 "IAF’s Smart Fences Plan will greatly strengthen airfield security")
The Indian Air Force (IAF) just released a Request for Information (RFI) for installation and commissioning of Integrated Perimeter Security System (IPSS). The plan is to procure IPSS for 30 bases. Vendor is envisaged to Supply, Install, Integrate and Commission (SITIC) all the equipment/sub-systems to provide a composite surveillance picture embedded with video analytics to generate decision making solutions.
Indian military installations have been targeted by foreign-based terrorist on many occasions. These included the 2002 Kaluchak military station attack and massacre; the 2016 Pathankot airbase attack; the 2016 Uri Brigade HQ attack; the 2018 fidayeen attack on 23rd CRPF battalion camp at Karan Nagar area of Srinagar; the 2018 terror attack on Indian Army camp in Sunjuwan, Jammu, and the 2021 Jammu airbase drone attack, among others.
Airbase attacks in India
IAF’s Pathankot airbase, located barely 25 km as crow-flies from the Pakistan border, is a typical flying base spread over 2,000 acres. It also has a civil enclave of the Airport Authority since 2006. The airbase, was attacked in 2016 by Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad. The pre-dawn gunbattle raged for four days, killing seven security personnel and a civilian. None of the IAF assets were damaged. The terrorists were apparently in India for at least 48 hours prior, and had studied the base layout and selected soft entry points. They perhaps had local assistance.
The terrorists managed to breach the outer wall of the airbase through an entry point that adjoins a village. They then entered the domestic area. Day and night airborne sensors were used by the IAF, yet it took four days for the IAF commandos, Garuds, to neutralise the six Pakistani intruders.
Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) made a drone attack on IAF’s Jammu airbase on 27 June, 2021. There were twin blasts, five minutes apart, at middle of the night, around 1:35 am. The first drone-dropped bomb-let damaged one building when it went through the roof. The second exploded on the open tarmac at a little distance from a parked helicopter. There was no damage to any operational asset or loss of life. It was later understood that the target was Air Traffic Control (ATC) tower and parked IAF helicopters. The two IEDs weighed around 5-6 kilograms with RDX as the main explosive charge. The drop was made through stored location coordinates.
The drones had flown from across the border, which was a mere 14.5 km away and flew back after the IED drop. Drones have continued to be used in Punjab, Rajasthan and J&K sectors for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). They are also used for smuggling drugs and small arms.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsAirfield security: Lessons from civil aviation
Civil aviation went through some major disasters before they woke up to serious airport security. The single deadliest airline catastrophe resulting from the failure of airport security to detect an on-board bomb was Air India Flight 182 ‘Emperor Kanishka’ from Montreal to London in 1985 that crashed over Atlantic killing 329 on-board. Another on-board bomb that slipped through airport security was on Pan Am flight in 1988, which killed 270 people. The 11 September, 2001, attacks on the twin World Trade Centre (WTC) towers are the most widely recognised terrorist attacks in recent times involving air travel.
India stepped up its airport security after the 1999 Kandahar hijacking. The central Industrial Security Force (CISF), a paramilitary organisation was given the charge and put under the regulatory frame work of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (Ministry of Civil Aviation). They created especially trained groups as Airport Security Units.
Approach roads to the airport often pass under the approach path of aircraft taking-off or coming to land. Some of these are not easy to keep under constant surveillance. There is a risk of someone launching an explosive-laden drone into an aircraft as an act of terror. Another problem that some airports face is the proliferation of slums around the boundary walls and in the approach zone.
Airport access has since been tightened. Passenger entry into the terminal is highly regulated. Passengers and baggage are screened using ever improving metal and explosive detector machines. The backscatter X-rays machines are being used to screen carry-on items and checked luggage. Full body scanners are in use to security check human-beings and even animals taking a flight. Security has greatly improved ever since.
Typical military airbase security
Entry into any airbase could be through one or two main entry gates which are well manned and have barricades, and “tyre-killer” spike drive-in barriers. Other than operational and technical personnel, a certain number of other personnel like airfield maintenance and construction contractor labour also pass through these gates to work inside. The entry gates have CCTV cameras. Some airbases have introduced airport like scanners and checking devices for humans and materials.
Most airbases have fairly high concrete boundary walls. There are watch towers along the boundary wall at short intervals. There are outfacing and swivelling searchlights atop watch-towers for surveillance of area immediately outside the airbase. Sometimes, the boundary walls may have drains passing under them, but are secured by iron-rod grills. These need constant vigil and monitoring, lest someone may breach them. Thick forest/vegetation near boundary wall/fence can offer cover to an intruder and hamper security. The foliage is normally kept cleared. Most airbases have night-vision devices with security personnel. Airbases are using drones to monitor and secure the boundary wall and key installations.
Sometimes unauthorised civil structures come adjoining/touching the boundary wall despite clear laws against this. The rule stipulates that no construction can take place 100 metres from the airbase boundary and no structure can come up to 900 metres around the ordnance depots. Many places this has been flouted and needs to be cleared with the help of district civil administration.
Most airbases are secured during peace time by Defence Security Corps (DSC) soldiers manning the periphery wall and the watch-towers. The security of more sensitive operational and technical areas is normally augmented with military personnel. Most airbases around the world also have quick-reaction force made up of commandos, such as the Garuds in IAF, to take-on major real-time threats. IAF’s Garud Commando Force was formed in September 2004 after attempted terror attacks on the two major airbases in J&K.
The Vital Assets (VA) at an airfield include the runway, ATC building, base operations centre, the communication hub, bulk-petroleum storage, bomb and weapon storage, specialist vehicles, and high-technology laboratories among others. The Air Warriors and their families also have to be kept safe.
Airfield-wise Counter-Terrorism Contingency Plan (CTCP) is evolved and rehearsed.
The Base Commander has to personally monitor planning and execution of security plan. Day and night ground based and airborne surveillance devices are innovatively used. Drones are a great asset for airbase surveillance. Even locally-based helicopters can be used in case of imminent threat. The IAF did implement actions based on many lessons after Pathankot attack. Istalling “smart fences”, electronic surveillance systems, thermal imagers, close circuit television (CCTV) cameras and drones were the next logical step. Most airbases display warnings of “Shoot-at-Sight” for intruders.
Drone threat and anti-drone measures
Kamikaze drones are being extensively used in the ongoing Ukraine and West Asian conflicts. These have become very sophisticated, accurate and lethal. Security establishments around the world are working on anti-drone measures and systems that include hard and soft-kill. Drones can be neutralised by shooting down using guns, entrapped by firing a net. The drone radio-link can be jammed. Lasers or other forms of directed energy could be used to burn the electronics or blind the sensors. Even the drone warhead could be exploded in the air. With more drones being flown in a swarm, the complexity of neutralising would increase.
Smart parameter operational requirements
IAF has just released a very comprehensive Request for Information (RFI) for smart parameter security. The responses are expected by late June 2024. The aim is to identify equipment and probable vendors for implementing its smart parameter security plan. It will help identify technologies, equipment, and networked integration, manning and training requirements.
Airbases on an average covering perimeter length of around 12 km each with a Ground Defence Control Centre (GDCC) located suitably within the station. The government intends to procure IPSS for 30 IAF bases along with its associated equipment from an Indian vendor.
The RFI defines that the IPSS system must be capable of providing perimeter surveillance in all weather and ambient light conditions throughout the year in day and night conditions. It shall consist of five layers of sensors for intrusion detection. Layers will include Electrical Smart Power Fence (ESPF); CCTV (Visible/Near-IR) cameras with IR illuminators and inbuilt video analytics and automatic intrusion detection capabilities; radars; Underground Vibration Detection System (UVDS) connected with dedicated Optical Fibre Cable (OFC); and last layer will be Dual PTZ (Thermal & visible Cameras). The sensors should be programmed to automatically slew to cue the nearest PTZ dual camera on intrusion detection and notify the GDCC of the exact location of intrusion.
Mini unmanned aerial vehicles which can be controlled centrally for launch & recovery during the threat/intrusion to provide for aerial surveillance within the perimeter. Each layer of sensors has to provide ‘gap free coverage’ throughout the perimeter. Sensors are to be integrated by AI-enabled software & automation network, and connected to the GDCC.
Water bodies such as drainages, canals, culverts, etc, passing through the perimeter shall be protected using Metallic grills with OFC based electro-optical sensors. There shall be corrosion proof equipment capable of intrusion detection through drainage system. There will be main and stand-by silent DG sets (along with dedicated 3 phase power line laid exclusively for IPSS load) to cater for standby power supply at each base. All systems must withstand strong winds (up to 120 km/h).
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) shall be part of the kit. Data connectivity with the PDA has to be implemented. UPS with batteries should be able to take the load of the entire IPSS for at least 30 minutes. There will be provision of bulk SMS service. Secure communication system of TETRA/P25 standards to provide uninterrupted communications for security staff with range of 20km or more. There is to be provision for cell phone/mobile directional RF Jammer and UAV Jammers. There will be an automatically activated centralised alarm system for warning station authorities by audio, visual and V/UHF means.
Airbase security: Way forward
India’s internal and external security environment requires high vigil especially at its military bases. The terrorist or cross border attacks take advantage of security vulnerabilities and risks. Attack on military stations affects national morale. Airbases have very high value assets. Rafale class of aircraft costs nearly $100 million. Security of airbases is thus very important.
Newer security equipment, sensors and weapons must be introduced on regular basis. Technology must be used. Space-based and airborne sensors increase coverage area. Access-control must use digital technology. Local commanders have to use innovative airbase-specific ways and local civil liaison to strengthen security. Modern security systems also act as deterrents.
Is it also time to raise special airfield defence units and train them to secure vulnerable installations and maybe gradually replace DSC at airbases? Meanwhile technology must be harnessed. The enemy is at our gates. It is time to talk less and act more.
The writer is Director General, Centre for Air Power Studies. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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