 "How full-scale invasion or blockade of Taiwan will be a fool’s bet for China")
Xi Jinping, on taking over as president of China, started with ‘peaceful reunification’ of Taiwan as one of his aims and later got it included as a key goal in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, Article 1 of the PRC Constitution states that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Additionally, the preamble emphasises the goal of achieving the complete reunification of the motherland, which includes bringing Taiwan under PRC sovereignty. Xi has called unification with Taiwan the “essence” of the country’s “rejuvenation”, which needs to be achieved by 2049, the one hundredth anniversary of the PRC.
Meanwhile, President Lai of Taiwan (Republic of China), or ROC, spoke on the annual Double Tenth Day, marking the 113th anniversary of ROC’s founding on October 10, 2024, that the two sides “are not subordinate to each other” and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had no authority to represent the island. He believes that Taiwan is a “sovereign country” and it was “absolutely impossible for the PRC to become ‘motherland’ of the ROC’s people” because Taiwan had older political and democratic roots.
Consequently, PLA’s military drills like “ Joint Sword-2024B” launched on October 13, 2024, as a “stern warning to the separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces” mainly to coerce Taiwan. Beijing continues to brand Lai as separatist and continues coercive military posturing ever since the DPP got elected in 2016.
President Xi had earlier emphasised that the country’s reunification with Taiwan was “inevitable” in his last New Year’s address too and also told President Biden that ‘Beijing will reunify Taiwan with mainland China but that the timing has not yet been decided’ with the ‘peaceful’ word prominently missing. Despite the fact that Taiwan has never been ruled by the PRC and has operated as a separate political entity since 1949, with its own government, economy, and military, and other parameters to qualify it as an independent state. The inference drawn from Xi’s assertion is that the PRC will continue to make efforts to reunite it with mainland China, but the question remains: how, when, and at what cost?
One China Principle
The PRC may keep claiming Taiwan to be its domestic issue, but it has external dimensions. Diplomatically, the US may claim to follow ‘One China Policy’, but it treats Taiwan no less than an ally. The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, effective March 26, 2020, is an indication. The Taiwan Relation Act, 1973; the Taiwan Travel Act signed in 2019; and the National Defence Authorisation Act signed earlier this year to facilitate the sale of state-of-the-art weaponry and joint exercises justify the statement.
Impact Shorts
More ShortsThe US will always like to trade and strategically partner with democratic Taiwan outside Beijing’s influence and not Taiwan under CCP. Moreover, in any potential invasion of Taiwan, the spillover of the battle space to Japan is obvious due to geographic proximity, an ally which the US is obligated to defend.
China’s Agenda
China is trying to pursue the idea of ‘Winning without Fighting’ using its Three Warfare Concept, which entails public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare along with aggressive military coercion, air violations, firepower power demonstrations, and some symbolic economic boycott of Taiwan, thus creating heightened tension around Taiwan to put adequate deterrence on DPP leadership. Not to declare independence, and stern message to Washington not to abandon ‘One China Principle’. China, therefore, is using its Gray Zone tactics to control Taipei without firing a single shot before escalating to the next level at an appropriate time. In the meantime, the PRC is building its military capability to invade Taiwan in the next few years, should its attempt at peaceful reunification fail.
The PRC’s threat to the US not to arm Taiwan hasn’t shown much results, as Taiwan is yet to receive the first batch of F-16 Block 70 jets from the arms deal worth US$7.69 billion for 66 jets due in September 2024, making Taiwan the third nation in the world to receive factory-fresh advanced fighter jets, besides approving $1.1 billion for upgrading its radars and missiles. The US $2 billion deal includes an advanced air defence system that has been used by Ukraine. In the 2025 budget, the Pentagon seeks US$500 million in arms support, indicating its intention of empowering Taiwan to have a military with a modern arsenal (HIMAR, ATACM, advanced air defences, anti-ship missile batteries) to defend itself against Chinese aggression.
Is Full-Scale Invasion of Taiwan Viable?
The cost of reunification by full-scale invasion of Taiwan for Xi Jinping would be extraordinarily high, militarily, economically, and politically. Chinese strategist Qiao Liang, a retired PLA Air Force Major General, had warned that taking Taiwan by force is ‘too costly’. The Chinese red line of “Taiwan going nuclear/declaring independence” has not been crossed as yet, giving no worthwhile justification for China to cross the US red line of ‘changing status quo by force’.
A military invasion or forced reunification has the bright possibility of direct involvement by the US under the Taiwan Relations Act and other regional powers like Japan, Australia, and South Korea. The capture of Taiwan requires an amphibious assault bigger than Inchon landing or D-Day operations in Normandy in the Second World War, that too in the battle field transparency of modern time, for which the Chinese amphibious fleet is currently relatively inadequate, which it’s hoping to develop by 2027.
The analysis of the terrain of Taiwan reveals that besides the complexity of amphibious assault, it poses tremendous challenges for invaders. Taiwan’s landmass has rugged mountains, built-up areas, and limited beaches, unsuitable for rapid moves by the invader. PLA may be able to cross the strait, but there are only a few deep-water ports and beaches available in Taiwan that can accommodate a large landing force, which will invariably be hindered by sea mines, barriers, obstacles, and anti-ship batteries on rocky terrain, as part of the ‘Porcupine or Honey Badger Defence Concept’ also referred to as “Fortress Taiwan”. The East and West coasts of Taiwan have shallow water lined by steep cliffs, posing problems for invading forces. Fighting/movement in built-up areas of Taiwan’s major population centres is only possible through a few narrow passes and tunnels, which Taiwan can destroy or defend.
For political consolidation of Taiwan, capture of Taipei is inescapable. Its closeness to the islands of Japan (Yonaguni Island is just 110 km from Taiwan) will necessitate PLA to breach Japanese maritime space for a viable amphibious operation, which will drag Japan and its defence partner, the US, into confrontation notwithstanding the strategic ambiguity displayed by the US for decades. Mountainous terrain and street fighting in built-up areas have the potential to prolong the war beyond Beijing’s expectations.
It may be noted that in case of invasion by the PLA, Taiwanese people will be fighting a ‘just war’ under an undeterred leadership, vowing to defend the democracy and security of Taiwan. A quick reference to the 1979 Sino-Vietnam War (the last combat experience of PLA) would reveal that PLA, when confronted with well-determined people of Vietnam, fighting a ‘just war’ under strong leadership and using terrain friction to its advantage got better of them, despite the vast superiority of military assets of PLA.
There is no reason that Taiwan can’t replicate it, given the kind of modern weaponry, determined military, and more than adequate warning of PLA’s intentions, which it has already received. Taiwan will have to take on the initial weight of the Chinese offensive, hoping US forces with its allies in the region to join at the earliest. Taking Taiwan by force therefore involves mobilisation of PLA’s all combat resources, expecting an escalation from limited war to an all-out war.
Numerous think tank wargames on the Chinese invasion of Taiwan have revealed a variety of results depending on the country wargaming it. CSIS (USA) developed one such wargame and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States, Taiwan, and Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defence came at a very high cost to all the parties. PRC is also aware of such consequences that it will put its overarching aim of ‘national rejuvenation’ out of gear, even if it gets some success in Taiwan.
Chinese Option to Quarantine Taiwan
An option to quarantine Taiwan is a low-cost option, and the cost would keep increasing with the degree of quarantine aimed at.
While China has the capabilities to successfully execute quarantine variations, their success and risk for China would depend on how Taiwan, the US, and others would respond to it. The limitations of such an operation are that even if successfully executed, it can inflict temporary pain on Taiwan, but it will not force it to surrender its sovereignty. A military blockade will certainly be necessary for the PRC to pursue its stated aim.
Cost of Naval Blockades
Most of the military drills of the PLA of the PRC have been to demonstrate the capability to blockade Taiwan and force it to agree to its terms without risking an all-out war with the US. In order to prevent foreign ships from entering or departing Taiwanese seas, naval forces have been used to encircle the island, limiting access to its ports. Establishing air and sea control, exploiting its superiority in a number of military assets, and posturing them to deter any ally of Taiwan has been part of Chinese strategy.
The idea of “Joint Blockade Campaign” finds mention in Science of Campaigns, a textbook published in 2006 by China’s National Defence University, which PLA has improved upon incorporating modern capabilities. The PRC might seize one or more Taiwan-administered outlying islands, including Kinmen or Matsu near China, the Penghus near Taiwan, or Pratas in the South China Sea, besides enforcing a blockade of the main island of Taiwan.
A Washington-based think tank, the Foundation for Defence of Democracies (FDD), held a tabletop exercise in Taipei and mentioned the “ Anaconda strategy", in which the PRC could use covert cyberwarfare and non-kinetic disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, followed by a military blockade, or other measures to strangulate Taiwan, rather than attempting an invasion. Prior to imposing a blockade, China might use its cyber capabilities to interfere with communications, vital infrastructure, and logistics, making it more difficult for Taiwan to coordinate its supply chains and defences.
In addition, it could use propaganda, psychological, and misinformation campaigns to undermine public support for the government in Taiwan and discourage external support. A blockade could also include economic measures, such as targeting trade routes and imports critical to Taiwan’s economy, including food and energy supplies. Taiwan’s heavy dependence on imported liquefied natural gas and limited energy reserves makes it vulnerable to such a threat. Coercion of countries having diplomatic or trade relations with Taiwan is also part of the blockade planned by the PRC.
The effectiveness of such a blockade would depend on Taiwan’s readiness in military, economic, and all other domains of warfare, including reserves of critical resources, as well as the response from the international community. Taiwan will have to bear the brunt of China’s initial onslaught and blockade, but the US and its regional allies could synergise their forces together and utilise their air and sea resources to cut off Beijing’s maritime lifeline both inside and beyond the South China Sea.
Chinese Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) outside Nine Dash Line are still vulnerable to choking/blockade like in Malacca Strait, and it will draw PLA into conflict outside its comfort zone. The same Anaconda strategy could thus be used in encircling PRC and cutting off its SLOC, trade routes, and essential energy, thereby “squeezing” it until its economy is crippled. If the US could ensure that Ukraine communications remained functional despite Russian cyberattacks, there is no reason that ‘Star-Link’ will not do the same for Taiwan in the future.
To this end, the US has signed an Enhanced Defence Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) with the Philippines to expand US military bases to include four new sites in addition to the five earlier. In addition, a contingent of Marine Rotational Force (MRF-SEA) deployment is likely to continue through March 2025 and includes six additional exercises and security cooperation engagements throughout Southeast Asia. This will ensure swift mobilisation in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
Economic and Political Cost
Economically, the Chinese dependence on the US dollar remains significant, and a conflict over Taiwan would result in a substantial economic setback for China, leading to a rapid exodus of capital and the relocation of companies from the country, occurring at a pace more accelerated than anticipated. This will also destroy the Chinese and Taiwanese economies, which does not suit the Chinese leadership struggling to revive its economy marred by trade wars, failing BRI, real estate crises, and domestic debt. China is the top destination for Taiwanese exports, accounting for approximately 30.7 per cent of total exports in 2024, with Taiwan having an overall trade surplus of $81.7 billion in 2024 with China. Taiwan is the world leader in semiconductor manufacturing, and any conflict that disrupts Taiwan’s chip production would have a severe impact on global supply chains, including those of China.
In the event of a military invasion, China would likely face severe economic sanctions from Western nations, similar to or even harsher than those faced by Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. Given China’s deep integration into the global economy, these sanctions would likely target its financial system, technology exports, and key industries. Even after the reunification, China could face long-term isolation from Western markets, which could slow down its economic growth further.
Politically, a forced reunification could damage China’s relationships with key trading partners and their allies. Asian neighbours may become more aligned with the US and Western countries, undermining China’s efforts to position itself as a rising superpower and responsible global leader. Such an image can take a beating if the invasion doesn’t succeed. An invasion of Taiwan would damage its global reputation and undermine its soft power in many parts of the world.
Domestic unrest could result from a protracted or expensive conflict. The ability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to sustain stability and economic growth is crucial to Xi Jinping’s leadership. Dissension within the party and among the populace could arise from a conflict, particularly one that does not end in an immediate and resounding victory. Significant Han Chinese casualties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait could threaten the CCP’s grasp on power. The public will become more democratic as a result of unification with democratic Taiwan, which the CCP has been stifling up until now.
Conclusion
While the leadership under Xi Jinping likely sees reunification with Taiwan as a central part of its national objectives, the costs associated with a forced reunification, especially when considering the Anaconda strategy or US-led containment strategies, could be overwhelming. The potential military, economic, and political blowback could indeed make the operation unbearable for China, depending on how events unfold.
Taiwan’s geography, modernised military power, resolute capacity, and its vital role within global supply chains and semiconductor dependency, notwithstanding the asymmetry in numbers of military assets with the PLA, will pose a challenge to the PRC. Taiwan’s determination to defend itself, growing defence spending and military capacity, strengthening the reserve force, training, and diversifying energy sources can increase the cost of PLA’s misadventure.
The conflict if imposed by China will be deadly, and Chinese, who want to win without fighting, are not known for their appetite to accept body bags of Han Chinese for a cause that doesn’t give them economic benefit but takes away their dream of national rejuvenation.
Even though China’s military has modernised significantly and maintains substantial numerical advantage over Taiwanese military, a full-scale amphibious invasion does not make any strategic sense for China, with bright chances of reputational loss, globally and domestically, in case the operations fail or get overly delayed.
The current strategic posturing and gaming will continue since neither the US nor China want to go to war, but neither wants to give a walkover either. In all fairness, Taiwan will expect the US and other allies to conduct military exercises/activities close to the Malacca Strait to relieve Chinese pressure and serve as a subtle reminder of their vulnerable SLOC in the event that any aggression (coercion, quarantine, blockade, or use of force) becomes intolerable.
Although Xi Jinping is renowned for taking measured risks, the sum of these costs may lead China to choose a course of sustained pressure and coercion over direct military action. The PRC wants to keep President Lai under pressure to refrain from declaring independence, hope that the DPP loses the next election, and work out advantageous agreements with the opposition that could benefit China.
The author is a global strategic and military analyst. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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