How India can prick Pakistan’s Washington bubble

The recent White House engagements—Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief General Asim Munir meeting President Donald Trump, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan preceding them by a few hours—would be viewed with interest in New Delhi.

Munir’s repeated trips to Washington and Sharif’s White House invitation look dramatic, even historic. But drama is not destiny. India should treat this as the predictable churn of transactional US diplomacy under a leader with a taste for rapid, tactical deals—and, crucially, see opportunity where others see menace.

The context is blunt. The Gaza war has upended regional alignments and given Washington a short-term imperative—stabilise West Asia fast so that focus can return to the Indo-Pacific contest. That logic makes partners who can deliver quick leverage more valuable than long-term strategic friends for now. Trump’s approach is to assemble pragmatic intermediaries for influence with Islamist actors. The Erdogan and Sharif meetings suggest an attempt to fashion a tactical architecture to manage fallout and secure short-term peace outcomes.

This is precisely why India must resist reflexive alarmism. Washington’s elevation of Pakistan today is transactional. Investment pitches, defence conversations, and leverage over Gulf capitals—this is not a wholesale replacement of India in US strategic calculus. The US still needs India’s economic heft, manufacturing base, and Indo-Pacific linkages. What Delhi must recognise is the tactical nature of the moment. It is temporary, expedient, and aimed at immediate crisis management rather than rewriting the long-term architecture.

One perception of the Trump strategy is that this sudden anti-India turn is not merely irritation at India’s Russia ties but a calculated effort to keep the Russia–China equation off balance. By tacitly ignoring Pakistan’s continued intransigence in Jammu and Kashmir, Washington injects a permanent irritant into India’s strategic environment. This creates complexity for Moscow and Beijing, both of whom have tried to cultivate India as a balancing partner in their own contests with the West but also do not have anything against Islamabad.

If India is fully comfortable at home, its ability to pursue an even-handed, rational course with Russia and China is facilitated. In that sense, not pressurising India would be to the transactional disadvantage of the US, because it would allow Russia and China to consolidate a more stable, long-term understanding with New Delhi—something Trump’s team would prefer to forestall.

But this temporary US approach of backing Pakistan can become consequential if left unattended by India. Two major initiatives that India once hoped would anchor it in West Asia—the so-called Western Quad cluster around Israel–UAE–US cooperation and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)—have lost momentum as the Gaza conflagration absorbed political capital and trust.

IMEC in particular has seen delays and stalling because Israel’s regional ties were disrupted and political attention shifted to conflict management. If India allows these initiatives to wither while others stitch short-term security bargains, New Delhi risks being crowded out of the very networks it helped catalyse in 2016–18.

The collapse of the so-called Western Quad (India–Israel–UAE–US) and the faltering of IMEC are not minor setbacks but symptoms of a deeper shift. In 2016–18, India was able to strike the right boxes with Gulf capitals—energy, diaspora, and security—while simultaneously gaining goodwill in Tel Aviv and Washington. That momentum gave India unusual visibility in the region. By contrast, the Gaza war has exposed just how brittle these arrangements could be. Without sustained Indian nurturing, the region’s states will move on, aligning with whoever delivers security guarantees and economic payoffs most quickly.

Equally, India will appreciate that Gulf countries are no longer passive actors waiting for external patrons. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing diversified global engagements—with China on infrastructure, with Europe on technology, and even with Russia on energy. India must reinsert itself with compelling offers or risk losing the privileged access it briefly enjoyed. That requires both nimble diplomacy and deliverable projects that go beyond rhetoric.

So, what does a proactive Indian response look like? First, India needs to stop being vocal in any defensive way that could project it being rattled. Diplomacy reads confidence. India is too far ahead to be considered irrelevant.

Second, convert stalled economic architectures (like IMEC) into lower-profile, practical projects that can survive political shocks—logistics corridors, economic consortiums, and quick-win energy and port linkages that do not require perfect diplomatic conditions. Rapid engagement in West Asia on the basis of our already well-established linkages will help.

Third, accelerate bilateral outreach to the Gulf—especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE—on purely transactional bargains (energy, investment, diaspora protection) while quietly rebuilding trust on security cooperation. The entry of Pakistan should not worry us. Multi-vector engagement beats everything when states are scrambling for security guarantees.

Fourth, and very essential. Strengthen India’s narrative and visibility in Washington’s own policy ecosystem beyond the Oval Office headlines. US presidential whims are transitory; institutional relationships are durable. Deepen congressional, business, think-tank, and military-to-military ties so the US has to factor in India even during tactical flirtations with other regional players. If Trump’s White House is buying short-term stabilisers, India must make itself the long-term, reliable option—not by asking, but by offering scalable, marketable deliverables (renewable energy supply chains, port investments, tech partnerships).

Let us also be candid about Pakistan’s leverage. Islamabad’s renewed proximity to Riyadh (and the recently publicised Saudi-Pakistan defence understandings) and its ability to influence certain Afghan and Islamist constituencies give it bargaining chips Washington will exploit when convenient. But these chips are limited by Pakistan’s economic fragility and dependence on other patrons. India should not overreact to Pakistan’s momentary visibility; instead, it should exploit the gap it leaves in India–Gulf economic and security engagement.

Finally, India must keep its strategic autonomy without being isolated. Reassert leadership in practical multilateralism. Attempt to push IMEC back onto the rails to keep it alive. Conduct international seminars on this at New Delhi, involving West Asia and other stakeholders. Revive people-to-people and business channels across the Abraham Accords space, and offer pragmatic channels for Gulf states to diversify their security guarantees without surrendering sovereignty. The alternative is a slow drift toward peripheral status in a region that matters not for charity but for strategic depth, involving energy, diaspora, investment, and political linkages.

We can expect more headline-grabbing, transactional US diplomacy in the Trump years. Ignore the theatrics; treat the moves as tactical, not strategic. Use this breathing room to harden India’s institutional ties, rescue and repackage stalled connectivity projects into deliverable wins, and regain the diplomatic initiative with Gulf partners.

If Delhi can manage that modest menu of measures, Pakistan’s “Washington moment” will remain just a moment—not a strategic realignment that relegates India to the margins. To do full justice, you need a consortium of Indian strategic affairs think tanks to take on second-rung information-based diplomacy through outreach by some major seminars across all the capitals of West Asia. The traditional political diplomatic approach is not known to deliver on such issues. It’s the unconventional outreach that reaps the dividends.

The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.