Iran, Ukraine and now Bangladesh: How US ‘interventionism’ subverts democracy

Former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reportedly accused the United States of attempting to depose her after she refused to cede control of Saint Martin Island, which would have granted the US a significant influence over the Bay of Bengal. While her son, Sajeeb Wazed Joy, later walked back these claims on X, if they prove accurate, they would reflect the covert political maneuvers reminiscent of the Cold War era.

The strategic allure of covert regime change in Bangladesh for the United States becomes apparent when considering the country’s key geographical position. Bangladesh’s ports, situated in the fertile delta of the Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers, are strategically close to both eastern India and China.

Hasina has alleged that the US seeks to establish a service port in Bangladesh for mid-sized naval vessels. This port could serve to counterbalance China’s presence in Myanmar and provide logistical support to US allies without requiring Indian consent. Moreover, controlling Bangladesh’s riverine economy could offer substantial strategic advantages, particularly for potential air operations targeting China’s less defended southeastern regions.

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The recent protests in Bangladesh began over a relatively minor issue but soon attracted widespread participation, especially from younger groups. Technology, including secure communication apps, played a key role, possibly with external support. Additionally, there was notable funding from new charities and NGOs, and media coverage included provocative content. These factors suggest that foreign influence might have been a factor in the unrest.

Proving the specifics of covert interventions is inherently difficult. Such operations are designed to allow the intervening country to deny involvement and deflect blame. The proliferation of conspiracy theories further complicates the task of separating fact from fiction. However, the suspicion surrounding US covert regime change operations is grounded in a historical pattern where the US has frequently used such tactics as a tool of foreign policy, often avoiding accountability for its actions. In fact, the US has in recent decades tried to overthrow more countries than everyone else in the world put together.

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One of the most notable instances of US intervention occurred in Iran in 1953 when the CIA orchestrated a coup to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh after he nationalised the Iranian oil industry, threatening Western economic interests. The success of this operation installed the Shah of Iran, a US-backed monarch who ruled with an iron fist. While this initially strengthened US influence in the region and ensured access to Iranian oil, it also sowed deep resentment among the Iranian people.

This resentment eventually culminated in the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which ousted the Shah and established the Islamic Republic, fundamentally altering the US-Iran relations and setting the stage for decades of hostility. The long-term effects of this intervention highlight the precarious balance between short-term strategic gains and the potential for enduring instability and backlash against foreign influence.

More recently, there was the alleged US involvement in the 2014 Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. The protests, initially sparked by President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to suspend the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, quickly escalated into a full-blown revolution. While the protests were rooted in genuine public discontent, there are some indications that the US played a role in supporting and guiding the movement.

High-profile visits by US officials, the distribution of support through NGOs, and leaked conversations between US diplomats reveal an active American interest in the outcome. This intervention led to the ousting of Yanukovych and a shift in Ukraine’s political alignment toward the West. However, it also provoked a sharp response from Russia, resulting in the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has now led to full-blown war between Russia and Ukraine, and contributing to enduring instability in the region.

In Covert Regime Change: America’s Secret Cold War, Boston College professor Lindsay A O’Rourke argues that between 1947 and 1989, the US tried to change other nations’ governments 72 times, viewing attempts at regime change as cost-effective strategies to boost US security and power. Of these, 66 attempts were covert operations and six were overt.

The most fascinating finding is that a majority of the covert attempts to overthrow foreign governments failed. During the Cold War, the US succeeded in 26 of its 66 covert operations to install a friendly government; the other 40 failed. Success often hinged on the tactics used. None of the US-backed assassination plots succeeded, although two leaders—South Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem and the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo—were killed by others during US-backed coups. Similarly, covert support for militant groups rarely worked, with only five of 36 attempts succeeding. Coup sponsorship was more effective, with nine out of 14 coups achieving their goal.

Meddling in foreign elections has been the most effective covert tactic. O’Rourke identified 16 instances where the US covertly funded, advised, and spread propaganda for its favoured candidates, often across multiple election cycles. In 75 per cent of these cases, the US-backed parties won. Of course, it is possible that many of these parties might have won even without US backing.

O’Rourke quotes Ray S Cline, the former head of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, as saying that the key to a successful covert regime change lies in providing just the right amount of marginal assistance in the right way at the right time. John Bolton, a former White House National Security Adviser has also been quoted in 2022 saying, “As somebody who has helped plan coups d’etat - not here but you know (in) other places - it takes a lot of work.”

The biggest downside is faced by the countries upon which regime change is imposed. These nations tend to lose faith in democracy. In the worst cases, there are eruptions of public violence that severely destabilise the state and tip it into civil war.

Scholars have two main theories about what pushes countries into civil war — grievance and opportunity. In the grievance model, civil wars start when people are so unhappy with their government or each other that they resort to violence. In the opportunity model, violence becomes more likely when the government is weak, allowing criminals and extremists to exploit existing grievances, whether genuine or not.

The opportunity model suggests that improving law and order is crucial, while the grievance model focuses on addressing the root causes of discontent. Research supports the opportunity model, showing that weak states, transitions, and challenging geography are strong predictors of civil war. Factors like dictatorship, discrimination, and ethnic divisions are less predictive. So even when regime change leads to civil war, it’s more often due to the weakness of the state and the botched process of transition than due to the public illegitimacy of the puppet regime.

Civil wars typically occur in areas where the state’s control is weakest, often in rural areas rather than cities. This pattern was evident in the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, where removing dictators created opportunities for violence rather than leading to immediate stability. One of the best predictors of insurgency is having the kinds of terrain that governments cannot reach, like swamps, forests and mountains, and Afghanistan has these in plenty. As such, efforts based on the grievance model, like “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency, often fail, as seen in the US experience with nation-building.

But how have all of these regime change efforts worked out for US interests? To systematically assess how effective foreign-imposed regime change is, Alexander Downes, a political science and international affairs professor at The George Washington University, has explored the topic in his book, Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong. He finds that more often than not, leaders brought to power through regime change do not remain loyal to their foreign supporters for very long. Once they take control, they typically come to the realisation that following the agenda of their foreign backers leads to strong domestic backlash. As a result, they usually end up softening their stance, and in some cases, even breaking away from their foreign allies altogether. In addition, the act of regime change itself very often leads to the fragmentation of the military, which then increases the risk of armed men starting an insurgency against the puppet regime. Therefore, the drawbacks of regime change are inherently embedded in the very process of attempting to achieve it.

To understand why states still persist with this strategy, we must understand how since World War II, the international norm of territorial integrity has become a cornerstone of global relations, significantly reducing the incidence of territorial conquest. Historically, nations frequently sought to expand their territories by force. However, since 1945, this practice has diminished significantly, partly due to the United Nations’ reinforcement of the sanctity of existing borders. Although conflicts continue, successful annexations are rare and typically go unrecognised by the international community.

From 1648 to 1945, as many as 93 of 119 armed conflicts were classified as “territorial wars”, focused on issues related to control over land. Of these territorial conflicts, 80 per cent led to changes in territorial boundaries. Between 1945 and 2000, there were 40 territorial wars, but less than 30 per cent resulted in changes to international borders. Most post-World War II territorial expansions occurred during the decolonisation era. No country has been erased from the map through conquest since the 1950s. Even Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 resulted in widespread international condemnation and Iraq’s subsequent isolation. This demonstrates the strong global aversion to territorial expansion.

In contrast, the principle of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of other countries lacks the same level of enforcement and clarity. Unlike the prohibition against territorial aggression, which is well-defined and universally recognized, sovereignty is a more flexible and contested concept. This flexibility allows states to pursue covert regime changes without facing the same degree of international condemnation as they would for overt territorial conquests. The less stringent enforcement of sovereignty principles compared to the clear-cut norm against territorial expansion means that covert operations, which aim to influence or overthrow governments without altering borders, are often seen as a more viable and less risky alternative for achieving strategic objectives.

As global norms evolve, the pursuit of regime change may continue to adapt, but the fundamental challenges and ethical considerations remain central to understanding its impact. The persistent conflict between the principles of territorial integrity and non-interference in sovereignty further complicates the international landscape, making it crucial to scrutinise the underlying motives and outcomes of such interventions.

CIA-sponsored regime changes have had significant and often detrimental effects on the economic and political landscapes of countries like Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Panama. These interventions led to substantial declines in real per-capita income, democracy, and civil liberties. Research indicates that within five years of such regime changes, per-capita income fell by approximately 10 per cent, and democracy scores dropped by nearly 200 per cent by some measures. These interventions, ostensibly aimed at promoting democracy, often resulted in weakened governance, reduced freedom of expression, and a decline in civil liberties. This illustrates that the costs imposed on the population outweighed any strategic benefits for the US.

For Bangladesh and its neighbours, the risks could be significant if claims of foreign intervention hold true. A regime supported by external powers might destabilise the economy, leading to a reduction in living standards akin to the decline seen in Latin American countries. Moreover, the weakening of democratic institutions and civil liberties could incite social unrest and erode the rule of law, potentially destabilising the entire region.

Given the Indian subcontinent’s intricate geopolitical landscape, this could further exacerbate regional tensions, leading to sustained instability. For India, this poses a strategic challenge that demands a proactive and measured response. Ensuring regional stability and safeguarding its interests will require India to closely monitor these developments and engage diplomatically to counter any potential threats to the balance of power in the region.

Koushik Verma is a data scientist specialising in AI-driven analytics with a passion for sustainable tech solutions. He enjoys exploring classical music and trekking in his spare time. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.