Jamaat genie out of bottle: How Yunus has failed to tame radicalism in Bangladesh

The word “secular” in the context of Bangladesh is in itself a cliché. Bangladesh’s contemporary image often boasts of its secular origins, yet the country has a long-standing history of Islamist politics and religious violence that predates its independence. The roots of its modern extremism lie in historical processes of the state and the emergence of the subsequent formation of its Islamic national identity, which has crystallised over the years under successive regimes.

From 1971 to 1975, under the leadership of its founder, Mujibur Rahman, also known as Sheikh Mujib, Bangladesh undertook efforts to secularise Bangladesh. Shortly after its independence, the inaugural constitution introduced in 1972 established a legal framework for secular governance. It enshrined secularism as a core principle of the state and forbade the exploitation of religion for political purposes.

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However, by 1974, Bangladesh’s failing economy, famine, and growing local Islamist sentiments forced Sheikh Mujib to shift his approach. To garner public support, he began integrating Islamic culture and values into public life, introducing new religious holidays, imposing bans on alcohol and gambling, endorsing Islamic education, and reinstating Quranic broadcasts on public radio and television.

Following Sheikh Mujib’s assassination in 1975, Bangladesh entered a period of 15 years under the autocratic rule of Ziaur Rahman, who imposed martial law in the country. Zia’s administration removed the term “secularism” from the constitution in 1977 and then subsequently lifted the ban on Islamic parties, including Jamaat-i-Islami, which had opposed the country’s independence. Zia, who also founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and his political allies, including Jamaat-e-Islami, promoted the notion of Bangladesh as an Islamic state through their political practices and rhetoric.

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His government made several moves to integrate Islam into the fabric of the state’s political and legal framework, thus laying the foundation for radical organisations like Jamaat-e-Islami and Hizb-ut-Tehrir to spread their network within Bangladeshi Muslim society. After Zia’s assassination in 1981, General Hussain Muhammad Ershad took control and continued the trend of Islamising Bangladeshi politics, culminating in the 1988 declaration of “Islam as the state religion” of Bangladesh.

In 1990, a democratic uprising led to the removal of General Ershad, thus ushering in a new era of electoral politics in Bangladesh. Over the next three decades, Bangladeshi leaders navigated a complex landscape of both secular and Islamic values. Under BNP’s Khalida Zia (daughter of Ziaur Rahman)-led government, the Islamic fervour of Bangladesh remained prominent, with Jamaat-e-Islami being its critical mainstay, while under the recently ousted Prime Minister Sheikh asina, the identity of secular politics retook shape.

It was after the return of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League party back in power in 2011 when “secularism” as a term was reinstated in the constitution while still maintaining “Islam as the state religion”. Hasina has repeatedly emphasised Bangladesh’s secular identity. The Awami League, her party, is prominently linked with secular nationalism. However, both the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) have strategically utilised Islam for political gains. Though Sheikh Hasina during her tenure took many steps to curb radicalisation and bring the semblance of secularism back in the social fabric of Bangladesh, multiple surveys conducted over the last two decades have pointed towards increased prominence of radical Islamism over secularism.

In a 2006 Gallup poll, 91 per cent of Bangladeshis said they wanted sharia as the only (or at least as one) source of legislation. A 2013 survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre found that 82 per cent of Bangladeshis favoured making sharia the official law, and among that, a significant minority, 44 per cent, supported executing apostates.

In a 2017 survey commissioned by the RESOLVE Network, a large majority of Bangladeshis supported property rights, free political expression, judicial independence, and free elections. Yet even larger majorities advocated for a greater role for sharia, including the imposition of harsh physical punishments for criminality and forced veiling.

Nearly 80 per cent of those surveyed said sharia should have a “somewhat” or “much larger” role in the legal system. The data show a widely held belief that sharia will ensure better governance outcomes. These results clearly indicate how the radical Islamist organisations have been able to push Bangladesh as a state towards a similar nature to that of Pakistan.

Evidently, Bangladesh is affected by the growing radical demand for a greater reflection of Islamic values and sharia in governing institutions. Alongside the expanding role of religion in mainstream Bangladeshi society and politics, violent extremism also sprouted and spread with the intention of creating an Islamic caliphate transnationally as well as domestically.

During 1980 to 1990, thousands of Bangladeshis joined the Afghan jihad war against the Soviets. After the fall of the first Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1996, many of them returned back to Bangladesh and formed the now-proscribed radical terror organisation Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). JMB marked the beginning of Bangladeshi violent extremism. JMB with its affiliated groups and individuals were responsible for multiple bombings, suicide attacks, and intimidation. In 2005, JMB carried out a series of bombings at nearly 500 locations across Bangladesh.

Over the subsequent years, more terror organisations started surfacing in Bangladesh. Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), which is also called Ansar al-Islam (AAI), ISIS, and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), also started operating inside Bangladesh and have recruited Bangladeshis to carry out terror attacks to create a global caliphate as well as an Islamic state in Bangladesh. These organisations targeted the free thinkers and bloggers within Bangladesh as well as carried out terror attacks on foreign nationals in Bangladesh, the most prominent one being the Holey Artisan bakery attack in Dhaka, which left 17 foreign nationals dead, including an Indian national.

So it came as no surprise that ISIS flags surfaced among the protestors on the streets of Dhaka following the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government. Since her ouster, there has been a marked escalation in violence against minorities in Bangladesh. Reports indicate that there has been a significant increase in targeted attacks on non-Muslim communities, primarily against the Hindus. Vandalism and arson of temples, Sufi shrines, and other places of worship have also been reported. Videos on social media have emerged where the radical Jamaat-e-Islami members, while distributing relief materials among the minority Hindu community, are seen tearing away the sacred threads worn around the neck amidst radical Islamic sloganeering and cheering in the aftermath of floods Bangladesh is witnessing currently.

The interim government led by Mohammad Yunus has largely failed to stop the violence against the minorities and has also made matters worse by lifting bans on radical Islamist groups and releasing terror suspects from jail that rule the roost on the streets of Bangladesh. This situation is reminiscent of the fact that Bangladesh, which fought hard for its independence to escape from the shadows of Pakistan, is now starting to reflect as a mirror image of the same Pakistan it once sought to overcome.

Raja Muneeb is an independent journalist and a columnist. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.