Why Iran's next move will be critical in deciding the fate of West Asian crisis

A series of successful strikes on commanders of Iranian proxies in Tehran and Beirut have escalated the tensions in the Middle East. The sequence of events indicates a more professional strategy of Israelis in targeting commanders of Iranian proxies, which is certainly better than mass punishments of Palestinians influenced by revenge psychosis, adopted so far. The ball is currently in the court of Iran, which is evaluating options to recover from the embarrassment of the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh on its soil as a guest.

Although few interim exchanges have taken place between Hezbollah and Israel and a US strike on Iraqi non-state actors and retaliation in US bases post-assassination, these are routine exchanges as major retaliation is yet to come. The next move of Iran could shape the future escalation dynamics in the region.

The Assassination Drive

While Israel may not own up its hand in the assassination of Hamas top political leader and negotiator Ismail Haniyeh , and the US has announced that it was neither informed nor is involved in it, the Iranians have assumed it was a successful covert operation by Mossad (Israel).

While the ownership of the killing of Hezbollah’s No. 2 Commander Fuad Shukr in Southern Beirut, Ali Nazih Abed Ali, a senior officer in Southwestern Lebanon, Hamas leader Mohammad Deif in Gaza, and some Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders in Syria is well established, it’s the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, which seems to be the most important trigger for escalation, where Israel is exercising the option of plausible deniability.

The Western media’s initial narrative of internal feud within Hamas, with hardliners seeing Ismail as too moderate or Iran not being happy about Hamas handshake with Fatah in Beijing being cause of assassination, hasn’t found any takers. The intention, benefits, and capacity to do so in the past (Israel has successfully knocked off a few nuclear scientists by covert operations in the past) pinpoint Israel as a prime suspect.

The fact that most of the killings of important commanders happened after Netanyahu’s visit to the US and Fuad Shukr was also on the target list of the US due to the 1983 Beirut Barrack bombing (killing 241 US Service members) creates a suspicion of a silent US hand or a clearance given to undertake such strikes. It’s understandable that Ismail’s assassination in Qatar, Egypt, or Jordan would have been very uncomfortable for the US; hence Iran was the right place, from a US perspective.

There are many theories about the methodology of assassination from a bomb planted months in advance and activated remotely through AI or, as given by the IRGC narrative, strike by a short-range projectile, but all indicate a major breach in Iranian security structure and a major embarrassment for Tehran. It leaves Iran with no option but to take some action to prove its credibility to its proxies and domestic audience, which has taken a big hit by exposure of its vulnerability.

Impact on Israel

From a military perspective, these assassinations have boosted the sagging morale of the IDF, extended the political lifeline of Netanyahu, pushed all ceasefire proposals out of the window in the near future, created a do-or-die situation for all proxy fighters of Iran, and put Tehran’s military credibility to a serious test.

Netanyahu has every reason to pat his back and that of his agencies involved, but it might put the lives of remaining hostages at grave risk. This aspect may cause some internal friction/dilemma with the IDF, Mossad, and many cabinet members pushing for a ceasefire and release of hostages, and Netanyahu, with some hardliners pushing for prolonging war to achieve an impractical goal of “ complete destruction of Hamas ” as a precondition to a permanent ceasefire.

Israel is also communicating with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain to defend against the upcoming Iranian attack by allowing it to use their airspace and help in neutralising some projectiles. Prolonging the war and refusing to accept a two-state solution is also widening the gap between Netanyahu and Joe Biden, who finds himself getting increasingly and reluctantly involved to chase the impractical goals of Netanyahu and his political survival.

The Iranian Options

There is a wide asymmetry in conventional combat capability (including nuclear arsenal) of Israel backed by the US and Iran along with proxies; therefore, Iran has been more comfortable fighting a proxy war through its regional proxies instead of direct confrontation. Iran knows that an all-out war cannot give it any favourable outcome. Iran and the Houthis don’t have land access to Israel; hence, they have very little option other than launching standoff attacks through missiles, drones, and rockets of varying intensity, magnitude, and impact.

Hezbollah is the only strong group that has some capability to fight an intense ground battle, but it’s no match to the collective capability of Israel and the US. It would therefore prefer standoff attacks and covert operations over conventional war. The capability of Hamas has been weakened considerably, but it will continue small tactical clandestine actions against IDF under the leadership of Yayha Sinwar , its leader in Gaza and one of the alleged planners of the October 7 terror attack on Israel, a hardliner now appointed as the new head of its political bureau, replacing Ismail Haniyeh.

There are many backdoor negotiations going on, and the fact that Iran has given adequate time to Israel and the US to prepare against its possible attack to minimise casualties indicates that there could be a symbolic attack, bigger than its strike carried out in April 2024, in response to Israeli attack on its consulate in Syria, to satisfy its proxies and public. Hezbollah maintains that keeping Israel waiting is part of the punishment! In the absence of credible options of an all-out attack by Iran, it appears that the actual revenge could also come through some terrorist action, clandestine operations, or new hostage crisis, for which its proxies will be on the lookout for targets anywhere in the world as terrorism has no boundaries.

American Stakes

The US has no choice but to defend the strategic location of Israel, which is its most trusted ally, maintaining its strongest foothold in the Middle East. Netanyahu continues to encash this strategic equation to fulfil his political agenda, forcing the US to oblige, despite the optics of trying to control his overdrive/excesses by the IDF, to amuse its domestic audience/voters and some allies not comfortable with excessive civilian casualties in Gaza. Simultaneously, it’s still trying to push negotiations for a ceasefire, the release of hostages, and its peace plan with all parties.

The USA is sending more fighter planes, warships, and a carrier strike group to the Middle East. As per the Pentagon, additional cruisers, destroyers, and a fighter squadron are part of the deployment, along with the carrier strike group USS Abraham Lincoln , to strengthen defences and assist Israel in its defence against a possible military attack by Iran and its proxies Hezbollah, Hamas, and Houthis.

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Meanwhile, as a show of support, Russia had sent former Defence Minister and Head of National Security Council Sergei Shoigu to meet Iranian President Pezeshkian and counterparts in Tehran. Russia has reportedly started sending advanced air defence systems and radars to Iran, and Iran has reportedly asked for Russian-made Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. Iran has deployed Russia’s most powerful jamming communication system, Murmansk-BN, at strategically important locations. Reportedly, President Vladimir Putin too has asked Iran’s Supreme Leader for a restrained response to avoid civil casualties in Israel, as Russia may not be keen to overstretch itself at this point in time.

Iran could count on political and diplomatic support from China and Russia at the United Nations, which may not be good enough to go for full-blown war.

Turkish President Recep Erdogan made statements suggesting that Turkey could potentially intervene militarily to support Palestinians, drawing parallels to his past interventions in Karabakh and Libya. His comments look more like political posturing than for real; as a NATO member, it may not be easy for him to do so, with the US standing firmly with Israel. Erdogan is using this opportunity to score a point in the Islamic world. Turkey has stopped trade with Israel since May 2024 and might continue with such gestures. North Korean posturing seems to be more of an optics at this stage.

The Arab world hasn’t supported Palestinians beyond lip service in one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes and violations of international humanitarian law by Israel in response to a brutal terror attack by Hamas on October 7; hence, Iran can’t expect any help from them. In fact, many Arab countries might be happier with these assassinations leading to the embarrassment of Iran.

Future of Gaza

If Hezbollah launches an offensive, Israel might be compelled to pull some more troops from Gaza, scale down combing operations, and rely more on standoff strikes, as it has been doing in the past. Indicators are that IDF is pushing for scaling down large-scale operations in Gaza to specific intelligence-based targeting. Ceasefire will be difficult in the near term. Netanyahu’s ambition of ‘Greater Israel’ will block any two-state solution on some pretext or the other. Palestinians will continue to suffer due to a lack of effective, sensible, moderate leadership, under uncontrolled Israel, backed by the US, and the global community not acting beyond lip service.

The US is trying for a two-state solution independent of Hamas, with a puppet leader from Fatah to govern Gaza and the West Bank, which is unlikely to be accepted by Israel as well as Hamas. Hamas, their quest for an independent state and hatred towards Israel will not die down. The leaders will get replaced, but the ideology will remain.

Global Impact

Israel-Iran escalation will push the world further under inflationary pressure. The Red Sea may become even more risky, and shipping through the Persian Gulf too may face a serious threat. A disturbed oil flow may further cause price rises and a turbulent economic environment. From an Indian perspective, initiatives like I2U2 (Israel, Iran, the UAE, and the US) and the India-Middle East Europe Economic Corridor may get postponed indefinitely. Israel, as one of the suppliers of military hardware to India, may face problems in meeting Indian supply orders. The global power blocks with Iran, Russia, China, North Korea, and Syria getting closer to oppose the US, Israel, and their Western allies are an obvious outcome. Most importantly, Iran’s chances of going nuclear may increase much more, which may not be good news for the region.

The author is a global strategic and military analyst. The author can be reached at Facebook, LinkedIn and Instagram as Shashi Asthana, @asthana_shashi on X and personal site , email [shashiasthana29@gmail.com], LinkedIn and YouTube . Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.