India’s delicate balancing of East and West in Cold War 2.0

The phrase “Cold War 2.0” has gained increasing attention in recent debates about world politics. It reflects the idea that the international system is consolidating once again into rival blocs, reminiscent of the 20th-century confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, however, the configuration looks different.

On one side are the United States and its allies; on the other is the China–Russia partnership, sometimes referred to as the “Dragon-Bear”. Within this rivalry, India emerges as a critical and pivotal state whose choices will significantly impact the balance of power.

The suggestion that global politics is once again hardening into blocs has been reinforced by political rhetoric, including statements from US President Donald Trump in his recent post. The notion is that Washington, with its European and Indo-Pacific partners, faces a cohesive rival bloc led by Beijing and Moscow. This positions the international system as bipolar in spirit, if not yet in strict structural terms.

While the Cold War metaphor has its limits, the return of great-power rivalry gives it a particular resonance. At the same time, it reduces the present moment to a simple binary. Unlike the original Cold War, today’s order has strong multipolar characteristics.

Middle and emerging powers fall neatly into either camp. Their pursuit of strategic autonomy, diverse partnerships, and regional influence complicates the picture of two rigid blocs. In this sense, Cold War 2.0 may share the rhetoric of bipolar rivalry, but its actual structure is closer to a contested multipolarity.

India’s Unique Position

India does not fit neatly into either bloc, which is why it is often described as a swing state. Historically, New Delhi has had deep strategic and defence ties with Moscow. At the same time, its partnership with Washington has grown considerably over the past two decades, particularly in trade, technology, and defence cooperation. Meanwhile, India’s strained relationship with China, characterised by territorial disputes, border clashes, and strategic competition throughout Asia, introduces additional complexity.

This mix of relationships gives India an unusual degree of flexibility. It can engage with both sides while avoiding overdependence on either. For the United States, India is too important to ignore, even when differences arise. For Russia and China, India remains a factor that complicates any effort to consolidate an exclusive bloc.

In short, India’s strategic positioning makes it a central player in the balance of power in the emerging global order. Given this context, it is likely that Washington and New Delhi will continue to seek areas of convergence, regardless of changes in political personalities or leadership.

For the United States, India is indispensable in efforts to counterbalance China in the Indo-Pacific. For India, the United States offers critical technological, economic, and strategic support, even if its interests are not always fully aligned. This pragmatic convergence is likely to persist, even in moments of friction.

Multipolarity and Swing States

Rather than a strict return to bipolarity, we are moving toward a multipolar world in which swing states play an outsized role. These are states that, by virtue of their size, geography, and autonomy, can influence outcomes by carefully balancing between competing powers.

India exemplifies this role, along with countries such as Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia. Swing states complicate rigid bloc politics because they resist being tied down and prefer to preserve their strategic autonomy. This allows them to shape negotiations, set agendas, and even tilt the balance in regional or global confrontations.

At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge the argument that initiatives like the Quad — the grouping of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India — were always limited. One reason is that they did not fully account for civilisational dynamics in shaping international alignments.

Japan, for instance, shares closer cultural, institutional, and historical affinities with the West, making it a more natural partner. India, by contrast, represents a distinct civilisation with its own historical trajectory. This does not prevent cooperation, but it makes alignment less seamless and less predictable. India is not a Western outpost in Asia; its foreign policy is shaped by its own civilisational memory, which includes non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and an insistence on multipolarity.

The same perspective can be applied to Russia. Periodically, US leaders have discussed bringing Moscow closer to the West, but these efforts have consistently failed. Part of the explanation lies in Russia’s civilisational history. The history of Tatar rule in the mediaeval period, followed by centuries of autocratic governance and later the Soviet regime, has profoundly shaped Russia’s political and cultural identity.

The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution represented a significant departure from Russia’s traditions. It dismantled previous institutions and established a communist system that continues to impact Russia’s mindset and governance today. These longstanding legacies make genuine integration between Russia and the West more complex than simply considering strategic interests.

Beyond Power Politics

The broader lesson is that geopolitics cannot be explained by power calculations alone. Civilisational legacies and historical memory continue to influence how states act, the alliances they form, and the limits of their partnerships. This is why the Quad’s potential has been constrained, why US–Russia rapprochement has faltered, and why India continues to chart its own distinct path.

India’s position in Cold War 2.0 highlights both opportunity and challenge. On one hand, its autonomy gives it leverage, ensuring that its voice carries weight in shaping the international order. On the other hand, it must carefully balance great-power expectations without being drawn too deeply into either camp.

The key takeaway is that India’s role will not be defined solely by power balances but also by its civilisational trajectory. Its challenge is to preserve autonomy while influencing the balance of Cold War 2.0. In doing so, India may well become the most decisive actor in an era where memory and identity matter as much as strategy and force.

Sreshtha Chakraborty holds PhD in International Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University and is currently an Assistant Professor at Bennett University. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.