How Russia’s Turkestan gift to China rewrote the history of Himalayas and compromised India’s security

Though it is impossible to rewrite history, one can sometimes regret it. Decades ago, a tiny change, the flap of a butterfly’s wing, could have created an entirely different situation today. It is the case in eastern Ladakh where since May 2020, the armies of India and China confront each other and despite 15th rounds of talks between the senior military commanders of the two countries, there is no end in sight, with China refusing to return to its pre-2020 positions. But things could have been different if India had been facing an independent Turkestan, even under Russia’s backing. In many ways, Russia is certainly a less hegemonic nation than communist China, and this in spite of the recent happenings in Ukraine. Outer Mongolia is a case in point. Let me explain. A bit of history By the mid-19th century, the Russian Empire started encroaching upon the periphery of the Middle Kingdom’s northern frontiers. In 1933, the first East Turkestan Republic was declared which encompassed Kashgar, Khotan and Aksu prefectures in the south. However, in the battle of Kashgar in 1934, the forces of the East Turkestan Republic were defeated by the Kuomintang’s 36th Division, thus putting an end to the short-lived Republic. Then in 1937, the Soviet Union invaded the region, putting the entire province under the control of a Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai, who ruled the region for the next decade, with close support from the Soviet Union which maintained military bases in the area and had several military and economic advisers. Eastern Turkestan was fully under Soviet control; it resulted in a peaceful northern border for the state of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. Military annexation of Xinjiang and the revolutionary changes On 1 October 1949, the new People’s Republic of China was proclaimed; during the following months, the new regime did not miss an opportunity to tell the world that China would soon ‘liberate’ large areas at the periphery of the Middle Kingdom. A few months earlier, on 4 February 1949, a meeting took place between the Soviet Foreign Trade Minister, Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong. The Great Helmsman raised the issue of Turkestan (Xinjiang) and pointed to the northwestern district of Iili, where China had noted an independence movement. Mikoyan was aware of nationalist forces in the district: “This movement was triggered by the incorrect policy of the Chinese [nationalist] government, which does not want to take into account the national specifics of these nationalities, does not present rights of self-rule, does not permit the development of the national culture.” The Soviets defended the autonomy of the Uyghurs and other nationalities: “If the nationalities of Xinjiang were given autonomy, the soil for the independence movement would likely not remain.” When Mao told Mikoyan that China was planning on “giving Xinjiang autonomy, in the same manner as for Inner Mongolia, which is already an autonomous region,” Mao got the green light he needed. Incidentally, the Uyghurs in Xinjiang or the Tibetans in Tibet never got the promised autonomy. Three months after this discussion, Mao instructed the PLA to ‘liberate’ the entire region, which included Xinjiang and Tibet. In the Mainland during the following months, the remnants of the Nationalist forces were slowly and systematically annihilated. Mao used two tactics in Xinjiang: Sending a large number of troops in two different directions, while inducing the surrender of the Nationalist forces. In Turkestan, he already had the assurance from the Soviets that they would not only not interfere, but would also support the annexation. Why Mikoyan and Stalin decided to surrender Turkestan has never been explained, but it would have incalculable consequences for the Indian borders. The two-pronged Advance The PLA had to cross deserts, walk over high snow-capped mountains, suffer starvation; indeed, the communists achieved an unbelievable military feat. The PLA walked some 3,000 km in six months to complete their mission; the main force, in more than two months’ time, successively liberated each important town and city in the north and south of Xinjiang, and “pinned down uprising launched by reactionaries of Nationalist Party”, said a report. Strategically, Communist China was at the Gate of Tibet… and of India. A couple of years later, the construction of a road across the Indian territory in the Aksai Chin area would start. It is in these circumstances that the Consulate General of India in Kashgar was closed… to never be reopened. The difficulties on account of distances and terrain were considerable, especially for the PLA of those days which lacked modern equipment, vehicles and air transport resources. However, the Soviet Union came to their rescue and offered 40 transport aircraft to quickly airlift troops from Jiuquan to Urumqi. Charles Kraus, who collected a large number of historical documents for the Digital Archives of the Wilson Center, observed that “Soviet aid (along with military cunning, political skill and some luck) enabled the 1949 PLA invasion [of Xinjiang].” The American scholar said that the invasion of Xinjiang by the PLA in October 1949 “was a stunning development”. It was stunning by its speed, the unconditional (and somehow incomprehensible) support of Stalin and the unexpected success of the PLA. Kraus analysed: “Mao Zedong’s eyes had been on Xinjiang for a while. He worried that his rivals, the Nationalist Party, would hang onto Xinjiang and use it as a base for continued operations against the CCP. Stalin stoked Mao’s fears, warning that countries antagonistic to the CCP, such as Great Britain, could ‘activate the Muslims’ in Xinjiang in order to ‘continue the civil war’. And of course, taking hold of the oil and other strategic resources present in Xinjiang motivated Mao.” But what has not been explained so far is why Stalin readily offered all these goodies to Mao. Kraus said: “The invasion was military cunning combined with political skill and, frankly, dumb luck. But it also couldn’t have happened without the aid of the Soviet Union. Moscow’s support to the CCP in this area has been known in general terms for some time.” The Soviets provided all crucial supplies to the PLA for the annexation. The Wilson Center documents mentioned: “After Stalin loaned the aircraft, Mao asked for aviation fuel. ‘We are encountering great difficulty in this matter’. Once again, Stalin pledged his support.” By the end of 1949, the Russians were out and the Chinese were in. India would soon learn the hard way about the land-grabbing tendencies of its new neighbour. An Indian publication, Chinese Aggression in Maps, says: “Territorial claims were put forward for the first time by the Chinese Prime Minister in September 1959, based on a Chinese map published in 1956. In December 1959, Zhou affirmed [that] the boundary on this [1956] map as the correct boundary claimed by China. China kept its claims on Indian territory undisclosed till 1959 though it had already, in 1957, surreptitiously cleared a motor road across the uninhabited Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.” The Publication Division booklet explained: “Since then the Chinese claim line has varied according to China’s bargaining convenience and the progressively increasing extent of occupation of Indian territory through force. …In 1960, during talks between officials of the two governments, the Chinese advanced their claim line further into Indian territory. …China now falsely claims this as the line up to which it exercised actual control in November 1959.” In May 2020, China tried to change the LAC again, resulting in a massive present confrontation. In 1949-50, Mongolia was shared between Stalin and Mao; Inner Mongolia became a province of China, while Outer Mongolia was given independence under the tutelage of the Soviets. Here China did not dare to push the line. It was not the case, in Turkestan (now known as Xinjiang), where the southern neighbour was weak, confused and dreaming of ‘Eternal Friendship’. History can’t be rewritten, but it is worth pondering, what if… What if Turkestan had been given independence by Russia, like Outer Mongolia? It is probably what we call ‘karma’ in India. But why does it entail so much suffering for India as well as the Uyghurs or the Tibetans? No one can answer this question. The writer is a noted author, journalist, historian, Tibetologist and China expert. The views expressed are personal.