Nikki Haley has emerged as one of the few Republican voices offering clarity on Indo-US relations at a time of turbulence. In a recent Newsweek op-ed, she urged the United States to treat India as a “prized free and democratic partner” and warned that losing it would be a “strategic disaster”. She has criticised tariffs and punitive measures against India even as China is spared similar treatment. She has urged direct talks and course correction before the damage becomes permanent.
Haley’s intervention is a reminder that strands of realist thinking remain alive in the Republican Party’s foreign policy circles. At a moment when Indo-American ties appear frayed, her words anchor us back to the enduring logic of partnership.
The speed at which Indo-American relations have seemed to unhinge is itself a cause for worry. Policy shifts, rhetoric, and bureaucratic impulses in Washington have produced a situation in which strategic partners look more like estranged acquaintances. A measured posture is critical because both sides have too much to lose with drift. This is not the first time that misunderstandings have shaken confidence; history suggests that interests will reassert themselves if policymakers resist the temptation to indulge in short-term fixes or retaliatory gestures.
Looking back, the last great reset in Indo-American relations came at the turn of the century. After India’s Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998, sanctions and suspicion prevailed, but President George W Bush chose to overcome the negatives. By then, US perceptions of China had begun to shift. Beijing’s ambitions were becoming overbearing, its appetite for regional dominance was evident, and its concern for securing its maritime trade and energy routes was driving tensions.
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More ShortsFreedom of navigation in the Pacific was already an issue, and American faith that China would integrate as a rational stakeholder was eroding. At the same time, 9/11 struck the United States emotionally and strategically. Its animosity with the Islamic world sharpened, and India—long a victim of state-sponsored terrorism—suddenly found its experience resonating in Washington with the convergence of parallel tracks.
It was during this phase that Pranab Mukherjee, as India’s defence minister, delivered his seminal address at the Rand Corporation in 2005, signalling India’s readiness for deep cooperation. US analysts such as Professor Stephen Blank, then with the US War College, observed that India was “intrinsically desirable as a partner” and that the partnership rested on mutual needs and interests rather than abstract values such as the rhetoric of democracy.
For nearly two decades, the analysis proved right. The Indo-American nuclear deal was concluded, major defence agreements like Comcasa, Beca, and Lemoa were signed, and military exercises became routine. India joined the Quad, and the Asia-Pacific was renamed the Indo-Pacific, partly to recognise Indian strategic centrality. So long as China was viewed as the primary adversary, India was indispensable. Under Trump 1.0, Indo-American relations achieved a transformational peak.
The drift began under Joe Biden. Perhaps Washington’s deep state grew uncomfortable with India’s rapid rise. China, meanwhile, tested India’s resolve through the Line of Actual Control (LAC) confrontation in eastern Ladakh in 2020, after the earlier Doklam confrontation. India remained resilient, positioning itself as the world’s soon-to-be third-largest economy while retaining democratic legitimacy. Yet Washington’s actions began to puzzle New Delhi. The $450 million package to refurbish Pakistan’s F-16 fleet revived old anxieties.
New Delhi saw the F-16 package as reviving US-Pakistan security links at India’s expense and masking it under counterterrorism rhetoric. During the Ukraine war, India’s decision to purchase discounted Russian oil was treated as defiance, although it was India’s traditional energy diversification. That Caatsa sanctions were not imposed for India’s S-400 purchase, giving India confidence that Washington understood its strategic autonomy. But over time, irritation grew in US officialdom. The overthrow of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, widely seen as US-backed, raised eyebrows in India.
The latest wave of tariffs appears to ‘remind’ India that autonomy has limits. Some in Washington may have hoped India would act as a lever on Russia, ignoring contextual influence on Moscow that doesn’t go beyond Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s candid advice to President Vladimir Putin against war. The pressure appears aimed at compelling India to do the impossible.
Haley’s reminder comes at this fraught moment. US policy toward China has not changed fundamentally; countering Beijing remains Washington’s top priority, alongside preventing a Russia-China entente. If so, why is Washington pushing India into a Russia-China corner while giving Pakistan new space? The contradiction is striking. It is possible that once there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, US priorities will shift and the pressure on India will ease.
Until then, India must hold steady and rein in its own strident media discourse, which in 2020 contributed to heightened tensions with China. Quietly improving the relationship with Beijing must continue to preserve manoeuvrability. With Trump, optics often matter more than substance, so India must ensure its optics project steadiness and strength rather than defiance.
The Indian diaspora in the United States will also have to step up. Normally vocal, it has been unusually quiet. Most of it voted Republican and now finds itself disoriented, watching its chosen party lean toward Pakistan under pressure from campus activism and lobbying. Haley’s words give the diaspora a rallying point. If America is to be reminded of why India matters, the diaspora has to play its part in shaping opinion.
The way forward lies in pragmatism. India should continue high-level engagement with Washington, explaining that its strategic interests remain aligned with the US when it comes to China and global stability. At the same time, it should push for supply-chain partnerships, deepen technology and defence cooperation, and expand educational and innovation linkages. Washington must recognise that India’s rise is not a threat but a reinforcement of the balance of power.
The India-US partnership has survived many storms before. This one will pass too if all responsible remember the foundation of the past 25 years. Haley’s warning should be heeded; losing India would be a strategic disaster. The task now is to prevent impatience, red tapism, or political optics from achieving what adversaries could not.
The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.