Why Xi's military purge isn't about corruption but something more sinister

The purge within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China continues unabated. Latest inputs flowing from Beijing mention that Lin Xiangyan, the commander of its Eastern Theatre Command, committed ‘suicide’. This theatre command’s area of responsibility includes eastern China, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. He was responsible for leading operations against Taiwan once the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, gave a decision. No reasons for his suicide have been mentioned, though it is believed that he suspected that he would be investigated for corruption.

There are also reports that the PLA’s Central Military Commission Member and Director of the Political Department, Miao Hua, has been ‘suspended from duty’, suspected of ‘serious violation of discipline’. In addition, China’s defence minister, Dong Jun, has been placed under investigation for corruption. He had met Indian defence minister, Rajnath Singh, on November 20 on the sidelines of the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting. Both of them were personally selected by Xi for their current assignments.

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Dong, appointed as defence minister in December last year, is the third consecutive defence minister to face such scrutiny. His predecessors, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were both dismissed for similar allegations. Though specific allegations against Dong remain unclear, his dismissal is part of a crackdown aimed at eliminating corruption within the PLA.

It appears that either corruption is rampant within the PLA or that it is just an excuse to remove those that Xi considers disloyal to him or the party. Kickbacks, buying, and selling of promotions have been standard practices within the PLA for decades.

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In December 2023, nine generals were ousted, including the commander of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force. A number of PLA Rocket Force commanders, as well as senior leaders of Chinese military-industrial state-owned enterprises, have been removed from service in recent times. Such a massive purge cannot only be limited to corruption. It was initially presumed that the purge was against members of the Rocket Force. However, it now includes officials of the navy as well as the state-owned enterprises, implying something more sinister.

If corruption is so widespread in an institution where those at the top of the hierarchy are expected to be role models of honesty, then it would be far greater in all other spheres of governance in China. Further, corruption is not a new phenomenon in China.Surprisingly, Xi’s efforts at eradicating corruption are centred around the PLA, largely ignoring other departments of the state.

There is also cut-throat competition amongst the hierarchy of the PLA to gain promotions for a few top spots in the organisation, as well as its governing body, the CMC (Central Military Commission). This competition also leads to those in line falsely accusing their rivals, exploiting the ‘whistleblower’ system established by Xi, resulting in purges. Xi needs loyalty from the PLA to ensure the survival of their communist model.

Thus, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) has an army while China, as a nation, does not. Such is the fear amongst the CCP hierarchy that any threat to their power results in instant arrest and disappearance. Corruption charges are possibly an excuse for a purge.

A report in ‘War on the Rocks’ of 2015 mentioned that corruption cases were ongoing against over 4,000 officers of the rank of Lt Colonel and above, including 82 Generals. Most cases were financial. Many of those investigated were also involved with recruitment. Currently, they are the top brass.

Historically, all autocratic leaders fear being removed by a coup; many also have been. Hence, employ every trick in the book to keep any force capable of removing them from power under check, including nominating their fiercest loyalists to top posts. In China it is the PLA that possesses such ability, hence frequent purges, some even based on rumours. The fact that Xi removed many of his own protégés indicates the paranoia within the leadership or that his choices were wrong.

Xi’s demand for loyalty and constant purges has resulted in the PLA leadership seeking to be more politically correct than professional. This is further amplified by Xi insisting that his political thoughts are part of essential reading for all members of the PLA. This is given greater importance than professional military knowledge. Xi had mentioned during the CMC Political Work Conference in June 2024, ‘The gun barrels should always be in the hands of those who are loyal and reliable to the party.’

CCP propaganda, intending to project China’s governance model, claiming removal of poverty is also being pushed within the PLA. Regular purges have begun producing military leaders with limited experience who devote maximum time to displaying party loyalty rather than working for the betterment of their subordinates or training their commands.

Added is rapid expansion of the armed forces, mainly the navy and air force. Reports flowing from China indicate that the navy lacks experienced captains, as also the air force, trained pilots. Thus, it is untrained leaders leading untrained soldiers.

Simultaneously, the PLA is modernising. It is developing capabilities to meet future challenges. Inputs on most of their inducted capabilities flow from Chinese media networks. What remains in doubt is whether these have truly been imbibed by the force and tested in battle-simulated exercises. In March this year, General He Weidong, the second highest-ranked member of the CMC, called for a crackdown on ‘fake combat capabilities’ of the PLA.

Xi is ruling through fear, cracking down at frequent intervals, and promoting those loyal rather than those professionally competent. For Xi, the PLA is more to ensure that the communist party continues to rule China rather than preparing it to win wars. Thus, he adopts a strategy of coercing other nations to toe the Chinese line by displaying Chinese military power as formidable while avoiding direct conflict. He is aware that a major conflict may not work for China’s benefit as the Russia-Ukraine war has displayed. This is evident in the Chinese strategy against Taiwan.

The fact that the PLA has not engaged in any major conflict since 1979 leaves many to doubt its ability to fight a major war, especially when its senior hierarchy is changed so frequently.

The author is a former Indian Army officer, strategic analyst and columnist. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.