 "How 'scarcity' of competent South Asian scholars mars perception of Indian democracy in West")
In one of his op-ed pieces, The Delicate US Task of Courting India, Wall Street Journal columnist and Hudson Institute fellow Walter Russell Mead lamented that one of the reasons there are several wrenches in the US-India relationships, at least from the US perspective, is “the scarcity of real Indian expertise in America”.
To the uninitiated, the “scarcity” Mead was writing about may sound absurd given the number of Indians or Americans working at the ubiquitous South Asia centres of US universities and think tanks. However, these scholars often get exposed as their “expertise” is, at best, disconnected and disjointed from the complex Indian reality.
It was the intelligence wing of the US government that initially set up and ran most centres for South Asian Studies at American universities. Consequently, many South Asian scholars were spies of the US government. Their investment in this enterprise was for US national security. These centres also had a missionary connection as they trained ordinary folks about to go off to do church work in India.
Once Indian-origin scholars and academicians joined those exclusive South Asia departments, they knew that pursuing a pro-India stance would get them nowhere. They were too happy to maintain their status quo. Even today, as the AEI scholar and WSJ columnist Sadanand Dhume writes, these scholars “understandably believe that parroting left-wing talking points…[not real scholarship] is required to succeed in their fields”.
In this background, one needs to analyse the coverage of the recently concluded Indian elections in the US media. Scholars and experts—for most, a PhD, even in an obscure South Asian studies programme, gives them above-par agency in matters relating to India compared to the natives—have published numerous articles and op-eds. One that stands out is the Sadanand Dhume op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal: Modi’s BJP Has a Diversity Problem.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsDhume’s opinion piece has two aspects. First, Dhume argues that Muslims are underrepresented in India’s electoral politics, more specifically in the Lok Sabha (LS), the lower house of the Indian Parliament. This lack of representation, Dhume claims, is due to PM Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) failure to give Muslims representation.
Secondly, Dhume also claims that Muslims in India do not support the BJP. He blames the BJP’s Hindutva and Hindu nationalism agenda for the lack of support the BJP has among Muslims.
There are several reasons for the lack of support for Modi’s BJP among Muslims, none of which is due to the lack of efforts on the part of the BJP. Neither is it due to discrimination in the delivery of governance. But let us first tackle the question of the shrinking Muslim representation in the LS.
Recognising that Muslim representation in the LS has stayed within 6 per cent is crucial. Despite seeing a consistent rise in population—from 9.8 per cent in 1951 to 14 per cent in 2024 of the total population—the Muslim representation in the LS has constantly declined since the first general elections of post-colonial India were held in 1952. It is also a fact that the so-called non-BJP secularist parties—the INC, the communists, the Yadavite parties, the Dravidians, etc—have been, for the most part, at the helm of electoral politics and government in post-colonial India.
According to Ibn Khaldun Bharati, an Indian Islamic scholar, the number of Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs) in the current LS has decreased from 26 in the 17th LS to 24 in the 18th, despite a significant increase in LS seats won by non-BJP opposition parties. The opposition Indian National Congress fielded only 19 Muslim candidates this time around, despite their pro-Muslim rhetoric, compared to 34 in the 2019 general elections.
One of the reasons Muslims do not support the BJP is Islamic supremacism. Many Muslims, including subcontinental Muslims, do not view Hindus as equals, and a political party championing Hindu causes is seen as worth defeating at all costs. According to Bharati, Islam “became politicised at the outset and set out to conquer all that it could and develop concepts and categories that would further its supremacist and imperial agenda. Kafir is one such concept”.
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, a proponent of the ‘Two Nation Theory’ that led to the partition of India, once declared (Speech of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan at Meerut, 1888, Columbia University website) that Muslims and Hindus couldn’t sit on the same throne and remain equal in power. “Is it possible that under these circumstances, two nations—the Mahomedans and the Hindus—could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not,” said Khan to the crowd. This theory ultimately led to the creation of a Muslim-majority state following the partition of India.
Muslim supporters and leaders of the BJP, as well as those Muslims who reject “secular” patronage in India, are often vilified among Muslims. For example, the BJP’s Muslim candidate from the Bhagalpur LS constituency and former Union minister, Syed Shahnawaz Hussain, failed to retain his seat in the 2014 general elections despite a Modi wave.
Similarly, Islamic scholar and politician Arif Mohammad Khan lost his LS election as a BJP candidate in 2004. Khan was an INC MP but quit the party due to his opposition to the passage of the Muslim Personal Law pushed by then PM Rajiv Gandhi that enabled Muslim men to avoid alimony to their divorced wives. Notably, Bharati must also write under a pseudonym to protect his identity.
The assertion that only a Muslim MP can effectively represent Muslim constituents also raises the logical question of whether Muslims can effectively represent non-Muslim constituents.
The power-sharing agenda of the Muslims in undivided India at the expense of participatory democracy ultimately led to the partition of India in 1947. The partition was primarily an Islamic project, as the Muslim League leader and Founding Father of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, opposed any constitution that would result in a Hindu-majority government.
Paradoxical to Dhume’s claim, religion does not figure in Vinayak Savarkar’s Hindutva, which means Hindu-ness in Sanskrit. Savarkar was a rationalist atheist who wanted his body cremated after his death without any religious ceremonies. Savarkar defines a Hindu as one who:
Regards the entire subcontinent as his (or her) motherland.
Is a descendant of Hindu parents.
Considers India’s land holy.
Derived from this notion of a Hindu, Hinduness is then presented in terms of a common nation (Rāshtra), a common race, and a common civilisation (Sanskriti). Savarkar distinguishes between “Indian religions” and “religions practised in India”. The former represents “Hindu nationality”, while the latter is “Indian nationality”.
India’s society and politics are complex and cannot be satisfactorily explained using predominantly non-native perspectives and frameworks. They require a much more nuanced understanding and exposition.
The author is a Chicago-based award-winning columnist. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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