India–China ‘de-escalation’: New progress or new normal?

The last week has seen significant exchanges regarding the India-China border dispute. During his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meetings, India’s External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, emphasised the exceptional significance of bilateral ties.

The EAM also expressed concerns about the disturbances to peace and tranquillity at the borders, which have cast a shadow on relations for the past four years. Jaishankar reiterated that the ties should be based on the approach of the three mutuals: mutual respect, mutual interest, and mutual sensitivity.

This approach, along with the eight principles, was outlined by Jaishankar in 2021 during his virtual keynote address at the All-India Conference of China Studies. He stated, “Respecting the three mutuals and observing those eight principles will surely help us make the right decisions.” Jaishankar’s remarks come amid the ongoing border row in eastern Ladakh, now entering its fifth year.

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Speaking at the 14th East Asia Summit, at the Foreign Ministers Meeting, in Vientiane, Jaishankar emphasised that the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) passing through the South China Sea are critical for the peace, stability, prosperity, and development of the Indo-Pacific region. He stated that the Code of Conduct should be substantive and effective, consistent with international law, and should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of nations not party to the discussions.

Given that his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, was also in Vientiane for the summit, Jaishankar’s remarks were particularly significant. The resource-rich South China Sea has become a hotspot due to aggressive Chinese actions in recent times.

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In Tokyo to attend a Quad foreign ministerial meeting, Jaishankar stated that India’s relationship with China is not good and is not doing well. He ruled out any role for a third party in India’s border dispute with China, emphasising that the two neighbours have an issue that they must resolve themselves.

It was interesting to read between the lines of the statement released by the Chinese on the meeting between Wang Yi and his Indian counterpart. The statement noted, “The two sides agreed to make concerted efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas, and work for new progress in consultations on border affairs.” The phrase “new progress” is particularly noteworthy in the statement.

However, recent media reports reveal that China has completed the construction of a 400-metre bridge near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh. Recent satellite images also show that the bridge is now black-topped and being used by light motor vehicles. All of this raises questions about the Chinese counterparts’ enthusiasm to de-escalate tensions with India.

First, a bit of history needs to be revisited to understand Chinese perceptions and its true inclination in resolving the current standoff with India. China has land borders with 14 countries, and it has settled disputes with all of them except India and Bhutan. Even with Bhutan, China has signed a three-step roadmap for expediting and settling boundary negotiations.

However, it is significant to note that historically, while settling those boundaries and territorial disputes, China has not compromised on its strategic and economic interests. In the new circumstances surrounding China, Beijing has tied its “independent foreign policy of peace” to sovereignty and territorial integrity, a stance highlighted as early as 2003.

By expanding the definition of national security and integrating security into every domain, President Xi Jinping introduced the term “Comprehensive National Security” during his address at the founding session of the Central National Security Commission of the CPC in 2014. This concept now comprises 16 types of security, including ‘Territorial Security’. The concept of territorial security, which has been central since the times of Mao, is now given primacy by linking it to the centenary goal of achieving China’s ‘national rejuvenation’. This also explains Beijing’s aggressive manoeuvring against Taiwan and its actions in the South China Sea against the Philippines in recent times.

Second, having settled border disputes with 14 countries, China’s attention has slowly shifted from its western and northern land borders to its eastern borders, which are predominantly maritime in character. China has always been concerned about a maritime conflict involving the US and Japan in the East and South China Seas, a concern that has been accentuated by the formalisation of Quad and AUKUS. The construction and opening of Camp Blaz, the first new US base since 1952, on the US Pacific Island of Guam, has increased fears in China of a US intervention in any conflict related to China.

In this context, China perceives that India might side with the US and take advantage of the situation to further its claims in the border dispute between New Delhi and Beijing. It should be noted that among the Quad countries, India is the only one with a physical border with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Hence, this presents a two-pronged scenario for Beijing to handle.

Third, the second scenario involves Chinese perceptions of a future war erupting on the maritime front in East Asia if China undertakes a misadventure to capture Taiwan by force or in a scenario involving the South China Sea. China fears an Indian blockade on its sea lines of communication and ‘commerce raiding,’ which would again strengthen India’s position vis-à-vis China and enhance US operations in the Pacific.

The common denominator in both scenarios of Chinese strategic calculations is India. China has also been unequivocal in its statements, reflecting uneasiness with India’s increasing proximity to the US.

Mention must also be made of Beijing’s first dedicated “Land Borders Law,” which lays down provisions for border protection and integration of border areas. This law came into force on January 1, 2022. With 62 articles in 7 chapters, it justifies the use of military means and transgressions at the LAC by the People’s Republic of China, effectively providing a ‘legal cover’ for such actions.

Hence, Beijing’s strategy is not going to remain static in the new circumstances where security takes precedence over everything else under Xi Jinping, with economic growth being balanced with military modernisation and national rejuvenation. All these factors may explain Chinese overtures to India, providing a sense of hope in the form of urgency in resolving the ongoing standoff. This approach encapsulates the Chinese proverb [tāo guāng yǎng huì], famously loosely translated as “hiding one’s strength and biding one’s time"—the original idea, used by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s as part of a famous description of China’s foreign policy, also meant maintaining a low profile and hiding one’s true intentions and goals to gain an advantage over opponents.

The lesson for India may not require any crystal gazing but to continue to reiterate its position firmly, remain vigilant of any Chinese misadventure in the days to come, and ensure that the ‘new progress’ of China’s continuing illegal occupation at the border does not become the ‘new normal’.

The author is a Senior Research Officer at the Centre for National Security Studies (CNSS), Bengaluru. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.