How ‘Squad’ is neither replacement for Quad nor setback for India

While other issues and regions are currently dominating foreign policy discussions, a significant international development took place this week in Washington. An emerging regional bloc, unofficially dubbed ‘Squad’, has linked Australia, Japan, and the United States with the Philippines. This alliance underscores Washington’s ongoing commitment to integrating all its Indo-Pacific allies to counter China’s ’excessive claims in the region’.

Analysts are optimistic that this alliance will evolve into a more permanent or institutionalised grouping, given the member countries significant commercial interests in the contested South China Sea and East China Sea. According to US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin, the so-called ‘Squad’ will conduct more maritime exercises and provide increased security assistance to the Philippines.

The formation of the ‘Squad’ closely follows the first joint patrols by these nations in the South China Sea and a significant trilateral summit at the White House involving leaders from the US, Japan, and the Philippines in April 2024. Over the coming months, the alliance plans to enhance military interoperability, conduct additional joint patrols and drills, and improve intelligence and maritime security cooperation. These efforts are aimed at addressing the challenges posed by China across the Western Pacific.

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This quadrilateral partnership is the latest regional alliance forged by Washington to counter Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the region. Ironically, the individual most credited with making this happen is Chinese President Xi Jinping.

This development comes amid a tense crisis in the South China Sea, where Beijing claims about 90 percent of this crucial waterway, through which one-third of global shipping passes each year. Beijing has been harassing and threatening ships near disputed islands and geographical features it claims as its own. Recently, China’s tactics have become increasingly aggressive, resulting in several naval skirmishes with Chinese vessels. As a result, the member countries of the alliance are strengthening their security capabilities.

China’s state tabloid, the Global Times, has stated that the ‘Squad’ grouping will pose ‘a more targeted challenge’ to Beijing, as it allows the US to ‘manage the security situation in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait’.

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Philippines: More Than a Pawn in Great Power Contestation

In 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, more commonly known as ‘Bongbong’, won an outright majority in the presidential election in the Philippines. Back then, Marcos Jr held, “The Philippines will not cede any one square inch to any country, particularly China, but will continue to engage and work on our national interest.” When asked if he would ask for America’s help in dealing with China, Marcos Jr said, “No. The problem is between China and us. If the Americans come in, it’s bound to fail because you are putting the two protagonists together.”

However, two years later, it seems a lot has changed. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s decisive pivot towards Western alliances and his firm stance on the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea have been instrumental in the formation of this new quadrilateral grouping. This strategic realignment signifies a significant departure from the more reserved foreign policy stance of the previous administration, positioning the Philippines at the forefront of the broader US strategy of ‘integrated deterrence’ in the region.

The Philippines, a crucial regional player in the South China Sea, has borne the brunt of China’s escalating military assertiveness for quite some time. Concerns have been raised over Beijing’s potential plans to deploy floating nuclear power plants in the disputed South China Sea, a move that could further militarise the waterway. In the most recent escalation, Chinese coast guard ships used water cannons against Philippine vessels near disputed shoals in the resource-rich South China Sea. The Philippines accused Beijing of various aggressive actions, including ‘harassment, ramming, swarming, shadowing, and blocking, dangerous manoeuvres’ prompting the summoning of China’s ambassador to Manila to protest against China’s actions.

The Philippines has frequently invited journalists to accompany its government vessels during sailings near disputed features. This is aimed at drawing attention to the alleged harassment by China, even within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which extends 200 nautical miles from its coast.

Against this backdrop, analysts stress the importance of the Philippines strengthening security cooperation with like-minded countries. This is crucial not only to reinforce its claims in the South China Sea but also to support its ongoing military modernisation efforts as it shifts its defence strategy from internal to external focus.

Japan and Australia have emerged as key allies, consistently condemning China’s aggressive behaviour. Therefore, forming an alliance with them is a natural step, given their shared concerns in the region. Chinese vessels have also repeatedly violated Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.

Furthermore, the Philippines already has existing visiting-forces agreements with the United States and Australia. It is also exploring the possibility of similar arrangements with France. Additionally, it is negotiating a reciprocal-access agreement with Japan and has signed a memorandum of understanding with Canada on enhanced defence cooperation. There is little to no doubt that such partnerships will be essential in strengthening Manila’s defences and its reputation as a middle power amidst rising tensions in the South China Sea.

China has explicitly expressed its displeasure with these developments, warning that the Philippines is increasingly being ‘manipulated by the US, losing its autonomy, and becoming a pawn of the US in the region’. However, it is unquestionable that Beijing’s growing maritime aggression, extravagant claims, and complete disregard for international laws have compelled Manila to establish these minilateral arrangements.

Squad: A Rival to Quad?

Writing on social media platform X, Derek Grossman, a senior defence analyst at the non-profit research organisation Rand Corporation, stated, “India will only go so far in helping Quad to counter China in the South China Sea,” noting that New Delhi was primarily focused on its own neighbourhood. “Hence, the US now has an alternate Quad.”

I disagree. At first glance, it may seem that the Philippines has replaced India. However, the formation of alliances in such a sensitive region involves much more nuance. The idea that one is a replacement for the other is entirely untrue. Despite limited interaction between the two, Manila and New Delhi share numerous similarities. While the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States under the Mutual Defence Treaty (1951), India is a close strategic partner of the US. Both countries are engaged in active territorial disputes with China and are committed to a rules-based system.

The biggest difference in their threat perception, albeit stemming from a common country, lies in the region. India is more concerned about its immediate neighbourhood, including the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Strait. Conversely, the Philippines’ focus is on the South China Sea and the Western Pacific portion of the Indo-Pacific.

If anything, there is an opportunity for both the Squad and the Quad to coexist. According to analysts, the Squad could complement the Quad, leading to a more versatile distribution of power and responsibilities.

Yoichiro Sato, Professor of Asia-Pacific Studies at Japan’s Ritsumeikan Asia-Pacific University, suggests that the two overlapping four-party arrangements ‘facilitate greater cohesion within each group’, allowing both India and the Philippines to ‘collaborate comfortably with Australia, Japan, and the US’.

India’s present focus and military capacity are restricted to its immediate neighbourhood. It has yet to build the capacity to project power and sustain military deployments in the South China Sea. But India is not an absentee in the regional dynamics either. This can be seen in the recent sale of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines. Reports indicate that Manila intends to deploy these weapons along its coast amid rising tensions with Beijing in the South China Sea.

According to analysts, India-Philippines ties are likely to progress in non-traditional security areas such as cybersecurity, anti-piracy, and anti-terrorism. India has unquestionable commercial and maritime interests in Southeast Asia; thus, it will position itself as a strategic partner for all the Squad countries.

Therefore, it is evident that deterrence efforts are intensifying in the South China Sea, with the Philippines at the forefront. The Philippines is signalling its readiness to collaborate with any party that can contribute strategically to regional security, laying the groundwork for the Squad.

However, this should not be interpreted as a diminishing relevance of the Quad or as a geopolitical setback for India. Given that the two blocs have different regional focuses, it is prudent for them to operate independently but in tandem, ensuring that both blocs remain agenda-driven and coherent, allowing them to effectively address the diverse security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

The author is a researcher at the East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.