How Horn of Africa is on the brink of a crisis again

The Horn of Africa is again in the throes of conflicts that have reignited old disputes. There was some hope that the 12-year-old dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Nile waters and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) would be resolved. The African Union initiative for a resolution failed in 2021; no further negotiation was held since; now four rounds of negotiations occurred after a two-year gap, but the hopes for resolution seem to be fading.

Both countries and Sudan, which is in the throes of its own civil war, could not find a solution. Egypt and Ethiopia have therefore both gone to the UN, putting their claims forward.

Egypt, which is normally the first to approach the UN Security Council, rather than the African Union, did so again. Ethiopia retorted, claiming that Egypt is, ‘stalling progress, reverting to hard lines and unreasonable positions’. Egypt’s objection is that Ethiopia continues to fill the GERD without reaching agreement with the downstream countries, Sudan and Egypt.

The traditional water rivals Ethiopia and Egypt have also taken different sides in the regional conflicts around the Horn of Africa. Sometimes they share allies like the UAE, and at others, they have them as rivals. Besides the water wars, the other flash point is that Somalia and Egypt have signed a military alliance.

This causes anxiety in Ethiopia, which believes that Egypt could open another front from the south, where Ethiopia’s restive Somali Region borders the still unsettled Somalia. For nearly two decades, Ethiopian troops helped stabilise Somalia. Most troops were withdrawn when civil war broke out in Ethiopia in 2019.Various regions in Ethiopia are in unrest. Egypt finds some allies among Ethiopia’s neighbours and sometimes among Ethiopian groups in their regions.

The breakdown between Ethiopia and Somalia has been in the offing for a while as Ethiopia tried to reorder the traditional alliances in the Horn of Africa, annoying Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya. Now, on 1 January 2024, Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland, a self-ruled province of Somalia. Under this, Somaliland agreed to lease a 20-square-kilometre section of the coast for 50 years to Ethiopia to set up a naval base and find access to the sea for this large landlocked country.

In 1993, when Ethiopia allowed Eritrea to secede, the ports of Ethiopia, Assab and Massawa, went to Eritrea. Since 1998, Eritrea and Ethiopia have been either at war or in an unhappy state of relations. They united when Abiy won the Nobel Peace Prize for reconciliation with Eritrea, and then they jointly fought down the rebellion in Tigray. Now that Tigray is quiet, Eritrea and Ethiopia have returned to bad blood.

By reaching out to Somaliland, Ethiopia tried to break out to the sea, which perhaps was tolerable, but in return, it offered diplomatic recognition to Somaliland. Somalia sees it as an act of aggression. Somalia, has lived with Somaliland acting autonomously economically but without de jure recognition from anybody. It now fears that Ethiopia’s action could encourage others to recognise Somaliland as well and unravel the tapestry of Somalia.

Djibouti, which had almost the entire Ethiopian traffic to the sea, is also worried that the development of an alternative port would impact its economic wellbeing. Djibouti has now offered Ethiopia access to the port of Tadjourah, barely 100 kilometres from the Ethiopian border, which will give access to the Red Sea. This is a change in Djibouti’s position, because last year, they were adamant that they would not support Ethiopia’s direct access to the Red Sea.

Now that Somalia is deeply annoyed with Ethiopia, they have signed a military alliance with Egypt. Under these five battalions of Egyptian troops are expected to land in Somalia. A similar number are anticipated to join the reformed African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Already, Egyptian military planes have been spotted in Mogadishu, disgorging military equipment, which was agreed upon when the Somali President visited Cairo in August.

Thus, Egypt and Somalia, both of which have different grouses, one on the river waters and the other on sovereignty, have come together to thwart Ethiopian ambitions.

Turkey, which has a finger in many pies in the region, has tried to mediate, but Somalia is clear that it will not relent unless Ethiopia clearly recognises Somalian sovereignty over Somaliland and rescinds the port and access agreement.

There are currently 3, 000 Ethiopian troops under the AU mission who will finish their term, and when the ATMIS takes over in January, there will be Egyptian rather than Ethiopian troops in it. It has been Ethiopia’s longstanding position that AU missions in Somalia should not have troops from countries inimical to Ethiopia.

During the G20 summit in New Delhi in 2023, Egypt, an Indian guest, and Turkey, a G20 member, held a summit after 12 years. The Gaza crises had overcome their animosity over siding with different sides in Libya. Since then, Erdogan visited Cairo in January 2024, and Sisi went to Ankara in September 2024 ‘to cement a new détente’ as analysed by ‘The Somali Wire’ of analyst Rashid Abdi.

Egypt and Turkey have some common anxieties in the Red Sea. They see Somalia similarly, seeking control by Mogadishu and not letting Somaliland break away formally. Turkey has invested in Somalia and is anxious that Somaliland should not wreck its party. ‘Egypt seeks to prevent Ethiopia from obtaining a naval outlet that could pose a strategic threat to its interests,’ says Abdi. The Egypt, Turkey, Somalia alliance tries to deter Ethiopian ambitions.

Thus far so good, but while Egypt is not averse to sabre rattling, Turkey is more circumspect, as it is itself a big investor in Ethiopia with 200 companies operating there. Turkey and Egypt align on Somalia, but Turkey does not want to bring the issue of the GERD into play as its relationship with Ethiopia is lucrative for its business.

Egypt evidently does not see any war with Israel, despite the problems in Gaza, and hence, feels confident to send nearly 10,000 troops to Somalia over the next several months. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey, besides Qatar, have all got important and sometimes rival links with countries in the Horn of Africa and in factions within them. The UAE, which has been supporting both Egypt and Ethiopia for different purposes, has invested in Somaliland’s Berbera port, from where Ethiopia will challenge the domination of Djibouti, because Ethiopia is the main market in the region.

In this broth of mixed alliances and clan loyalties, there are several slippery dunes on which the stability of the Horn of Africa is precariously placed.

The author is a former ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN and the African Union. He tweets @AmbGurjitSingh. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.