India-China: Tactical détente, strategic differences

A new phase of high-level India-China dialogue has been unlocked following the October 21, 2024, agreement on border patrolling. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping, along with both nations’ foreign and defence ministers, have held meetings since then, with the ministers’ talks concluding just last week. The two sides have also agreed to resume dialogue at the Special Representatives and foreign secretary-vice minister levels. These developments signal long-awaited progress in a prolonged border standoff, breaking the diplomatic ice that had frozen ties between Asia’s largest neighbours since the summer of 2020. Behind these positive steps lies a carefully orchestrated diplomatic manoeuvre, revealing much about the evolving dynamics of one of Asia’s most complex bilateral relationships.

Breaking the Ice 

The path to this moment began seven months earlier, in April 2024, when both nations began taking careful steps toward finding common ground. Prime Minister Modi’s  characterisation of the relationship with China as “important and significant” served as a clear diplomatic signal from the very top level of Indian decision-making. While maintaining India’s firm stance on the border standoff, these words offered an olive branch to Beijing. China’s response came in May with the  appointment of an ambassador to India after an 18-month vacancy, reopening a crucial channel of communication.

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The real momentum, however, built after India’s June elections with an intensive period of diplomatic engagement. The Foreign ministers  met  twice in July. The Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs (WMCC) held two meetings barely a month apart between  July and  August. The national security advisors  met on the sidelines of a BRICS gathering in September. Most significantly, corps commanders from both sides engaged in discussions spanning ten days in October to hammer out the details of the agreement.

The Agreement Beyond the Headlines

But what exactly does this much-anticipated agreement entail? Despite some media outlets heralding it as a détente, the reality is more nuanced. The agreement relates specifically to patrolling arrangements and grazing rights in the remaining two friction points of the standoff in eastern Ladakh where India and China’s militaries are yet to disengage — Depsang and Demchok. Both sides have agreed to conduct  weekly coordinated patrols, a significant step toward managing tensions but far from a complete resolution of their differences. Most importantly, disengagement has been reported complete but has not yet been officially announced completed; the process is  underway.

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The agreement doesn’t extend to the buffer zones already established in other friction points — the Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso, and the Gogra-Hot Springs area, where both sides are yet to work out patrolling arrangements — a reminder of the complex patchwork of mechanisms required to manage this challenging border.

Evolution of Border Management 

The evolution of border management between these nations tells its own story. What began as traditional patrolling patterns has over time transformed into a sophisticated, multi-layered system. Buffer zones, some extending 3-4 kilometres as in the  Gogra-Hot Springs area, create physical separation between troops. Regular ground-commander meetings provide forums for addressing disputes before they can escalate. This systematic approach represents lessons learned from multiple incidents.

Meanwhile, both nations maintain robust military capabilities along the Line of Actual Control. Infrastructure improvements, substantial force deployments, and advanced surveillance technologies create an armed coexistence — a reality that influences every diplomatic move and countermove.

High-level Engagement Amidst Structural Challenges 

The agreement paved the way for the first full bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi since the 2020 standoff, held on the margins of the BRICS summit in Kazan. Yet even this meeting revealed the fundamental differences that continue to shape the relationship. India  emphasised the centrality of border peace and tranquillity to any normalisation of relations, while China  advocated for preventing “specific disagreements from affecting the overall relationship”.

These divergent perspectives point to deeper structural challenges. India sees China’s actions in 2020 as having fundamentally altered the relationship, bringing the border to the forefront. China, meanwhile, views India’s deepening relationship with the United States as part of a containment strategy. Underlying these tensions is a fundamental question about Asia’s future order — whether it will be hierarchical with China at its apex, or more balanced with space for multiple rising powers.

Near-term Considerations 

As winter descends on the high-altitude border regions, both nations face immediate practical challenges, particularly in terms of the tooth-to-tail ratio. Temperatures plunging below -30°C in areas like the Depsang Plains and Pangong Tso create not just military-logistical challenges but significant economic costs. Every day of deployment requires specialized equipment, elaborate logistics networks, and constant vigilance.

The commercial relationship between these nations reflects similar complexity. India has walked a fine line, implementing stricter  screening for Chinese investments while maintaining essential trade flows. This managed approach to economic ties mirrors the broader relationship — neither fully cooperative nor completely adversarial. As Indian Army Chief Gen. Upendra Dwivedi  noted last month, India has to compete, cooperate, co-exist, confront, and contest with China.

The Path Forward: A New Framework for Stability? 

Looking ahead, the success of this latest re-engagement will depend on multiple factors. Both sides must maintain open dialogue channels while managing their economic interdependence. Crisis prevention mechanisms need to remain robust even as both nations pursue their broader strategic objectives. The resumption of high-level dialogue offers opportunities for communication and understanding, but it would be premature to mistake dialogue for resolution.

Both sides still need to take a series of steps to resolve the standoff in eastern Ladakh. Along with disengagement, both sides need to work out new patrolling arrangements in the erstwhile buffer zones, de-escalation of troops all along the border, as well as bridge the trust deficit that has mired the relationship since 2020. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s  recent emphasis on de-escalation points to this broader challenge — rebuilding trust while carefully unwinding military tensions. The recognition that both sides share this goal offers a glimmer of pragmatism in what remains a complex diplomatic process.

As External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar noted, managing this relationship between two rising neighbours will  require “deftness and diplomacy”. The latest development represents neither the complete reset some hoped for, nor the irreversible deterioration others feared. Instead, it offers a glimpse into the complex reality of two rising powers seeking to manage their differences while pursuing their ambitions in an evolving Asian century.

The path forward remains long and complex, requiring careful navigation of immediate security needs while pursuing longer-term strategic goals. As both India and China continue their ascent, finding a sustainable equilibrium will require not just agreements and protocols, but a shared understanding of how these two ancient civilisations and modern powers can coexist in an increasingly multipolar world.

Shibani Mehta is a senior research analyst with the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India. Her research focuses on the India-China boundary dispute with the purpose of analysing India’s foreign and security policy decision-making. Saheb Singh Chadha is a research analyst in the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India. His research focuses on China’s foreign and security policies, India-China relations, and India’s military modernisation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.