When India took steps to implement the Citizenship Amendment Act, not many countries took a deeper look at it. Not much opposition was visible among the Indian public. Why did the US State Department unconstructively react to it? Did such a knee-jerk reaction serve any American interest? Did it benefit any community that the US State Department perceived as a potential victim of CAA?
Without any doubt, such a reaction only supplements the growing areas of mistrust between India and the United States in recent times. It serves only one purpose. It helps create cracks in the painstakingly constructed strategic partnership between the two countries by successive administrations in Washington and New Delhi.
American stand on the Indo-Canadian Nijjar episode, Washington’s inaction over anti-India separatist groups targeting Hindu temples and Indian consulates in the US, India’s neutrality over the US-Russian Cold War in Ukraine, its hesitation to be fully on board with the US in containing China, India’s selective participation in the US-sponsored Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, New Delhi’s strong position to defend the interests of the developing countries in WTO negotiations, and several other factors have come in the way of realising the full potential of strategic partnership.
American policymakers are aware of modern Indian history. The US reaction to CAA is perhaps not “misplaced, misinformed, and unwarranted”. The expression of “concern” and desire to carefully “monitor” the implementation of the CAA by the US government are based on cautious calculation and strategic considerations.
The Indian government officials have conveyed multiple times to their US counterparts the rationale behind the CAA, and the Ministry of Home Affairs has made it amply clear that the implementation of the CAA will not adversely affect the Muslim citizens of India. The American diplomats residing in India are also aware that CAA has been politicised to serve the interests of the opposition parties.
The main reason the US State Department is reportedly “concerned” over a purely domestic issue in India is the American irritation over India’s determination to maintain its strategic autonomy, notwithstanding its desire to sustain strategic companionship with Washington on selected issues.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsDespite about a quarter of a century of US efforts to make India a very close strategic partner that would support US positions on international affairs, Washington’s ambition remains distant.
India has adopted a measured stand on the Ukraine War, has not abandoned its strategic relations with Russia, maintains its strategic partnership with Iran, and follows a foreign economic policy that suits India’s interests the most.
However, India, at the same time, has not done anything that would adversely affect the US. The US policy community needs to appreciate that India does not support the Russian war efforts in Ukraine, India does play an active role in addressing the unconventional warfare in the Red Sea, and though not part of US-led international efforts, India does support the idea of managing the aggressive role of China in the Indo-Pacific by being part of the Quadrilateral Security Initiative.
India has opened up its arms and technology market to American companies, and India actively backs the US approach to maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific, though it upholds an inclusive approach.
India is neither a banana republic that would follow the US diktat without questions, nor is it a junior alliance partner that would replicate Washington’s policies in all dimensions.
The US policymakers seem to be still under the illusion that it is a unipolar world order. They either do not remember or pretend to forget that in the post-Cold War era, even the NATO partners did not always follow the US’ policies, for instance, the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The Biden Administration is fully conscious of its limitations in handling Israel’s military moves in the continuing war against Hamas.
It is time there should be a recognition in Washington that India is an autonomous actor in world affairs that has chosen the US as an important strategic partner, not a camp follower.
The State Department’s periodic statements, especially on religious freedom issues in India, and New Delhi’s sovereign decisions to enact legislation that would serve the interests of the Indian people, including CAA, require serious reconsideration by the US Administration.
While the US official positions on issues related to religious freedom, minority rights, and human rights on moral and ethical grounds are understandable, times have changed, and the US cannot expect the rest of the world to follow US versions of those issues.
Especially in the case of CAA, the State Department’s response has only activated Indian scholars, commentators, and the media to expose American double standards.
The critical US response to CAA appears to have fuelled anti-American sentiments among the masses in India and is not in the best interest of the bilateral strategic partnership.
Contrary to the State Department’s expectations, even the alert and attentive Muslim population in India does not seem to have been entranced by its position on the CAA, and they are cognisant of the US’ policies towards the Islamic World.
Significantly, several American allies in Europe are no longer following the US stand on the CAA for the simple reason that the CAA aims at habilitating the persecuted minorities in India’s neighbourhood. Who should have an objection to this laudable goal? After all, examples are abundant that several countries in the Western world, including the US, have taken steps similar to those of India.
India and the US need to do a lot together to maintain peace, promote development, and provide stability in the Indo-Pacific. Non-interference in internal affairs and mutual respect for policies and principles are the keys to sustaining and further deepening the strategic partnership between the two countries. The sooner the State Department takes note of it and changes course, the better it is for the bilateral strategic partnership.
The author is founding chairperson, Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies, formerly Professor at JNU. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.