeting takes place, it is certain to shape the flow of great power relations.

Then, it will be time for the Putin-Modi summit when the former visits India before the year’s end. This summit is imbued with significance as Putin last came to India in 2021. Much has changed since then in the region and the world.

Finally, there is the next Quad summit, which India is scheduled to host before the end of the year. Its prospects have dimmed considerably, with some scholars suggesting that as Washington and New Delhi have been out of sync on multiple issues — not just tariffs — the present may not be the most suitable time for a Quad gathering at the highest level. The argument factors in the shabby treatment given by Americans to Japan and Australia, the other two members of the Quad. New Delhi will have to take a call on the timing of the Quad summit, even as it begins preparations for the BRICS summit in 2026.

In short, the current season of summits has just begun.

Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House, a former Indian Ambassador with extensive diplomatic experience in regional and global groupings, and the author of three books on Indian foreign policy. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.