 "How Iran’s pan-Islamic obsession pits it against Israel")
Is a war between Israel and Iran on the cards? Outbreak of full-scale hostilities between Israel and Iran was often feared during the last two decades. However, it was not until earlier this year that the Islamic Republic actually chose to hit Israel directly. Under Operation “True Promise”, Iran fired a barrage of around 300 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and suicide drones upon Israeli targets the night of April 13-14, 2024, almost a fortnight after Israeli airstrikes on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria (April 1) had killed 16 persons, half of whom were officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
Uzi Rubin, an expert of missile defence systems and a senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, disabuses the notion that the attack was a mere face saver aimed at inflicting minimal damages. Rubin argues that it was a strike of unprecedented magnitude, which was even more powerful than the Russian opening strike against Ukraine in February 2022. Israel’s ability to intercept and deflect these attacks was a testimony to the success of its missile defence system.
Recently, Tehran saw a merit in repeating those attacks as Operation “True Promise-2," after Israel booby-trapped Hezbollah’s pager devices and launched devastating airstrikes in Lebanon that killed Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah in his secret bunker. Whether Israel retaliates or decides to tactically overlook the volley, as it did last April, is a matter of speculation. If indeed Israel seeks reprisal, it has plenty of high-value targets on the ground in Iran to choose from.
They include military and intelligence sites, military command sites, oil terminals and refineries, and even nuclear reactors. Iran’s poorly developed air defence system is unlikely to provide cover from Israel’s vastly superior air strike capability. Israel’s air attack upon the Osirak nuclear research reactor in Tuwaitha, Iraq, on June 7, 1981, is still remembered after four decades. In more recent times, on September 6, 2007, Israeli air attacks devastated an alleged nuclear reactor in the Dair ez-Zor region of Syria.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsIsrael’s policy of assassination
Once, it had looked almost certain that Israel would undertake a full-scale offensive to deter the Islamic republic from developing its atom bomb. However, Meir Dagan, appointed as the Director General of Mossad in 2002, with the express object of thwarting Iran’s nuclear program, chose to deal with the challenge with a comparatively low-cost policy of assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists. Ronen Bergmen’s eminently readable account Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations (2018) describes how successful Dagan was in his plans.
Iranian secret service compromised?
Thus, even as Iran targets the Mossad headquarters in Tel Aviv with its missiles, it is feared that Iran’s own intelligence and security apparatus might be infiltrated with the Mossad’s assets. Could Israel have successfully eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, a top-ranking Hamas leader, inside the high security zone of Tehran, when an international event was on, without infiltrating Iranian security apparatus? The bomb that penetrated into the secret bunker of Hezbollah chief Hassan Nassarallah is also, in some way, symbolic of Israeli penetration into the terrorist group’s network.
Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent statement that the head of an Iranian secret service unit responsible for countering Israeli espionage activities in Iran was himself an Israeli spy has created a flutter. Though Ahmadinejad has a reputation as a madcap, yet his statement reflects the atmosphere of fear and suspicion within the Islamic republic even as it braces up for a possible war against Israel.
Pan-Islamism triggers hostility
The 85-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, recently delivered a rare Friday sermon at the historic Imam Khomeini mosque in Tehran. He symbolically held a Druganov rifle of Russian origin (“Sword of Islam” seems outdated) while haranguing against Israel and predicting the demise of the Zionist state. His sermon might remind Iranians so much about his predecessor and founder of the Islamic Republic, viz, Ayatollah Ruhullah Musawi Khomeini (1902-1989), who had always been urging Muslims of the world to unite to destroy Israel.
During the reign of Mohammed Reza Shah Pehalvi, Iran and Israel enjoyed high levels of trust. Islamic sensitivities did not stand in their way. A few undated photographs of Major General Azizollah Palizban, a senior officer of the Imperial Iranian Army, meeting Moshe Dayan and Arial Sharon in occupied territories in Palestine (possibly 1974) were discovered after the Islamic Revolution and published in an Iranian newspaper, Jumhuri-yi Islami, on September 17, 1980. The photos show all participants smiling.
The Swede-Iranian scholar Tritra Parsi, in his book Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (2007), relates a humorous anecdote about Israeli presence in Shah’s Iran. When Khomeini, on landing in Tehran, was taken to Shahyad Square (since then renamed Meidan-e-Azadi), where millions of his supporters had gathered to greet him, next to the religious revolutionaries stood Israel’s military attaché, viz, Yitzhak Segev, and head of the Israeli Mossad in Iran, viz, Eliezer Tsafrir, who were observing the proceedings and trying to fit into the crowd. A mullah passed by the two Israeli citizens and asked them in Persian why they were not carrying the pictures of the Ayatollah. They apologised—in perfect Persian—and were handed two large pictures of the Ayatollah. The two Israelis joined the crowd chanting “Allahu Akbhar, Khomeini Rahbar,” or God is Great, Khomeini is our leader (P.81).
Though the success of the Islamic Revolution (1979) was a setback for Israel’s ties with Iran, Israel chose to ignore Khomeini’s diatribes. Rather, it prudently chose to concentrate on their common enemy—Iraq under Saddam Hussein. A RAND Corporation study says that in 1980, in the backdrop of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin approved shipment of tires for Phantom fighter planes, as well as weapons for the Iranian Army. Israel risked the violation of US policy, which stated that no arms must be sent to Iran until the release of American hostages at the US embassy in Tehran. In return, Khomeini allowed a large number of Iranian Jews to leave Iran for the United States or Israel (Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, P.14-15).
The report correctly identifies that despite current animosity, Israel and Iran have always not been rivals. They are not natural competitors and not destined for perpetual conflict. These regional powers neither share boundaries nor are in economic competition. They belong to different regional zones of interest—the Levant for Israel and the Persian Gulf for Iran. Iran’s reformist presidents like Hasemi Rafsanjani (1989–97) and Mohammad Khatmi (1997–2005) followed a more pragmatic policy towards Israel, even if they were opposed by Iranian conservatives and were not appreciated by the Israelis at that time. In the 1990s, Iran was not seen as a security challenge by Israel. The situation, however, changed significantly after Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, an Iranian principlist (fundamentalist), known for his hard-line views on Iran’s nuclearisation, became the President in 2005.
Antipodal states
Yet, there is no gainsaying that Israel and Iran are antipodal. Israel, despite being established as a country for the Jews, adopted multi-party parliamentary democracy based on proportional representation as ordained in the UN General Assembly Resolution. UNGA Resolution 181 (II), dated November 29, 1947, called the UN partition plan for Palestine. Israel marks a compromise between secular and religious elements, which has prevented adoption of a unified constitution till date. The state apparatus is secular, despite the sizable presence of religious-minded Jews.
Iran, on the other hand, is the world’s first modern constitutional theocracy. The 2,500-year-old institution of monarchy in Iran was abolished in 1979 and replaced by the rule of Shia Islamic jurists. Ayatollah Khomeini propounded the theory that, in the absence of the divinely inspired Imam promised in Shia Islam, the country would be ruled by the guardianship of jurists (Vilayat-e-Faqih).
Every element of plurality and liberty in Iran—ranging from freedom of speech and expression to political parties—is explicitly subordinated to Islamic ideology. While Israel hardly shows any fear that freedom of speech or political diversity would undermine Judaism or the unity of the nation, the fear is quite palpable in Iran’s Constitution. Thus, for every right conceded to citizens, there is a matching condition that it should not violate the Islamic ideology.
Iran has an elected Parliament (Majlis), which is not sovereign, as all laws passed by it must be reviewed by a 12-Guardians Council (with equal representation of Islamic clerics and civilian law experts) for their compatibility with the tenets of Islam. The Guardians Council, besides acting as a constitutional court, also acts as an election commission, with a history of vetoing several reformist candidates for the president’s post.
Animosity towards Israel
Ayatollah Khomeini should be credited for devising the system of Vilayat-e-Faqih, which lies at the heart of his scheme of Islamic government. His best-known book Hukumat-e-Islam (Islamic Government) originated in a series of lectures delivered at Najaf (Iraq) between January 21 and February 8, 1970, where he had been living in exile then. His antipathy towards Israel, in those lectures, appears accentuated by the fact that the regime of Shah had enabled Israel to have a disproportionate influence in Iran’s military and commercial life.
“Israel has usurped a Moslem people’s land and committed innumerable crimes,” alleged Ayatollah Khomeini in an interview with Le Monde (May 6, 1978) during his French exile. Khomeini further stated that he had always urged Muslims throughout the world to unite and fight their enemies, including Israel.
Trita Parsi (2007) observes that Khomeini, while comparing Israel to a cancer that would destroy Islam and Muslims if not removed from the region, neglected the Palestinian dimension of the conflict, choosing to instead emphasise the global Muslim community, ie, Umma (Treacherous Alliance P83).
Constitutional obligation for Jihad
The Islamic Republic carries a constitutional obligation to wage Jihad. The Preamble of the Constitution (1989) speaks of an ideological army. The army and Islamic Pasdaran Revolutionary Corps (IRGC)—says the Constitution—“will” undertake the responsibility of not only guarding and protecting the borders but also weight of ideological mission, ie striving (jehād) on the path of God and struggle on the path of expanding sovereignty of the law of God in the world.
This constitutional obligation explains why Iran must fight against Israel, the Jewish state, and why it stirs up fundamentalist movements like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
Khomeini’s appeal limited
Khomeini perhaps underestimated his disadvantageous position despite the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. As a non-Arab and Shia, he could not achieve centrality in global Islamic discourse. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie (1988) was his last major act to gain leadership in the Islamic world. However, as Amin Saikal informs in Iran Rising: The Survival and the Future of the Islamic Republic (2019), no regional or distant Muslim country embraced Khomeini’s system of Islamic governance as it stood, despite his efforts to “export the revolution,” as was the official policy of the republic then.
However, his political Islamism appealed only to some minorities in the region, predominantly to marginalised Shia communities. The most successful case in this regard was Lebanon, where Iranian Hezbollahis (followers of the Party of God) assisted the formation of Lebanese Hezbollah (the Party of God), which grew into a formidable Iranian protégé force in Lebanese political and military life (P7).
Occupation of Lebanon and Gaza history
Hezbollah was established in 1982 in the backdrop of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as a resistance force of the Shia Muslims. Hezbollah, created by a group of clerics who were adherents of Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010), followed a strictly theological line laid down by Ayatollah Khomeini and argued for establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon based on the pattern of Iran.
It might be remembered that Lebanon, a country with fractured religious democracy, had erupted into civil war in 1975. Israel was forced to intervene in the hostilities, as it wanted to prevent the Palestinian Liberation Organisation operatives, expelled from Jordan in 1970 and thereafter based in refugee camps in southern Lebanon, from having a free run of the already destabilised country. The desirability and planning of that intervention, based on the advice tender by the then Defence Minister Arial Sharon, has been debated often.
However, Israel vacated the last inch of Lebanese soil by May 25, 2000, when Ehud Barak was the Prime Minister. The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) ceased much earlier. Today, Hezbollah is trying to fit in the Lebanese constitutional scheme as a political party. How is it justifiable for Hezbollah to attack Israeli positions and population today? It could be argued that they are in sympathy with the people of Gaza, fellow Arabs, who are being killed in large numbers in Israeli shelling. However, things could not be seen in complete isolation. How did one reach that situation when Israel has had no presence in Gaza for almost two decades?
Israel vacated the last inch of Gaza by September 22, 2005, when Arial Sharon was the Prime Minister. Yet, under Hamas, Gaza became a nursery of “rocket terror” threatening the Israeli population. Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had to launch repeated campaigns in Gaza, eg, Operation Cast Lead (2008–09), Operation Pillar of Defence (2012), Operation Protective Edge (2014), etc, to defang Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad, but in vain.
On the wrong side of global peace
Iran has defied the obligation to be a ‘normal’ state in the community of nations. Say, for example, it has had no formal diplomatic relations with the United States of America since 1980. The infamous US embassy hostage crisis (November 4, 1979–January 20, 1981) in Tehran is still etched in people’s memories.
Even the People’s Republic of China (estd 1949) had established full diplomatic relations with the US by 1979. Mao Zedong had taken the lead to invite President Richard Nixon to Peking (Beijing) in 1971. China, the globally second-largest economy, is reaping enormous benefits of integrating into the market economy.
Iran, on the other hand, has prioritised its Islamic ideology over integrating into the international order. It has preferred to extend its influence in West Asia through globally designated terrorist organisations like Hezbollah and Hamas and subversive groups like Iraqi militias and Yemen’s Houthis.
Ali Alfoneh, in his book Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guard in Turning Theocracy into Military Dictatorship (2013), informs how led by Ayatollah Ahmed Jannati, the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), along with Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, engaged in arming and training Bosnian partisans in the civil war of Yugoslavia. The IRGC provided military training to Bosnian Muslims, and the Islamic Republic authorities later admitted their involvement in the export of weapons to Bosnia during the war (P 230-231).
Similarly, Abdullah F Alrebh, in a recent document (2022) produced by MEI (Middle East Institute), has reminded us about the almost forgotten terrorist incident on Saudi Arabian soil—the Khobar Tower bombing on June 25, 1996, targeting the US Air Force’s 4404th wing (provisional) stationed in the kingdom’s Eastern Province—which was linked to a shadowy military organisation “Hezbollah Al-Hejaz” attributed to Iranian influence (Hezbollah Al-Hejaz: A Saudi Shi’a Group Cloaked in Mystery P4-5)
There is indeed some truth in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently describing India as a blessing to the world and Iran (along with Iraq, Syria, and Yemen) as a curse to the world in his UN General Assembly speech. This is despite the fact that Iranians are, as the Lonely Planet travel guide describes, the “friendliest” people on earth. The Islamic ideology has actually become a smokescreen for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to perpetuate its dominance in Iran’s economy. Any suggestion to open up Iran’s economy, as was done by the then-reformist President Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), is fiercely resisted in the name of Islamic ideology.
Based on the proposal of Iran’s then moderate President Mohammed Khatami, the UNGA on November 4, 1998, adopted a resolution to designate the year 2001 as the “United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations". It is evident that Iran has moved away from the path of dialogue since then.
The writer is author of the book ‘The Microphone Men: How Orators Created a Modern India’ (2019) and an independent researcher based in New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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