Is Armenia India’s new 'Extended Neighbourhood'?

In a major development on Thursday, the Indian government has appointed defence attaches to over half a dozen countries, including Armenia. Earlier, the hectic diplomatic parleys between India and Armenia in the last few years, especially since India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s visit to Yerevan in October 2021, the first of its kind by a high-profile Indian leader in the last three decades, show India’s keen interest in Armenia.

For the first time in the three decades, since the independence of Armenia in 1991 following the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union, a high-profile minister of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government visited Armenia. Similarly, the last four years have seen many diplomatic waters flown between New Delhi and Yerevan. For example, the Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ararat Mirzoyan, took part in the Raisina Dialogue, 2023 organised by India’s External Affairs Ministry, and subsequently in February-March 2024, an Armenian delegation comprising academicians, think tanks and cultural ambassadors visited various institutes, think tanks and organisations in New Delhi, Hyderabad and Bengaluru, besides taking part in the Raisina Dialogue 2024. Many analysts, strategists, and diplomatic honchos, both in Yerevan and New Delhi, believe that the recent rise in India-Armenia relations is the need of the hour amidst the crucial geopolitical ballgame in the South Caucasus region.

Armenia fervently desires India to balance the fractured geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus that has witnessed regional power rivalry, conflict over territory, and war as well. While, Russia, which has been the main support system of Armenia in the post-Soviet space, is now embroiled in several issues, especially the Western sanctions, following its war with Ukraine and thus taking scant interest in the issues related to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Further, the dubious silence of Russian leadership during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2023 for whatever reason casts doubt on Armenia’s dependence on Russia in the coming times. It is, therefore, ironically felt that amidst the weakening of Russian support to Armenia, India is the only country that can play a sheet anchor role in the South Caucasus both because of her strategic and economic interests in the region. And perhaps Russia will have no inhibition for India playing its part in the South Caucasus.

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Hence, India’s intervention in the South Caucasus is veritable as understood from this author’s recent interaction with several Armenian scholars, academics, strategists, media persons, common people, etc. in Yerevan in the last week of March 2024. They firmly believe that a person of Prime Minister Modi’s international stature can balance the situation in the South Caucuses. They also believe that since India has strong strategic bonds with three of the important powers (Russia, Israel, and Iran) who have stakes in the South Caucasus, it can persuade these three countries not to antagonize Armenia and provide direct or indirect support to Azerbaijan that has tormented Armenia left and right in the last few decades. Besides, Armenia wants India to use its good office to influence Azerbaijan leadership to end hostility along its border with Armenia.

Furthermore, Armenia seriously wants India to ink the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) to take the present bilateral defence partnership to a new high. It is important to highlight here that India’s defence exports to Armenia constitute some 90 per cent of Armenia’s total arms imports including drones, radar etc. From the Indian point of view, it coincides with the economic and strategic interests of both countries. For example, Indian intervention in the South Caucasus will not only send a strong signal to Azerbaijan to stop tinkering with India’s INSTC initiative under Turkiye’s influence but also will give a fillip to India’s significant defence production from nearly $3 billion now to over $10 billion under the Make in India project by 2028-2029.

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It is important to underline here that the critical geopolitics in the South Caucasus over strategic resources poses a serious challenge to India’s bid to reach Russia and beyond to Europe by realising its strategic signature initiative, the International North South Trade and Transit Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal network of land (roads, railways, etc.) and sea routes that connects India with Russia and beyond. The main route of the INSTC is through Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia, which will ultimately link India to Europe. However, the shortest and safest route from India to Europe could be through Iran, Armenia, Georgia, and Russia, bypassing Azerbaijan which has been under the influence of Turkiye.

India perhaps understands why Armenia wants India to divert the INSTC through Armenia, instead of Azerbaijan, a) the strategic and economic benefits of INSTC will go to Armenia, and b) to stem the Turkiye-Azerbaijan rot. With Turkiye’s active support (financial, defence equipment, etc.), Azerbaijan wrested the Nagorno-Karabakh territory, which has been the bone of contention between Armenia and Azerbaijan for decades. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s belligerent bid to construct the Zangezur corridor connecting its mainland to the Nakchivan district is a cause of grave concern, both for Armenia and India. For example, once the corridor is constructed, it will have sway over the Iran-Armenia border thereby closing the shortest alternative route of the INSTC.

For India, what is a matter of great and grave concern is the growing nexus between Armenia’s adversary Azerbaijan and India’s inveterate enemies (Pakistan and Turkey). It may lead to an unholy nexus and also a peculiar security situation, which will jeopardise India’s far greater interests in the region. Azerbaijan is the fulcrum of Turkiye’s pan-Turkic agenda that aims at uniting all Turkic people in and around the region to spread Turkiye’s influence from the “Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China.” Further, it is a well-known fact that Pakistan has been aiding and abetting terrorists from across the border for decades against India. Its active involvement in the South Caucasus will add insult to India’s injury.

Last but not least, one more factor that may sound non-descript to many is the China factor in the South Caucasus, which cannot or should not be ignored. It is worthwhile to mention here that China has a considerable capital investment in the main regional players in the South Caucasus such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, and Turkiye. However, one thing in this context that India agrees with is Armenia’s non-endorsement of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Whereas Baku fits the Chinese bill to be part of BRI because of its infrastructure and has been part of the BRI since its inception, Yerevan has not yet shown any interest or commitment. No high-profile leader (President or Premier) from Armenia has attended any of the four Belt and Road Forum since 2017.

At this critical juncture, both India and Armenia should translate their newfound bonhomie into a new-age partnership. It is well understood that as a votary of peace and stability across the globe, India will be an important player in the Armenian “Crossroads of Peace” project. India must consider Armenia as her “extended neighbourhood”, which includes the region from the “Suez Canal to the South China Sea,” at par with India’s partnership with Southeast and Central Asia. Furthermore, it could be a stepping stone to a much-needed mutual SPA between New Delhi and Yerevan, which has a solid foundation of centuries-long civilisation linkage. Many in India and Armenia strongly believe that Yerevan may be the first in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s bucket list after winning the third term as Prime Minster of India in June 2024. The appointment of defence attache in Yerevan could be a pointer in this regard.

The author teaches at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.