How PM Modi’s China visit is not a reactionary act, but a multi-alignment strategy

Much of the commentary in Indian media has described Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit as a “balancing act”, a reaction to US tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump. This view not only oversimplifies India’s diplomatic choices but also underestimates its standing in the international system.

India today is not a small power adjusting its posture to suit the whims of superpowers; it is a strategic actor in its own right, whose decisions are guided by its long-term national interests rather than external pressure.

China has projected this summit as one of its most important diplomatic events of the year, hosting leaders from across Asia, Eurasia and the Global South. For Beijing, the symbolism of gathering such a diverse group of states is central to its attempt to present itself as a stabilising force at a time of international uncertainty.

For India, however, the motivations are different. Its participation is not about lending credibility to China’s narrative, nor about cushioning the blow of American protectionism. It is about being present at every major forum where decisions affecting its security and economy are discussed. It is also about shaping the agenda rather than watching from the sidelines.

The SCO has struggled to establish a clear identity since its founding. Originally focused on regional security, it now ventures into trade, connectivity and Global South politics. Its guiding idea of “indivisible security” is positioned against Nato’s bloc logic, but the organisation itself remains divided on many issues. Members have disagreed on Ukraine, on Israel-Palestine and on terrorism, where India’s calls for stronger condemnation of cross-border violence have often been ignored.

These divisions make it difficult to see the SCO as a coherent bloc. Even so, the very act of convening such a group carries value. For India, the forum is an additional space to advance its concerns, particularly on terrorism and regional stability, and it uses that space pragmatically.

To view PM Modi’s presence as a hurried response to tariffs misses this point entirely. India’s foreign policy has historically always sought to maintain its relationships without being bound by the rigidities of alliances. This principle of strategic autonomy allows India to simultaneously conduct naval exercises with the Quad, purchase oil from Russia and pursue dialogue with Beijing. None of these strands cancels out the other. They reflect the complexity of India’s position in a multipolar world. The idea that Trump’s tariffs forced India to Tianjin reduces this complexity to a ‘false binary’ and ignores the accumulated weight of India’s choices over the years.

Furthermore, the India–China relationship, in particular, cannot be reduced to the setting of one summit. Since the clashes in Galwan in 2020, relations have remained fragile, marked by mistrust even amid efforts to stabilise ties. The SCO meeting may add some warmth to the normalisation process, but it would be naïve to expect a dramatic breakthrough.

Both countries understand that letting the relationship deteriorate further is against their interests. But mutual suspicions run deep, and structural problems, from border disputes to competition for influence in the region, will not vanish through one meeting. The summit may ease tensions at the margins, but it will not take the relationship to “new heights”, as pointed out by media houses.

It is also important to note that India’s engagement at Tianjin sits alongside, not in opposition to, its ties with the United States and its partners in the Indo-Pacific. To attend the SCO is not to abandon the Quad; to talk with Xi is not to turn away from Washington.

These dual tracks reflect precisely the kind of pragmatic diplomacy that India has pursued for decades and which is now increasingly recognised as a mark of its maturity. Far from balancing nervously between two poles, India is demonstrating that it can engage multiple centres of power on its own terms.

The SCO summit will matter for its optics more than its substance. China will use the occasion to highlight its convening power, Russia will present itself as not isolated, and smaller members will seek visibility. And India? For New Delhi, the symbolism lies in refusing to vacate a space dominated by Beijing. Its presence affirms that decisions about Eurasia and the wider Asian region cannot bypass New Delhi. To mistake this for a reactionary act is to miss the deeper truth—India is not adjusting under pressure but exercising choice from a position of confidence.

Hence, India’s participation in the SCO summit should be understood within the larger arc of its foreign policy. It is a policy defined not by reactions to the superpowers but by a steady assertion of autonomy. This strategic autonomy has enabled India to sit at multiple tables, sometimes with adversaries, sometimes with partners, but always with a clear sense of its own interests. The SCO meeting may smoothen the rough edges of the India–China relationship; however, it will not transform it. Nor is it meant to. What it does show is that India today engages the world not as a supplicant or a balancer, but as a strategic player shaping outcomes in line with its own national priorities.

The author is a researcher at the East Asia Centre, MP-IDSA, New Delhi, India. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.