INS Vidyut: The silent performer of 1971 War

In a few weeks from now, on December 4, the Indian Navy will be celebrating yet another edition of Navy Day. The service has grown in a spectacular manner since independence and will, undoubtedly, be proud of its achievements and accomplishments over the past eight decades. The Navy Day celebrates the Indian Navy’s daring exploits in the 1971 war, which was, arguably, the Navy’s finest hour.

While the vast canvas of the Navy’s actions straddled two seas and involved a range of varied missions, none captured the national imagination more than the twin strikes on Karachi—the citadel of the Pakistan Navy—on December 4 (Op Trident) and on December 8 (Op Python). The enormous destruction caused by these strikes and the psychological damage they wrought on the enemy meant that they would be remembered and cherished for a long time.

One of the remarkable aspects of these strikes was that they were undertaken by very small missile boats that had been inducted into the Navy barely a few months before. The 25th Missile Vessel Squadron was formed of these eight Russian-origin OSA I class boats, which were the first missile-armed vessels in the Navy. Packed with lethal firepower and manned by a thin young crew with lots of chutzpah, they were, after the war, colloquially christened as ‘Killers’. The same attitude and brio were inherited by the new set of missile boats (the Tarantula class) that we acquired in the late 80s from the erstwhile Soviet Union. These ships too have served the country well over the last four decades; now, only a few of them remain in service.

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And thus, a Killer tradition was set—of high-performance ships and spirited young crew. Every year, the magnificent ‘Killers Night’ (usually held around the last week of November or early December) sees young and veteran Killers get together to celebrate not just the 1971 war but the Killer saga ever since. Many stories are exchanged. Remarkably unsung in all this is the story of INS Vidyut (referred to without the prefix INS hereafter), which essayed an important if low-key role in the war. This article attempts to shed light on that and give the ship its just due.

Background

INS Vidyut (pennant number K 83) was commissioned in February 1971 at Kolkata. Kolkata, because it was the only port with a 200-tonne crane that could offload the missile boats that had been transported on bigger merchant ships. After unloading (and before commissioning), a sea trial was done by the ship’s crew under the supervision of the guarantee specialists. Thereafter, they left Kolkata for Bombay. As the ship’s engines had limited hours of running before overhaul, the missile boat had to be towed by a bigger ship. The overhaul facility in the Bombay dockyard was not ready and was in the process of completion. The tow was not conventional; it was an indigenous design in the form of a necklace around the hull of the boat. The passage from Kolkata to Mumbai, spread over many days and witnessing several bouts of bad weather, gave the crew of all the missile boats the chance to work up as well as practice connecting and disconnecting the tow expeditiously. It also built team cohesiveness, camaraderie, and familiarity with equipment. All of these were to prove immensely useful in the days ahead.

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The commissioning commanding officer (CO) of Vidyut was Lieutenant Commander (later Cdr) Bhupendra Bikram Singh, or BB as he was popularly known. The other officers in the commissioning crew were Lieutenant (later Cmde) RP Singh (Executive Officer or XO), Lieutenant RR Beedu (Engineer Officer or EO), and Lieutenant VK Paradkar (Missile Gunnery Officer or MGO). Sub Lieutenant (later Cmde) Surojit Neogi joined some months later as the Second MGO. Cmde Vijay Jerath, in a book he authored in 2013, called 25th Missile Boat Squadron: An Untold Story (Prakash Books), speaks affectionately about his close friend BB, whom he describes as his ‘cricketing friend’. He further says, “Whether we played for the same side or stood in opposite camps, he was always fun to have around. Ever smiling and ready with his jokes—some harmless, others risqué, and a few unprintable. Both of us were straight-speaking and, on many occasions, were heard saying, ‘Sorry, sir, I beg to differ’. He usually had a mischievous glint in the eye and a smile on his lips."

Later in the book, calling him a champion cricketer, he also says that BB yielded the captaincy of Missile Boat Squadron’s cricket team to him (Jerath) because “he (BB) had no intention to be sober or give up his jokes and anecdotes on and off as the field could Captains were expected to do”. A few other officers and crew members that this author spoke to have the same recollection of BB.

As war clouds loomed, the Navy top brass steadily but stealthily made plans to use the missile boats in an offensive role and attack enemy strongholds at their doorstep. Given their limited range, this implied that the boats had to be towed some distance and fuelled mid-sea, if needed. This required missile boats to practice their missile firing drills as well as hone up seamanship skills. By November, the missile boats were raring to go. Six of the eight missile boats were available while INS Nirbhik and INS Nashak were under maintenance. From all accounts, it appears that the Navy had planned at least three waves of attacks on Karachi: ‘Trident’ at the onset of the war, ‘Python’ a couple of days later, and ‘Triumph’ following two days later.

Of course, since it could not be foreseen then as to how and when the war would terminate, the Navy’s concept of operations did consider the fact that, if necessary and feasible, the missile attacks could continue. This required the planners to factor in quick operational turnaround, replenishment of spent missiles, and the need for supporting units. In the initial stages, four missile boats—IN Ships Nipat, Veer, Nirghat, and Vidyut—were kept under the direct control of the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Naval Command (FOCinC WNC), while two—INS Vijeta and INS Vinash—were assigned to the Western Fleet Commander.

Operations During War

Vidyut and Nirghat sailed from Bombay on November 20, 1971 (some data suggest even earlier, around November 10) and berthed at Sayaji Pier in Okha. They were loaded with four war-shot missiles and were fully prepared for war. INS Katchall, the Petya class corvette was also in company. These ships were, thus, meant to be the first line of defence, at the forefront, so to speak, during the hostilities phase. Naval planners would certainly have had the memories of 1965, when Pakistan carried out a sneak attack on Dwarka, when the Indian Fleet had been restricted by the government to operate south of Porbandar. While the Dwarka raid had been completely ineffectual, it gave the Pak Navy something to crow about. It was to forestall such adventurism by Pakistan that India forward deployed its assets from mid-November. In an interview to the Navy publication ‘Quarterdeck’ (1996 issue), Admiral SM Nanda, the Navy Chief during the 1971 war, also suggested that these ships were deployed in Okha to give Pakistan the impression that they were being utilised only for harbour defence. Verily, a deception of sorts. Be that as it may, since these ships sailed out for many patrolling sorties off Okha over the next fortnight, often remaining at action stations when they detected suspicious targets on radar, it gave them the much-needed ‘terrain familiarisation’ and robust work up before the war broke out.

Acting on orders received, Vidyut and Nirghat sailed from Okha in the early hours of December 4. Earlier, on the evening of December 3, Lt Cdr BB Singh and Lt Cdr IJ Sharma, the Commanding Officers of Vidyut and Nirghat, respectively, had been summoned to the office of the Resident Naval Officer (RNO), Kathiawar, Cdr Khambatta, and had been handed over a sealed envelope marked ‘Top Secret’. As recollected by Lt Cdr (later Cmde) IJ Sharma, in the book Jungee (p 363), authored by his daughter Priya Sharma Shaikh, Khambatta told them, “Your orders for Operation Trident. You should be proud to be part of independent India’s first naval operation (sic), and the first ever attack on the fortress of enemy’s strength, Karachi. This envelope spells death or glory for your men and you. It is strictly to be opened at a given time, which you will know once you are at sea. May God bless your ship’s company and you." At about the same time, two young Assistant Missile Gunnery Officers (AMGOs), Sub Lieutenant Ashok Dewan (Nirghat) and Sub Lieutenant Surojit Neogi (Vidyut), were receiving instructions on the ‘NUCO or New Signal Code’ from the RNOs office to be used over tactical circuits as an added security measure. The stage was set.

Early afternoon on December 4, they were joined by two other missile boats from Bombay, INS Veer and INS Nipat, as well as the Petyas INS Kiltan and INS Katchall, at the assigned rendezvous point, off Dwarka. While the other ships went ahead as the Op Trident strike force, Vidyut was to remain off the Saurashtra coast in order to guard the return passage of the attack force. Its assigned task was to act as a cover force in case the attack force on their return leg would be pursued by Pakistan naval units.

This plan was conceived by the Headquarters, Western Naval Command. In his book, We Dared, (Lancer, 1989, p 48), the late Vice Admiral SN Kohli, explaining the organisation of the attack, says “The Missile boats and Petyas would use up all their ammunition and during the return journey they would be most vulnerable. It was hence decided that only three missile boats would go to Karachi and fourth would patrol off Okha to cover the withdrawal of our forces. One can imagine the disappointment of the officers and sailors of this boat at having been left out of the fun and games. But it could have been otherwise and in case of a Pakistani attack they would have to perform a most vital role. They also serve who stand and wait.” However, this was contrary to what the Naval Headquarters in Delhi had sought to do. Vice Adm MK Roy, who was the Director Naval Intelligence during the war and privy to the mind of the Navy Chief, in his book War in the Indian Ocean (Lancer, 1995, p 221) brings out that “this plan (by WNC) was contrary to the appreciation at Naval Headquarters who advocated that maximum missiles should be fired in the first attack as surprise was the dominant factor for overall success”.

While both approaches were valid in their own way, the point that needs emphasis is that Vidyut was an active part of Op Trident with a definite role to play as a deterrent or countermeasure force. The fact that the Strike Force achieved great success and Pakistan was so completely disoriented that they did not counterattack in any manner, has resulted in Vidyut being ignored or obscured in subsequent rendering of the Trident story. Interestingly, while the Strike Force Missile Boats – Nipat, Veer, Nirghat – entered Mumbai harbour on December 06 to a – much deserved – rapturous welcome and for operational turnaround, Vidyut continued to patrol off the Saurashtra coast. Much of this patrolling was done under tow – first by INS Tir and later INS Katchall. The Rangout radar of Vidyut with its good radar ranges and efficient performance was put to good use. This clearly indicates that the planners wanted to use Vidyut for another attack and to, therefore, conserve its engines.

Meanwhile, the Western Fleet, under RAdm EC Kuruvilla, flying his flag on INS Mysore, had sailed out of Mumbai harbour on December 02, 1971. They had in company the Missile Boats Vinash and Vijeta. However, on December 04, Vijeta had a breakdown and had to return to Mumbai. This effectively left the Fleet with only one Missile Boat. The attack on Karachi by the Fleet (Op Python) was initially planned on 06 Dec. Given this development and the stupendous results of Trident, Naval Headquarters wanted to press home the advantage and contemplated Vidyut joining Vinash for the second attack. As brought out in the official history book of the Indian Navy for the period 1965-75, Transition to Triumph (Lancer, 2000) authored by Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani, “it was felt necessary at NHQ that the Fleet should have an extra missile boat for this attack” (p 198).

Accordingly, plans were rehashed, Vidyut was directed to rendezvous the Fleet and was taken under tow by INS Tir for this purpose. However, a combination of circumstances such as widely dispersed geographic positions of the ships, possibility of positional compromise due to Tir’s inadvertent HF Transmissions, Vidyut’s machinery problems, possibility of Pakistan Air Force being on alert for a follow-on attack or attacking the Fleet and, above all, rough seas precluded that plan and Vidyut was back to patrolling duties. This was also the time when the overall Command for Missile boat attacks quickly yoyoed from Western Command to Naval Headquarters and back. After the war, the differences in approaches between the two entities were the subject of some critique, much study and gave lessons to be imbibed for the future. However, pertinent to our protagonist, it can be seen that the fog and friction of war once again deprived Vidyut of action. The magnificent outcome of Op Python, which effectively KOed Pakistan Navy, negated any need for subsequent post mortems or counterfactuals such as “what may have happened if Vidyut had joined the Python strike”.

Thus, Vidyut continued to be off Saurashtra until it was called back to Mumbai on December 10 in the aftermath of the sinking of INS Khukri the previous night. In the words of Lt (later Cmde) RP Singh, who was the EXO on board, “we returned to home port after three weeks. The ship was in a fit state technically and the crew’s morale was high”. Since, it was not known when the war would end, a third strike, Op Triumph, was planned on December 16. Originally this was to be undertaken around December 8-9 but the postponement of Python by two days, the loss of Khukri and, above all, the excellent results obtained in both strikes gave Naval planners the flexibility to push it further. Accordingly, Vidyut sailed again to anchor/patrol off Diu Head on December 15. Like with Python, the third strike was to be executed by a single ship, Vidyut alone. But it could not materialise as Pakistan’s Army surrendered in the east and ceasefire was declared. The war ended and Vidyut was ordered to return to base. Vidyut, as some may aver, was ‘third time unlucky’.

Interestingly, while patrolling off the Saurashtra coast with INS Katchall in company and as Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), Vidyut had apparently made a report of submarine periscope sighting to Katchall in the late afternoon of December 08. The latter with more advanced plotting and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities concluded that it may have been a fishing stake and disregarded the contact. Katchall may well have been right and, in any case, it is difficult to conclude definitively as areas close to the coast have plenty of fishing vessels. It is also speculative and incorrect to opine on this, far removed from the battlefield in time and space. However, as fate had it written, the very next night, in an area further south of where Vidyut had reported the submarine, INS Khukri was torpedoed by PNS Hangor. There are also some unconfirmed reports of Vidyut having intercepted and captured a small ship carrying cargo for Pakistan, off Saurashtra coast, in the later stages of the war. However, people’s memories are hazy on this issue and there are no other sources to verify the same.

Post War

There is a fascinating postscript to this in that the story does not end here. After the war, all missile boats except Vidyut were ordered to unload missiles. Therefore, for Vidyut, the routine continued as for a loaded ship viz. four active fully fuelled missiles with 380 Kg warheads (each) in hangars on board. Although war had ceased, contraband control remained in force. Plus, certain precautions were necessary to have a ready ship for deployment in case of a flare up at short notice or recurrence of conflict. Few days later, they even had to respond to an emergency when an American merchant ship anchored in the port defied orders and fled harbour. It was suspected to be carrying cargo for Pakistan and the next port of call was Karachi. Vidyut completed its ‘action checks’ and was poised to sail out to interdict the vessel when it was informed that the merchant vessel had heeded warnings and returned. Vidyut again lost out on some possibility of ‘action and excitement’. It was only after complete normalcy returned, sometime in March 1972, when Vidyut was ordered to unload its missiles.

This issue of loaded missiles needs some elaboration. Unlike many of the anti-ship missiles of today which use solid fuel, the P 20 (Styx) missiles of those times used liquid fuel. Liquid fuels are considered less safe to handle and armed missiles need proper monitoring. The standard drill in those days, therefore, was that the missiles were prepared (and stored) separately in what was called the Technical Position or TP. Ships would normally carry dummy missiles for practice or drills during routine exercises and be equipped with prepared missiles only in the precautionary phase or for war. Once the prepared missiles were loaded on the ship, the ship’s company followed a more rigorous safety and firefighting routine that involved more critical monitoring, enhanced watchkeeping, ensuring temperature control and such like. For a small ship with a sparse crew, it imposed a heavy burden.

As brought out by Jerath, in his book, “The missiles were not only potent when fired – they had deadly liquid fuels. Which could leak and cause havoc. In case, the leak could not be stopped, then the missile had to be jettisoned” (p 114). Elsewhere, in another context, but highlighting the importance of this issue, VAdm VL Koppikar, who in 1971 war was the Chief Staff Officer (CSO) of the Missile Boat Squadron, writes “as the year drew to a close, a certain number of boats were kept ready at all times, fully armed and at short notice for sea. All at once, things began to look menacingly real. I used to have recurrent nightmares of a freak accident in which half of Bombay and its environs were wiped out” (Quarterdeck 96, p 42).

In effect, it was nothing short of extraordinary that Vidyut kept prepared missiles on board for about 4 months from mid Nov 1971 to March 1972. This would have been a great challenge and stress to the ship’s company. In an exchange with this author, Cmde RP Singh recollects “What an experience it was for a missile boat and its crew. The ship’s technical reliability was tested to its longest continuous period. It remained operational throughout except for a few hours of routine maintenance by the crew as and when required. The professional knowledge and efficiency of the crew was at its best level topped by very high morale. No one ever complained or asked odd and awkward question regarding the ship’s deployment or its assigned tasks. For me as an XO it was a proud privilege. All through the deployment my Captain was much mature and never lost his cool. Ever.” It bears mention that during the initial loading before the war one of the missiles on Vidyut had developed a leak. The ship’s company watered the leaking fuel down till the Technical Position personnel came and stopped the leak. Possibly, that helped the ship’s company prepare for the challenges ahead.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it is clear that INS Vidyut played an important role in the 1971 war. It was very much part of Op Trident and assigned a definite role of covering the return passage of the strike force. The Navy’s Official history book is clear on this. Hiranandani emphatically states “The Karachi strike group consisted of two Petyas and four missile boats armed with four missiles each. One of the four boats was to remain on patrol off Dwarka in order to provide cover for the force on its way back” (p185).

Vidyut was to also have been a part of Op Python and Op Triumph but exigencies of fate and the various factors that determine the trajectory of war precluded that. Notwithstanding that, it was vigorously involved right from November when it was forward deployed, through the war when it was almost continuously on patrolling duties and after the war as a ‘ready duty ship’ for any eventuality. It accomplished the enormous feat of having armed missiles on board for four months. It also, arguably, spent the longest time at sea – often eventful – amongst all the missile boats during the war. Through all this, but for minor niggles, it remained technically and operationally in taut condition.

Subsequent historical recollections of the war whether in official histories or informal accounts have, somehow, tended to gloss over or ignore the role of Vidyut. It is somewhat incongruous because unlike Nirbhik, Nashak and Vijeta (with no disrespect to them at all), which had limited role to play in the war, Vidyut had been a very active – arguably, most active – participant. It is nobody’s case that this happened by design. It is in the nature of human affairs that the more visible events and happenings tend to get toplined. The euphoria of war victory and the more important need of ‘getting on with life’ and attending to post war issues meant that Vidyut’s contribution remained relegated to a footnote. Given the natural disposition of men in uniform, the officers and men of that ship soldiered on giving their best to the service. It is possible to hazard a guess though that some recognition of their contribution would have earned their gratitude and evened the balance. However, the good thing about history writing is that it has space for retrospective reviews and revisions. Perhaps, it would be in fitness of things, more than fifty years later, to acknowledge the splendid, if silent, work of INS Vidyut and its crew.

There may be some poetic justice to the fact that having been deprived of the chance to fire its missiles in the war, Vidyut during the two decades of its commission, reportedly, had the distinction of highest number of missile firings amongst all its intrepid peers. It also, fittingly, ended its life on a high. During the last commission from 1990 to 1991, the ship sailed out on 37 occasions and clocked 2,700 miles. Deservingly, it won the best missile boat trophy bowing out with a hurrah. Decommissioned on March 31, 1991 at Visakhapatnam, it had indeed been a long journey for the doughty warrior. From Russia to Kolkata to Mumbai to Okha and the coast of Saurashtra and finally to Visakhapatnam. Karachi remained a box to be ticked but it would have been proud of its equally accomplished mates who went there. In some ways, the teamwork of the eight siblings is reflected in the fact that the recent accounts of 1971 Missile Boat actions, especially in social and digital media, refer to them as ‘Vidyut class’ ships. The Wikipedia even describes Vidyut as ‘the lead vessel of its class of fast attack craft of the Indian Navy’. Why was this even though it was not the first among them to be commissioned or the seniormost among the eight? We may need a separate article to decode that but it does seem to suggest a recompense of sorts for the ‘silent sentinel’.

Tailpiece. As with most good things in the Navy, the old Vidyut was given a befitting farewell and a new one was commissioned soon after. On January 16, 1995, a modern state of the art Missile Vessel, INS Vidyut (pennant Number K 48) was commissioned. More importantly, this was built in India, a product of our drive for indigenisation. Over the last three decades, the second avatar of Vidyut, the youngest of the Veer Class, has given an impressive account of itself. It has participated in a number of operations over this period including dozens of forward deployments, deployments during Op Parakram and post Pulwama. Along with its siblings, it is a bridge between the upcoming New Generation Missile Vessel (NGMV) and the earlier Veer Class ships. It would be fitting if one of the NGMVs to be commissioned in the coming years is named Vidyut. That would be an apt tribute to the illustrious legacy of its predecessors.

Cmde Srikant Kesnur, is a Navy veteran who comments on Maritime Issues. Views expressed here are personal and do not reflect those of the Firstpost. Sources for the references quoted are available with the author but are not being outlined here owing to the constraints of space and format of this publication. The author is immensely grateful to veterans Cdr BB Singh, Cmde RP Singh and Cmde Surojit Neogi for their recollections. Photographs courtesy Indian Navy and Cdr BB Singh.