 "How Uzbek premier’s Kashgar visit legitimises Chinese repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang")
Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov led an Uzbek delegation on a two-day tour to the Kashgar city of Xinjiang from February 29 to March 1, 2024. He held bilateral meetings with the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Secretary of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Ma Xinjui. Besides, he participated in a trilateral dialogue with the aforementioned Chinese authorities and the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan, Akylbek Japarov.
This is a significant follow-up measure by top Uzbek leadership to the Uzbekistan-China “All-Weather Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for a New Era” agreed by two sides just five weeks ago on January 24, 2024, during which Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping signed trade and investment agreements worth 52 billion USD.
Abdulla Aripov’s visit to Kashgar assumes great significance on many counts. For example, the Kashgar prefecture is considered the main Uyghur heartland; some even dub it the cradle of Uyghur culture and identity. It is important to note here that the Uyghurs had established an Islamic Emirate in Kashgar for a decade in the 1860s and 1870s under Yakub Beg, who symbolised the Uyghurs as a separate entity and East Turkistan as a separate nation.
In addition, Kashgar is an important segment of the Silk Route connecting South Asia (India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) and Central Asia (Tajikistan). One branch of the Silk Route from Kashgar connects to Uzbekistan (Samarkand, Bukhara, etc.) via Tajikistan, which has been witness to Uzbekistan’s civilisational linkage with Kashgar. In contemporary times, Kashgar has remained the stronghold of Uyghurs for a long period of time.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsUyghurs in Kashgar are more than 80 per cent of the total population at the prefecture level and more than 30 per cent of Xinjiang’s total Uyghur population. For this reason, Kashgar has been the main target of the Chinese authorities since 1949. Furthermore, this prefecture has witnessed a maximum number of pro-Uyghur movements and anti-Chinese protests and resentment since the “peaceful liberation” of Xinjiang in 1949.
It can be aptly described herewith that Aripov’s visit is good for China on many counts but bad, perhaps worse, for the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. It not only legitimises the Chinese excesses and repression against Uyghurs, who have been facing a genocide situation in the last few years, but also exposes Uzbekistan’s decades-long indifferent attitude towards Uyghurs, despite the cultural affinity between Uzbeks and Uyghurs. Even though Uzbekistan has a significant number of Uyghurs living in its territory (between 50,000 and 60,000, as per some estimates), they have never been a major factor between China and Uzbekistan, as found in the case of Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan has, at present, the highest number of Uyghurs living in its territory outside Xinjiang (nearly 5,00,000). This fact was corroborated by the Uyghur activists, scholars, and some Western experts this author has met in recent decades. However, the Uyghurs of Uzbekistan, who have maximum physical similarity and language affinity with the Uyghurs, hide their identity for fear of persecution at the hands of both Uzbek and Chinese authorities. They also fear their friends and relatives living in Xinjiang will face a similar fate if they boast about their original identity. That is why they prefer to call themselves Uzbeks or citizens of Uzbekistan.
Most importantly, Uzbekistan’s political dispensation, media, and civil society have kept mum about the issue of Uyghurs. One example in this context was the American bid to persuade Uzbekistan with regard to Uyghurs. Mike Pompeo, the then US Secretary of State, during his visit to Tashkent on February 3, 2023, while trying to raise the Chinese repression of Uyghurs, was rebuffed by his Uzbek counterpart with a plain-speak that Uzbekistan would rather refrain from “big power competition” in the region, thereby dodging the Uyghur issue successfully on one hand and sending a clear and friendly message to China about his country’s position on Uyghurs.
Since the emergence of Uzbekistan as an independent Central Asian republic following Soviet disintegration in the early 1990s, Uzbek political leadership has not paid any heed to the Uyghur issue, which in the following decades has been sacrificed at the altar of strong Uzbek-China bonding.
Importantly, China recognised Uzbekistan on December 27, 1991, and within a week, on January 5, 1992, both countries established diplomatic ties. Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian republic to do so. Like Kazakhstan, the Islam Karimov government felt that Uyghurs in Uzbekistan might demand a separate homeland within the Uzbek territory, precisely on the lines of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, who have been demanding a separate East Turkestan out of China.
Further, Uzbek authorities have serious reservations about the unholy nexus between the militants and terrorists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Uyghur terrorist organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was designated as a terrorist organization by China as well as enlisted in the Global Terrorist List in October 2001.
There were reports of both IMU and ETIM being aided and abetted by international terror infrastructure in Afghanistan, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and later on in Syria by the ISIS. The IMU indulged in several terrorist attacks inside Uzbekistan during the mid- and late 1990s, including a couple of attacks on the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov. This state of affairs prompted both Uzbekistan and China to unleash military crackdowns individually, jointly, and also under the ambit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
It begot the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which was strategically headquartered in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital. Both China and Uzbekistan were instrumental in keeping the terrorist infrastructure of IMU and ETIM at bay legally and politically through a regular clause in the SCO’s Joint Statement “to combat three evil forces (separatism, extremism, and terrorism)” at each of its Annual Summits since 2001 till date.
Further, the Uyghur issue has remained a low-key affair or a matter of no importance amidst the Uzbekistan-China partnership that is politically, diplomatically, and strategically sound and robust.
Shavkat Mirziyoyev has undertaken half a dozen visits to China in the last six years since he took over as Uzbek President. Since the report about the incarceration of millions of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities (Kazakhs, Kyrgyzs, etc.) was unearthed in 2016 onwards, Uzbekistan has not minced a single word because there is little evidence about the incarceration of any Uzbek in the internment camps across Xinjiang. This shows the tacit understanding between the two governments and Uzbekistan’s indifference towards Uyghurs.
This year, the Uzbek President’s choice of China as the first country to visit in 2024 is symbolic and significant. His statement on the sidelines of his meeting with Xi Jinping is more important, more China-friendly, and anti-Uyghur. He stated that Uzbekistan “abides by the one-China principle, strictly opposes external interference in China’s internal affairs, and stands ready to provide firm support for China on issues concerning China’s core interests, Taiwan, Xinjiang, and human rights." He assured the Chinese leadership and expressed readiness “to work with China to combat the three forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism”.
Therefore, the above analysis found that Uyghurs have never been an important issue or factor in the broad-based relationship between China and the Central Asian republics in general and between China and Uzbekistan in particular. Uzbekistan has never given importance to the Uyghur issue in the past three decades; instead, it sacrificed it at the altar of a growing Uzbek-China bond. The Uyghurs in Uzbekistan, too, give up their identity to immerse themselves in the Uzbek culture to avoid any wrath from both Uzbek and Chinese authorities. Further, the bonhomie between the IMU and ETIM has affected the psyche of the Uzbeks so seriously and so much that the Uzbeks neither talk about the Uyghurs nor show any empathy or sympathy for them. At this juncture, the slightest belief among the Uyghurs across the globe, especially in Xinjiang, to obtain support from their Central Asian cousins, mainly Uzbeks, remains a daydream.
The author teaches at the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost_’s views._
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