How China’s ‘grey zone warfare’ keeps East and Southeast Asia on alert

China has imposed new coast guard rules as of June 15 onward, empowering its maritime force to detain foreign nationals in the South China Sea (SCS), which is claimed entirely by Beijing.

This latest legal warfare (or lawfare) by the ruling Communist Party of China as part of its grey zone warfare strategy is bound to fail as other SCS littorals fight back, as we have already seen in the military domain recently.

Over the past few months, Beijing’s three maritime forces—the CCP Navy, the CCP Coast Guard, and the CCP Maritime Militia—have significantly intensified their disruptive and bullying activities in the South and East China seas, demanding immediate attention.

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While the Philippines and Taiwan have been the primary targets of these strong-arming efforts, other countries in the region have also raised concerns over a clear escalation in China’s troublemaking.

From Vietnam and Indonesia to Japan and the Pacific Islands, no country in the maritime neighbourhood has been spared some Chinese escalation—either through physical maritime activities or legal and cartographic manipulation, economic coercion, or even political interference.

The mega CCP military exercise around Taiwan, Joint Sword, is a clear example of Beijing’s aggressive, expansionist, and escalatory intentions, which go far beyond the annexation of Taiwan.

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In general, the CCP has decided that its near seas must be kept churning to enable it to realise its near-term goal of strategic primacy in the Eastern Hemisphere.

It has been argued that China’s economic growth alone was enough to achieve this goal in time, but this approach didn’t suit Xi Jinping’s ambitions.

It is clear now that Xi aims to achieve regional dominance in the near term and has embraced ‘unrestricted grey zone warfare’ as the primary strategy.

Unrestricted, as in the CCP, is willing to exploit any and all domains—economic, information, law, energy, military, and more—to gain an advantage over its neighbours.

The grey zone implies that Beijing may not prefer direct action using the CCP’s military, which has emerged as one of the world’s largest and most modernised forces.

Actions will continue to be ‘below the legal threshold of military actions’ as the CCP poses as a peace-loving organisation committed to inclusive regional growth.

Warfare in this context is optimally suited to explain Beijing’s desired outcomes from these actions. All their activities across domains aim to gain influence and control—physical, fiscal, legal, and informational.

Thus, through unrestricted, grey zone warfare, Xi’s CCP is raising the stakes to become the ‘rulers’ of East and Southeast Asia.

It is essential to examine why such behaviour has been markedly rising recently. Some global observers have related this changed posture to elections in the US, where the CCP sees an opportunity to undermine democracy.

The ‘opportunity’ created by Western entanglement in the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas conflicts has also been suggested as a catalyst for the CCP’s new aggression.

However, the most likely reason is that the Chinese economy is tottering, and the CCP needs something ‘big’ to keep the people’s attention diverted elsewhere.

Since the end of the Cold War, the CCP has built a strong narrative of how other countries are working together to hurt China’s growth. These sentiments have been stoked multiple times whenever the CCP felt its grip on the country slip.

Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that while global events have enabled China’s rising aggression in its near seas, the primary reason remains the CCP’s domestic political compulsions.

However, the concomitant effects of this belligerence at sea would cause concern for Beijing.

In recent months, the ASEAN countries have come together more confidently to call for more responsible behaviour in the South China Sea while also individually countering the CCP’s excessive territorial claims in the region.

Indonesia and Vietnam have stepped up maritime security efforts in their maritime zones and challenged illegal Chinese activity in the Natuna and East Seas, respectively.

Malaysia has doubled down on energy explorations in ‘disputed’ waters—well, within its EEZ, but part of Beijing’s fraudulent ‘nine-dash line’ claims.

The Philippines remains the most vocal and exemplary opponent of the CCP’s harassment in the South China Sea.

In recent months, Chinese Coast Guard vessels and militia boats in the Philippines’ Second Thomas Shoals have repeatedly antagonised and assaulted naval and civilian ships dispatched by Manilla for legitimate maritime activity and missions.

The unsafe and irresponsible behaviour of CCP’s sea-based goons has been shown to the world repeatedly, which has effectively burst the false narratives of ‘win-win solutions’ and ‘peaceful rise’ long espoused by Chinese diplomats and leaders.

The responsible maritime nations of the world have worked closely with the Philippines in this effort.

Recently, an Indian Navy task force exercised with its Filipino counterparts in a clear statement of solidarity and mutual support.

The first Indian Brahmos missile battery was also recently delivered to the Philippines, significantly enhancing its deterrent capabilities.

Taiwan and Japan have also similarly re-adjusted their national and military policies and postures in readiness for a military escalation by the CCP.

Taiwan’s entire population has been prepared in preparation for Chinese military action, and the island nation has demonstrated a steely resolve to retain its independence.

The recent elections, in which the pro-democracy government was re-elected in Taipei, would have caused discontent in the CCP.

Similarly, Japan’s national sentiment has gradually shifted to acceptance of using military force to safeguard national interests against a belligerent CCP.

The constant provocations by the CCP Coast Guard and military aircraft, particularly around the Senkaku islands, have enabled a heightened military posture in Japan, which would further upset the strategic calculus in Beijing.

At the same time, security alignments in the region, like the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), have re-asserted their commitment to safeguarding the freedom of the seas and airways in the region despite Chinese interference and provocations.

ASEAN nations have also come together to enhance maritime security coordination and transparency unprecedentedly.

The maiden India-ASEAN maritime exercise held a few months ago is a testament to this trend of growing regional coordination to safeguard the peace and security of the region’s seas.

In summary, the CCP’s decision to flex its muscles at sea has led to growing regional resistance, as responsible countries have come together to confront the bully and defeat Beijing’s plans for the region.

However, countries in the region and beyond must remain alert to the CCP’s growing desperation to deliver on Xi’s grand ambitions.

In particular, the irresponsible and provocative posture of the CCP’s maritime forces has raised the risk of unintended military friction, which could rapidly escalate to conflict in the troubled waters of East and Southeast Asia.

NC Bipindra is the chairman of Law and Society Alliance, a New Delhi-headquartered think tank. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.